Canada's Military Police Complaints Commission releases Major Cristian Hiestand Public Interest Investigation

Tim Dunne

The previous issue of The Observatory described the tragic suicide of RCAF flying instructor Major Cristian Hiestand.

On 25 November 2021, military police (MP) at Canadian Forces Base Moose Jaw received a complaint that the Complainant (identified as “C”) was twice sexually assaulted by her former boyfriend, Major Hiestand, a Royal Canadian Air Force flight instructor. MPs with the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (Western Region) arrested and charged Major Hiestand with two counts of sexual assault.  On 17 January 2022 he died by suicide.

His mother and sister filed complaints with the Military Police Complaints Commission alleging that the military police investigation was flawed, that investigators did not interview Hiestand before laying charges and failed to gather or consider evidence such as relevant text messages. Surprisingly, a former MP who served at the military police detachment that handled Hiestand's case a filed a third complaint alleging:

1. A warrant officer failed to ask the complainant whether she preferred to be interviewed by a female officer.
2. The warrant officer made an unprofessional remark about why the complainant had not gone to the local civilian police instead.
3. A sergeant returned to assist with the investigation while allegedly off duty and intoxicated.
4. Inexperienced military police members were assigned to conduct the interview and take notes.
5. The victim interview was not audio- or video-recorded even though recording equipment was available.
6. An unidentified support person was allowed to sit in on the interview before being properly identified later.  

On 21 November 2022, almost exactly a year after his death, the MPCC launched a public interest investigation into these complaints and others about how the case was initially handled by a local detachment.  

The MPCC’s review focused on whether the military police conducted an impartial and thorough investigation, including appropriate evidence collection and procedural oversight. Both MPCC’s reports, released 4 February 2026 by Chair Tammy Tremblay, found significant shortcomings in the military police’s handling — describing the investigation as rushed, affected by “tunnel vision” or confirmation bias, seriously flawed and characterized by “undue haste,” and inadequate investigative rigor. It concluded that key investigative steps were missed, such as pursuing relevant witness interviews and properly evaluating evidence before charging, and it called attention to supervisory failures. The MPCC also recommended reforms to improve accountability and investigative standards, including greater consultation with prosecutors in sensitive cases.[1]  

The report found that investigators prematurely formed the belief that a sexual assault had occurred and focused primarily on evidence supporting that conclusion while failing to adequately pursue potentially exculpatory information.

For example, “One of the significant failings in the CFNIS investigation was the lack of systemic examination of key text messages, despite investigators having access to them as of the night of November 29, 2021. 

“[O]n the night of November 29, 2021, at 22:00 hrs, MCpl ***** began downloading the contents of C’s cell phone via a Data Pilot device. Her Security and Military Police Information System (SAMPIS) notes indicate the process took some six hours, completing at 04:00 hrs on the morning of November 30, 2021. As per the disclosure received by the MPCC regarding this information, the text messaging information alone resulted in 1,299 pages of data. Regarding the messages which pertain solely to exchanges with Maj Hiestand, the Forensic Report prepared by Tech Services on January 18, 2022, indicates the extremely high volume of information that was extracted: 121 calls and 7,363 texts.

“MCpl ***** admitted in her interview with PS to conducting only a “cursory” five-minute review of the text messages on the night of November 29, 2021, prior to downloading the data into the Data Pilot.

“MCpl ***** described accessing specific text messages to bolster her grounds for arrest, yet her notebook entries do not reflect this.”[2]

Major Hiestand was given an opportunity to provide a statement to investigators but declined to do so on legal advice. The MPCC determined that investigators nonetheless had an obligation to continue gathering and assessing all available evidence before recommending charges. The report criticized investigators for not interviewing several potentially important witnesses, failing to fully analyze text messages and digital communications, and neglecting to adequately examine contextual evidence relating to consent, intoxication, and the interactions between the complainant and Hiestand before and after the alleged incident. The Commission also found that forensic evidence had not yet been fully processed when the decision to arrest and charge was made.

The MPCC further identified deficiencies in supervisory oversight and case management within the CFNIS. Supervisors failed to ensure investigative objectivity, did not sufficiently challenge assumptions made by investigators, and allowed the case to progress without confirming that investigative standards had been met. The report stated that this lack of oversight contributed to tunnel vision and a “rush to judgment,” undermining both fairness and public confidence in the military justice system.

 

While the Commission did not conclude that the investigation directly caused Major Hiestand’s suicide, it acknowledged the profound personal and professional consequences of the arrest and charging process. The report emphasized that investigators must remain aware of the serious impacts criminal allegations can have on accused persons, complainants, families, and military communities. The MPCC stressed that balanced and thorough investigations are essential not only for accountability and victim support, but also for protecting procedural fairness and the integrity of the justice system.

 

The investigation resulted in 13 recommendations directed at improving military police investigative practices, especially in sexual assault cases. These recommendations included enhanced training on confirmation bias and investigative neutrality, stronger supervisory review, improved documentation practices, more comprehensive evidence assessment requirements, and clearer standards governing when charges should be laid. The MPCC also called for measures to reduce tunnel vision and reinforce investigators’ obligations to seek both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

 

The final report framed the Hiestand case as a cautionary example of how investigative bias, insufficient oversight, and premature decision-making can compromise justice outcomes. It urged the Canadian military policing system to adopt reforms aimed at restoring confidence, improving professionalism, and ensuring fair, evidence-based investigations in future cases.

 

“I am troubled by the CFPM’s weak and dismissive response to recommendations grounded in clear and serious investigative failings,” Chair Tammy Tremblay commented. “These recommendations were designed to strengthen investigative experience, procedures, supervision, and case management in sexual assault investigations, all of which were plainly deficient here. Yet, in response to 13 recommendations, none were accepted by the CFPM. Despite the extensive problems documented in this report, the CFPM was unable to acknowledge the need for improvement in any of the areas addressed.

 

 “Given the facts of this case, such complacency is astonishing. The family, and indeed the members of the military police, deserve better. Without a willingness to confront these shortcomings and commit to meaningful change, the systemic issues highlighted in this investigation will remain unaddressed, to the detriment of future military police investigators, complainants and the integrity of military policing as a whole. It is imperative that the CFPM swiftly implement these recommendations to ensure that all future investigations are conducted to the high standards of rigour, impartiality, and professionalism that Canadians expect and that members of the Canadian Forces deserve.”^[3]

    

---

[1] https://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/public-interest-investigations-and-hearings-enquetes-et-audiences-dinteret-public/hiestand-investigation-enquete/pii-eip-2022-017-041-fnl-rpt-eng.html

[2] Ibid, p. 29-30.

[3] Ibid, pp. 68-69.

Bill C-11 and the role of Parliamentary Committees

This past week, there were significant developments in Canadian military law that proceeded without much fanfare.  And the reason for the lack of publicity may have been the manner in which Bill C-11 was yet again altered.

On Monday, 25 May 2026, Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the National Defence Act and other Acts (but which is often characterized by its short title, the "Military Justice Modernization Act") passed Third Reading in the House of Commons. 

This Bill had been the subject of significant debate and examination in Committee (specifically, the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence).  One of the key results of the Committee hearings was that complainants and victims of sexual misconduct would be given greater voice in whether allegations relating to offences of a sexual nature would be prosecuted in the civilian criminal justice system or in the military justice system.  Significant amendments were made to the proposed Bill.

To be fair, the amendments were hastily, and imperfectly, drafted.  In part, that is what comes from trying to improved flawed policy changes.  No matter the amendments, if select premises reflect flawed reasoning, those flaws will remain.  It calls to mind images of "sows' ears" and "silk purses".

The amendments reflected a broad consensus among all opposition parties (but not the party in government).  The fact that there was consensus across representatives of the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the Bloc Québécois (BQ) is not an insignificant factor.  These parties have widely divergent platforms.  But they all agreed that the proposed legislation needed improvement.  And these suggestions were borne out of significant and diverse testimony before the Parliamentary Committee.

Of note, these amendments were offered when the governing Liberal Party of Canada (LPC) was a minority government.  Over the past few months, the LPC has obtained a thin majority government through three recent by-elections and several notorious incidents of CPC (and one NDP) Members of Parliament (MP), "crossing the floor" to join the LPC.  [An earlier by-election was held last August in the CPC stronghold of Battle River-Crowfoot, Alberta, in which the Leader of the CPC, Pierre Poilievre, ran in the seat vacated by one of his MPs, after Poilievre had lost his seat in the General Election at the end of April 2025.] 

The recent by-elections resulted in the LPC maintaining seats in the three contested constituencies, but, in total, the LPC has managed to establish a thin majority (due to the floor-crossings).  Of the 343 seats in the House of Commons, the LPC now holds 174.  The minimum necessary to form a majority government is 172.  [After the General Election, a little over a year ago, the LPC held only 169 seats.]

After the LPC obtained a majority, they moved to reconfigure the distribution of Committees, including that of National Defence, and undid the Committee-recommended amendments to Bill C-11.

Following these changes, the BQ, the NDP, and the Green party voted with the LPC government in support of Bill C-11, in what can be described as its "original" form.

Australian "weaponisation inquiry" report issued

The Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force has issued the 89-page report of the Inquiry into the Weaponisation of the Military Justice System, which can be found here. The Inquiry's conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

CONCLUSION 1: ADF discipline processes provide greater transparency and more robust safeguards, compared with administrative processes, contributing to higher levels of fairness and confidence in the military justice system.

RECOMMENDATION 1: Where conduct may disclose a Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 offence, the ADF consider discipline action in the first instance.

NOTE: The Defence Force Discipline Amendment (RCDVS Implementation and Related Measures No. 1) Bill 2026 [hyperlink added] is consistent with the intent of this recommendation. The Bill intends, among other measures, to create a ‘summary contravention scheme’ to enable minor disciplinary matters to be addressed more efficiently without compromising fairness. Defence Force Discipline Amendment (RCDVS Implementation and Related Measures No. 1) Bill 2026, Explanatory Memorandum, para 2.

CONCLUSION 2: Involuntary termination of service is confronting for ADF members and may give rise to concerns of unfairness if it is perceived to be arbitrarily applied. Decisions to end an ADF member’s service on the basis that it is not in the interests of the Defence Force should therefore be initiated and finalised consistently and at appropriate levels to maintain fairness and confidence in the military justice system. While unit commanders must retain operational discretion as to whether particular members should serve under their command, they should not have authority to use the potential termination of ADF service as a means of leverage over personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The Chief of the Defence Force withdraw commanding officers’ delegations to initiate termination of an ADF member’s service on the grounds that their service is not in the interests of the Defence Force.

CONCLUSION 3: The use of the terms ‘dismissal’ in disciplinary processes and ‘termination’ and ‘early end of service’ in administrative processes, to describe essentially the same outcome, create confusion and undermines confidence in the military justice system. This confusion is reinforced, and gives rise to a perception of ‘double jeopardy’, when an ADF member’s service is involuntarily administratively terminated or ended early after a Service tribunal declines to impose a punishment of ‘dismissal’ following a discipline trial.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Relevant legislation and policy be amended to harmonise the terms ‘dismissal’, ‘termination’ and ‘early end of service’.

Not military justice, but . . . HIV+ case to be reheard en banc

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has voted to rehear en banc the case of Wilkins v. Hegseth. According to The Advocate:

A federal appeals court has revived a major challenge to the U.S. military’s HIV enlistment ban, reopening a closely watched case that could determine whether people living with HIV can continue to be categorically barred from serving.

In an order issued May 18, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed to rehear Wilkins v. Hegseth, vacating a February ruling by a three-judge panel that upheld the Pentagon’s restrictions on recruits living with HIV. The rare move resets the case and gives advocates another opportunity to dismantle one of the military’s last remaining HIV-specific exclusions.

The court's order can be found here.

New judges sworn in in Paraguay

La Tribuna has the story here. The Supreme Court of Military Justice now consists of Brigadier General Julio Vargas Alonso and Military Justice Colonel Zulma Vargas Villamayor. The court's alternate member is Military Justice Colonel Sandra Gómez de Molinas.

The extended arm gesture is not a salute; it is used for oath taking. As in this image.