1995-1997: Commission
of Inquiry - Deployment to Somalia
These abuses led to a Royal Commission of Inquiry [established by Order in Council,
P.C. 1995-44, 20 March 1995] that revealed serious failures of leadership at
the highest levels of the Canadian Armed Forces [CAF] and the disbandment of
the CAR. The Inquiry
was headed by the Honorable Mr. Justice Gilles Létourneau, then judge of
the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada which held public hearings from late 1995
until the fall of 1996.
Study Paper “Controlling Misconduct in the Military
A comprehensive study paper was prepared by Professor Martin L. Friedland for
the Commission of Inquiry titled “Controlling Misconduct in the Military”. It was published in June 1997. In Chapter 7: Civil Control, Integration, and Oversight,
Dr. Friedland wrote that the 1994 report of the Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence
Policy had already concluded unanimously that Parliament’s role should
be strengthened:
“. . .whatever our individual views on particular issues of
defence policy or operations, there was one matter on which we agreed almost from
the beginning – that there is a need to strengthen the role of Parliament and
development of defence policy.”
Dr. Friedland went on to state that:
“Parliament
should receive more reports on military matters. There are [now] no annua reports to Parliament by the military or the department. . . .What type of
governmental structure could provide [an] effective review? The conclusion is
reached that two types of review is desirable. One is a body internal to the
military, comparable to the U.S. inspector General of the army. . . . The other
type of review should be by a civilian body outside the military that reports
to Parliament. . . [at 125]
Commission of Inquiry's Final Report recommended creation of Office of Inspector General
The
Commission of Inquiry’s 2,000 page long final report titled: “Dishonored Legacy:
the lessons of the Somalia Affair. [Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
the Deployment of the Canadian Forces to Somalia.] was also published in 1997.
The report contained 157 recommendations, the majority of which were aimed at
transforming the military justice system.
One
of its key recommendations aimed at ensuring both the oversight and accountability of the
military. This was outlined in Volume 2 of the Report (pages 399-406): as a matter of
high priority, the National
Defence Act needed to be amended to establish an independent Office of the Inspector General with
the following comprehensive powers, to:
· Bring
reports of wrongdoing to the attention of superiors;
·
Conduct
periodic reviews of appointment to key leadership positions to ensure that the
proper criteria are being applied and that such appointments are as competitive
as possible;
·
Receive
and investigate complaints about officer misconduct and about possible
injustices to CAF members;
·
Correct
or assist in correcting injustices to CAF members;
·
Inspect
all relevant documents, conduct interviews as may be necessary, review minor
disciplinary proceedings and administrative processes and make recommendations
flowing from recommendations;
·
Evaluate
systemic problems in the military justice system;
·
Conduct
investigations into officer misconduct, such as failure to investigate, failure
to take corrective action, personal misconduct, waste and abuse, and possible
injustice to individuals;
·
Protect
those who report wrongdoing from reprisals; and
·
Protect
individuals from abuse of authority and improper personnel actions, including
racial harassment
1998. Negative reaction of the Canadian military to the proposed IG appointment. An article published
by David J. Bercuson in the Canadian Military Journal (Volume 9, No3, 2009) summed
up the reaction of the Canadian military to these recommendations:
“The
initial reaction of the Canadian Forces on the whole was predictable; it
resisted change. It resented civilians telling it what it ought to do. [at 37]
The Department of National Defence rejected the Commission of Inquiry's recommendation for an IG. Instead, the office of the Ombudsman was created with a reporting structure directly to the Minister of National Defence was created and in
1998 the first Ombudsman was appointed. The office of the Ombudsman was set up
to resolve complaints of unfairness and maladministration in the Canadian Armed
Forces and the Department of National Defence. The office operates consistent with
the principles of ombudsmanry: fairness, independence, impartiality, and
confidentiality. However, the office of the Ombudsman does not
exist in legislation. Instead, its exists by way of Ministerial Directives
that can be withdrawn or modified at any time. The
Ombudsman is also reliant on the Deputy Minister of National Defence for financial
and human resources authorities.
Twenty-years later the Canadian military accepts the concept of an IG. In response to the recent several allegations made against the
most senior military leaders combined with a number of incidents of ineffective
chain of command and high-profile resignations, at the behest of the senior military
cadre, the Canadian Defence Academy prepared a Concept Paper dated April 12,
2021 whose purpose is to establish an Office of the IG. The paper recommended that the Chief of the Defence
Staff (CDS) recommend to the Minister of National Defence the creation of an Office
of the IG.
Most strangely, the concept paper proposes to appoint a
retired Lieutenant-General or a former CDS as the Inspector General who would be “responsive
to the CDS”. This proposal was the subject of a recent critical review by military
analyst, David Pugliese, of the National Post who writes
“. . . it would be a major mistake to have the military involved
in any way in the office of an inspector general. The appointee needs to be
seen and perceived as being totally independent and impartial
“The
appointee needs to be a ‘real civilian,’ not someone from the armed forces or
public service. .The Inspector General should not report to the CDS, the DM
or the Minister. . . The IG should be an officer of Parliament, such as the Auditor General or Privacy Commissioner.”