Saturday, July 4, 2026

Supreme Court of India’s Arshnoor Kaur judgment – gender-neutrality v. gender-equality (guest post)

(Guest Post/Commentary by Ananya Sharma and Roopan Atwal on Arshnoor Kaur v. Union of India, the defining recent judgment by the Supreme Court of India on gender discrimination in the JAG of the Indian Army)

Half of our citizenry continued to face discrimination due to certain skewed, and perhaps, overlooked policies of an organization that otherwise takes pride in its fair, unassailable and invulnerable selection process, an organization otherwise known for its impeccable standards and ethos- the Indian Army. The judgment we discuss in this article reveals the institutional indirect discrimination perpetuated over the course of many years in the recruitment process for officership in the Judge Advocate General’s department, popularly also known as the JAG Branch.

A Bench of the Supreme Court of India recently struck down the Indian Army’s policy on induction of women in the JAG Branch wherein reservation for males had been introduced, a concept alien to the Constitution of India (See WP(C)772 of 2023 Arshnoor Kaur & Anr Vs Union of India & Ors decided on 11-08-2025). Not only was the entire selection process declared to be NOT “gender-neutral” and violative of fundamental rights of female candidates, but the bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan also directed the Army to publish a “joint merit list” for both male and female candidates.

The Petitioners, Ms Arshnoor Kaur, and Ms Astha Tyagi, challenged the Army’s policy for induction into JAG 2023 and had approached the Supreme Court for declaration of the said notification as ultra vires Articles 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. The Army earlier used to reserve vacancies based on gender with disproportionately high vacancies for men, later the policy was changed to a 50:50 basis with equal vacancies for both males and females. Even with this, women more meritorious than men were left out since the merit list was prepared based on gender and not jointly as is expected in any examination wherein both males and females are eligible to apply. The challenge was based on the ground that, (a) they were more meritorious, and (b) underwent identical selection parameters. It was pointed out that female candidates with higher marks were not selected by citing the 50:50 induction rule, and “operational and functional requirements” of the Indian Army, leading to indirect discrimination against them. They also argued that reservation of seats for men is a practice violative of Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India and contravenes law laid down by Courts based on constitutional principles that the State may discriminate only in favour of women.

While on the other hand, the flag-bearers of “Nari Shakti” (Women Power) - the Respondents argued that service in the Defence Forces cannot be equated with any other forms of service as all JAG officers are combatants, and the finalisation of their vacancies is based on war-time operational and functional requirements, urging the Court to view the JAG branch as not a mere legal advisory body to the Army but as a force of combatants to be potentially mobilised as and when required.

The publication of a common merit list for both men and women was also vehemently opposed by the Union of India on the pretext that the Services Selection Board Interviews (SSBs) for both categories were held separately. Citing the notifications / internal communications of the Army, the Union of India contended that the previous induction policy of 70:30 (Men: Women) had now been progressively and graciously liberalized to 50:50 in 2024, based on the recommendations of a study conducted by “expert members”. It was also submitted that declaring the said induction policy ultra vires and any judicial interference therein would undermine the “functioning and command of the Army”.

The Respondents argued that the practice of women’s induction in the Army finds its basis in the provision of Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 (“Act, 1950”) added by the Parliament in exercise of its power to limit the fundamental rights for the Armed Forces of the Union of India under Article 33 of the Constitution. Section 12 prohibits women’s induction in the Indian Army, except for when notified by the Central Government from time to time, and thus, the government was empowered to modify and restrict the induction of number of women in the Army and the extent thereof under Section 12.

The Petitioners, however, impressed upon the fact that any notification / communication issued by the Army cannot be seen to have a force of law or authority over the provisions of the Indian Constitution, especially when it was based on archaic views about the nature of war and the attributes required to qualify for combat roles. Further, it was argued that the eventuality of combat requirements was a dangerous ground to reject gender-neutrality, as it could also be used to endanger women’s intake in non-combat arms. The Petitioners thus, prayed for the Court to interpret the said policy in the context of the Constitution and the provisions of the Act, 1950.

Tuesday, June 30, 2026

International historical models of military criminal law

Zoltán Hautzinger, International Historical Models of Military Criminal Law, 17 J. Eur. Hist. of L. 182 (2026). Abstract:

Criminal law rules and criminal justice solutions applicable to soldiers, and within that, members of the armed forces and other organizations serving individual states, have developed according to different historical models. The value of these historical examples lies in how the specific criminal law rules applicable to soldiers relate to general criminal law rules and the application of criminal law. The most common approach is for military criminal law to conform to the criminal law rules applicable to everyone, if there are no specific rules for maintaining military order and discipline. Military criminal law is most specific when it is codified to the exclusion of general criminal law norms. After presenting the definition of military criminal law, this study aims to show the reader examples of the application of military criminal law in the legal systems of different countries.

Removability of non-Article III judges

Are judges of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, U.S. Tax Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Cases, the District of Columbia local courts, and -- drum roll -- the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces removable with or without cause? Consider this exchange from yesterday's decision in Trump v. Slaughter:

Majority opinion, per Roberts, C.J. (at 28):

Nor do we determine the fate of officials not before us. In particular, as the Solicitor General recognized at argument, the permissibility of tenure protections for the judges of “non-Article III courts,” such as the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims, is not “presented” or “briefed” in this case and poses a “different set of questions.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, 28. We leave those questions for another day. All we do today is recognize what has been clear for a century— that those who fall within the President’s “general administrative control” must be removable by the President at will. Myers, 272 U.S., at 135.

Dissenting opinion of Justice Sotomayor (at 44):

The majority, for example, suggests that its rule might not apply to adjudicatory agencies, including non-Article III courts like the Tax Court. See ante, at 28. That is welcome news, but why is it so? As the majority explains, it cannot be because such agencies are exercising judicial power. Adjudications by Executive Branch agencies “are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power.’” Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 305, n. 4 (2013); see ante, at 19. Nor, after today, is it obvious that such agencies could safely depend on a precedent like Wiener, which did address an adjudicatory agency but rested squarely on “[t]he philosophy of Humphrey’s.” 357 U.S., at 356. Still, the majority says, a narrow exception for non-Article III adjudicators might yet survive. If that is true, questions immediately arise: What, exactly, is the “‘different set of questions’” raised by these agencies?

Inside baseball question: if CAAF judges can be freely removed, what about CAAF Senior Judges?