Saturday, November 21, 2026

Indonesian Constitutional Court summary of landmark military justice decision

The Constitutional Court of Indonesia has issued the following summary of the court's recent military justice decision:

If, within a maximum period of 2 (two) years from the date a quo decision is pronounced, the legislator hasn’t enacted amendments, then the Military Justice Law shall be deemed in conflict with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and shall have no binding legal force.

JAKARTA (MKRI) – The Constitutional Court (MK) has granted the entire petition for a judicial review of Law No. 31 of 1997 on Military Justice (Military Justice Law). The ruling hearing in Case No. 260/PUU-XXIII/2025, filed by Lenny Damanik and Eva Melina Br. Pasaribu, was held on Thursday, October 15, 2026 in the Plenary Courtroom.

Court is of the opinion that Law No. 31 of 1997 must be amended to include clear and definitive provisions regarding the definitions of military offenses and general (civilian) offenses, the jurisdictional boundaries between military and general courts on offenses committed by Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) personnel, the full integration of the military justice system under a single, unified structure; as well as regulations pertaining to military field courts and the necessary adjustments to procedural law.

“This includes the mechanism for resolving disagreements regarding the determination of the appropriate judicial forum for a case, specifically, instances where there is a dispute over whether a case should be brought before a military court or a general court, as stipulated in Article 43 paragraph (3) and Article 127 of Law No.  31 of 1997, the constitutionality of which has also been challenged or called into question by the Petitioners,” stated Constitutional Justice Enny Nurbaningsih while reading the legal considerations.

Court further observes that, although the Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the phrase “criminal offense” (tindak pidana) in Article 9, point 1 of Law No. 31 of 1997, requesting that it be interpreted as “military criminal offense”, a careful examination by the Court reveals that the phrase “criminal offense” in Article 9, point 1 of Law No. 31 of 1997 constitutes a highly essential provision, as it determines the substantive content of other provisions throughout Law No. 31 of 1997.

“Therefore, it is not possible for the Court to simply interpret the law as requested by the Petitioners in their petitum without restructuring Law No. 31 of 1997 in its entirety, in accordance with the mandates of Articles 65 and 74 of Law No. 34 of 2004, which are, in essence, the mandates of the reform movement as stipulated in Article 3, paragraph (4), letter a of MPR Decree No. VII/MPR/2000, as previously considered by the Court,” explained Justice Enny.

Restructuring to be Completed Within a Maximum of 2 Years

Regarding the restructuring of Law No. 31 of 1997, Justice Enny continued, the Constitutional Court has determined that the legislature requires a maximum period of 2 (two) years to implement amendments. This timeframe is considered sufficient to provide the legislature with the opportunity to undertake a fundamental reorganization, addressing the substantive issues discussed above, and to incorporate these changes into an amended version of Law No. 31 of 1997.

“Therefore, if the lawmakers fail to enact amendments within a maximum period of 2 (two) years, Law No. 31 of 1997 will automatically become inconsistent with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and cease to have any binding legal force (unconstitutional),” asserted Justice Enny.

Therefore, Justice Enny continued, the Petitioners’ argument, that the phrase “criminal offense” (tindak pidana) in the provision of Article 9, point 1 of Law No. 31 of 1997 is contrary to Article 24, paragraph (1) and Article 28D, paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, insofar as it is not interpreted as a “military criminal offense” (tindak pidana militer), is a well-founded argument. Consequently, the Petitioners’ arguments are entirely legally sound. Based on all the aforementioned legal considerations, it is evident that the phrase “criminal offense” in the provision of Article 9, point 1 of Law No. 31 of 1997 is inconsistent with the exercise of an independent judicial power and the guarantee of fair legal certainty, as stipulated in Article 24, paragraph (1) and Article 28D, paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, just as the Petitioners have argued.

“In this regard, since the Court’s considerations extend beyond the definition of the phrase ‘criminal offense’, which was deemed to raise issues of constitutionality, to encompass other provisions within Law No. 31 of 1997 that require restructuring due to a comprehensive revision of the Act, including matters raised in the arguments presented by the Petitioners, it follows that the Petitioners’ arguments are entirely well-founded in law,” stated Justice Enny.

Consequently, in the operative part of its decision, the Court granted the Petitioners' petition in its entirety. Furthermore, the Court declared that Law No. 31 of 1997 on Military Justice is contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and shall have no binding legal force, subject to the condition that it remains in effect unless amendments are made within a maximum period of 2 (two) years from the date this decision is pronounced.

“It is declared that if, within a maximum period of 2 (two) years from the date this a quo decision is pronounced, the legislator hasn’t enacted amendments, then Law No. 31 of 1997 on Military Justice shall be deemed in violation of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and shall have no binding legal force,” asserted Chief Justice Suhartoyo, as he read the verdict of Decision No. 260/PUU-XXIII/2025.

Friday, November 20, 2026

NIMJ releases Watson Article 32 documents

U.S. Air Force Major Jason Watson's preliminary hearing on September 18, 2026 was, as court-martial proceedings are required to be, open to the public. Some members of the media attended. But the main action inside the hearing was the submission of documentary evidence by both sides, followed after the hearing by the preliminary hearing officer's (PHO) written report. The public could not examine those documents... until today. 

The National Institute of Military Justice (NIMJ) pressed for full public-access rights, including the right to contemporaneous documents. The Air Force initially denied the request because the materials were deemed nonpublic and marked "CUI" (Controlled Unclassified Information). However, such a determination is inconsistent with what a federal judge ordered in another case, ProPublica v. Bligh. In response to NIMJ's demand, the Air Force today released the Watson Article 32 documents with the "CUI" label blacked out on each page. NIMJ posted the documents to CAAFlog. 

There is plenty of interest to the public in the released 260 pages. For ease of reference, every page number mentioned here refers to the PDF document page. Some highlights: 

Pages 1-20 contain the report of the PHO, U.S. Air Force Major Joshua J.Wendell. The report is well-reasoned and methodical. Wendell gives fair consideration to the evidence and a useful summation of First Amendment rights in the military context. He recommends that most of the charges proceed to general court-martial. I have some points of his analysis that I would like to revisit in another post, but overall, Major Wendell's effort is a credit to the U.S. military justice system. 

This is followed by letters from business records custodians from Bluesky (p. 34) and Substack (p. 60).  It is not unusual for military investigators to request digital records from social media companies, but this usually occurs in investigations of serious crimes such as murder and sexual assault. That the military sought these out in Major Watson's case for mere speech infractions shows how public attention on Watson's case motivated military officials to leave no stone unturned. 

 Page 65 - on to military standards. DoD Directive 1344.10 governs political activities by members of the armed forces. I wrote about it here. My take was that it permits far more activity than most people assume. 

Page 81 - the Air Force's standards on dress, wear of uniforms, and personal appearance from February 19, 2026. The memo is signed by the Air Force Assistant Secretary Richard L. Anderson. This is part of a trend in the second Trump administration of political appointees expanding their regulatory reach over the force. This guidance could have been signed by someone in uniform instead.  

Page 90 - rosters of Watson's leave requests. Not exactly a courtroom thriller. 

Page 109 - a written order from a Lieutenant Colonel to Watson ordering him to cease social media, public statements, or commit other offenses to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Department of War. The strange thing about the memo is that it is dated July 3, 2023 -- nearly two years before Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had ever uttered the words "Department of War." An unfortunate typo. 

Page 117 - Watson's lawyer Christopher Mutimer informs the government that his client will no longer wear his military uniform. 

Pages 118-186 - transcripts of Watson's statements. 

Pages 187-191 - defense evidence. The defense drew similarities to Marine LtCol Stuart Scheller, who spoke out against President Biden and then-former President Trump but did not receive as much pre-trial confinement as Watson. 

Pages 192-197 - Scheller's charge sheet. It is extensive. And it has never before been released to the public until today despite heavy public interest. 

Pages 201-205 - Watson's charge sheet. 

Pages 211-216 - emails between the PHO and attorneys. Military justice still conducts most business by email rather than a centralized case management system. This makes it harder to find out what is really happening in courts-martial. 

Page 217 - a written motion before the 32: the government did not want the defense to invoke Scheller comparisons. Major Heather Bruha wrote an excellent response for the defense -- a view which prevailed. 

 Page 236 - Watson's Article 32 statement. 

 Page 240 - the defense's Powerpoint during their argument. The defense leaned heavily into Scheller comparisons, who spoke out for weeks against the President. Scheller was later given a platform and a government position by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. 

The materials released did not include a transcript of the hearing.

The Air Force deserves credit for at least partially complying with the public-access requirement for courts-martial in Watson. Secrecy still reigns in most other military courts.  

Karnataka High Court, India calls for security organisations to examine Policies on Mental Health Assessment of Security Personnel

As reported by LiveLaw, the Karnataka High Court, India, has recently observed that security personnel who are entrusted with firearms must undergo periodic mental health assessments. Justice Suraj Govind, observed that the "Personnel entrusted with protecting the lives and safety of others must themselves be provided care, support and reasonable assistance when they face personal or mental health difficulties." 

The Bench also observed that the personnel serving in the armed forces are also experiencing grief, financial difficulties, illness in the family as well as other difficulties as normal human beings and stated that the "expectation that they must remain available for duty at all times, and discharge their responsibilities, come rain or shine, irrespective of their personal circumstances or mental condition, requires a change in institutional thinking. Discipline and dedication are essential, but cannot be demanded at the cost of ignoring basic human needs of personnel." 

The bench made the above observations in a case where a sub-inspector of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) had attempted to take her own life by shooting herself in the abdomen with her service weapon due to being unable to conceive. The sub-inspector had challenged the departmental inquiry instituted on her as well as a criminal case under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Court. She sought discharge from the criminal proceedings and quashing of the Departmental Proceedings. Placing reliance on Section 115 of the Mental Health Act, 2017 (Presumption of severe stress in case of attempt to commit suicide) the High Court allowed her prayer stating that the Respondents have not placed any material to rebut the presumption under Section 115.

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Another challenge to Pakistan's trial of civilians in courts-martial

Here we go again. Dawn reports here on developments in a case before the Lahore High Court. Like Uganda, Pakistan seems incapable of breaking this habit. Kudos to the lawyers who continue to fight the good fight.

While we are at the jurisdiction store, consider this report about the acquittal of a civilian in South Korea. "Although Boo is a civilian, the Military Secrets Protection Act gives military courts jurisdiction over charges of disclosing military secrets in the course of one's duties, so his first-trial proceedings were held in a military court."

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Recent developments in French military personnel law

Me Louis le Foyer de Costil of the Paris firm of Nausica Avocats has posted this useful summary of recent developments in French military personnel law. Bravo et encore!