AFT: IAF noncom has right to bail pending review of court-martial

India's Armed Forces Tribunal has ruled that a noncom convicted by court-martial may be released on bail pending action by statutory confirming authorities. Details here. Excerpt from The Tribune:

“The pendency of confirmation proceedings cannot be permitted to result in continued detention without due consideration of the applicant’s right to personal liberty, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,” the Tribunal’s Bench, comprising Justice Rajendra Menon and Lt Gen CP Mohanty, ruled.

“Merely because the process of confirmation of the findings and sentence awarded by a court martial is pending, the same cannot operate as an impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Tribunal to consider suspension of the sentence and grant of bail,” the Bench said.

Observing that the applicant had already undergone detention for a period of 35 days, which is more than half of the total sentence of two months’ detention, the Bench said that the period of detention already undergone shall necessarily be taken into account while computing the total period of sentence.

“Taking note of the aforesaid circumstances, we are satisfied that this is a fit case in which the sentence of detention deserves to be suspended and the applicant granted bail, pending confirmation of the findings and sentence by the competent authority, the Bench ruled while directing that the execution of the sentence of detention shall remain suspended pending confirmation, and the applicant be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond.

The Bench, however, made it clear that the suspension of sentence is confined to the punishment of detention only. Insofar as the punishment of reduction in rank is concerned, the same shall be given effect immediately upon confirmation of the findings and sentence by the competent authority, in accordance with law. There shall be no stay on the implementation of the said punishment, the Bench said.

Another civiian tried by court-martial in Uganda

Uganda stil hasn't gotten the memo. Its general court-martial has tried a civilian cab driver found wearing military clothing. Details here. African Charter jurisprudence forbids the trial of civilians by military courts.

Jury Selection Is Underway in the USS Cole Bombing Case, First Capital Case at Guantanamo Bay

That is the headline for a piece by Carol Rosenberg on Just Security.

Jury selection began Monday in the first capital case at Guantanamo Bay, with the court questioning the first 18 of up-to 200 U.S. military officers about their ability to sit impartially at the trial of a Saudi prisoner who is accused of conspiring in a terror attack on a U.S. Navy ship that killed 17 American sailors a quarter-century ago.

Suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole on Oct. 12, 2000, while it was on a refueling stop in Aden, Yemen. Besides those killed, 37 other sailors on the 312-member crew were injured.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 61, is accused of war crimes for allegedly helping to orchestrate the attack, and two others, at the behest of Osama bin Laden. He has been in U.S. custody since 2002 but was held by the CIA in black sites for the first four years, during which time he was tortured repeatedly. His treatment in U.S. custody has meant protracted pretrial hearings about which evidence can be used at the trial and whether he is even competent to be tried. Those pretrial hearings ended last week.

Empaneling 12 jurors and six alternates could take weeks. A total of 36 military officers were brought to the base over the weekend from a pool of 200 drawn from U.S. military bases around the world.

Monday, Col. Matthew Fitzgerald, the judge, told the first 18 candidates that the trial could last four-to-six months, or longer, but that he would recess for Thanksgiving and Christmas vacation.

Civilian convicted of offences against state cannot claim fundamental rights, govt says in report to LHC

That is the title of an article by Wajih Ahmad Sheikh, Dawn, November 2, 2026.

The Punjab government has told the Lahore High Court that civilians convicted of offenses against the state cannot claim constitutional protection of their fundamental rights.

The argument arose in the case of Hassaan Khan Niazi, nephew of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. A military court sentenced Niazi to ten years' imprisonment for his alleged involvement in the May 9, 2023, disturbances at Jinnah House, the residence of Lahore's Corps Commander.

Niazi challenged his transfer to military custody and subsequent court-martial. The government urged the High Court to dismiss his petition. It argued that Niazi owed his first duty of loyalty to the state and could not pursue a constitutional challenge after his conviction.

The Ministry of Defence separately argued that Pakistan's Constitution bars the High Court from reviewing proceedings involving persons subject to the Pakistan Army Act. It also maintained that Niazi must pursue his pending appeal through the military appellate system.

The government relied on a May 2025 Supreme Court decision that upheld military trials of civilians while retaining a statutory right of appeal. It contended that the decision did not authorize a separate constitutional challenge.

The case raises a fundamental question: Does conviction by a military court merely restrict a civilian's avenues of appeal, or does it extinguish constitutional protections against unlawful state action?

The Lahore High Court has yet to resolve that question.

AFL Deserves Commendation, But Military Discipline Must Go Beyond Administrative Dismissal

That's the headline to a piece in the The New Dawn (Liberia), 28 October 2026.

The decision by the High Command of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to dishonorably discharge two soldiers following the physical abuse of a civilian woman in Thinkers Village, Paynesville, deserves public commendation. It demonstrates an important commitment to military discipline professional accountability, and the protection of civilians against the abuse of military authority.

According to the reported circumstances, [two] soldiers abandoned their assigned duties to intervene in a private disagreement involving Sergeant Menyon’s girlfriend. What should have remained a minor civilian dispute allegedly escalated into an unacceptable demonstration of military intimidation and physical violence.

Major General Forleh and the AFL High Command therefore deserve recognition for refusing to tolerate misconduct simply because the perpetrators wore military uniforms.

Nevertheless, an important legal and institutional question remains: Why were the soldiers immediately transferred to the Liberia National Police for criminal investigation instead of first being subjected to the applicable military justice procedures under Liberia’s Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)?

The article takes issue with the decision to administratively separate them rather than court-martial them.

Major General Davidson Forleh and the AFL High Command deserve commendation for demonstrating that military uniforms do not place soldiers above accountability.

Their swift condemnation of the alleged abuse sends an important message that the Armed Forces of Liberia must never become an instrument of intimidation against the very citizens they are sworn to protect.

Nevertheless, Liberia must move beyond the symbolism of disrobing soldiers before cameras.

The real test of military professionalism is not how quickly a commander removes a uniform, but how faithfully the institution applies the law governing those who wear it.

The National Defense Act of 2008 and Liberia’s applicable Uniform Code of Military Justice must remain central to military discipline and accountability.

Administrative dismissal should never be treated as an automatic substitute for military prosecution where military law requires or permits such proceedings.