After years of preparation, the Botswana Defence Force has an updated military justice system. The new system is outlined in this video.
Global Military Justice Reform
Sunday, February 1, 2026
Bad day at the gym
El País has this report on yet another disciplinary case from Spain's Guardia Civil. To set the stage:
It all happened on April 1, 2022. The officer, who was in charge of guarding the gym at the Prime Minister's Office Security Department, was on the afternoon shift. Before starting work, he ate some tapas and drank two beers in the cafeteria. While he was at his post, two colleagues arrived with a bottle of gin, which the three of them drank with Coca-Cola. Thus, the Civil Guard officer "not only allowed the introduction and consumption of alcohol in the gym, but also participated in its consumption," the court emphasizes. Four hours later, around 7:15 p.m., two other uniformed officers arrived, including Sánchez's then-head of security. By then, the sanctioned officer already showed clear signs of having consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. In fact, without the ruling describing any trigger, the officer "lowered his trousers and exposed his buttocks, while dancing and squatting."
What punishment would you impose?
No exit
IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Randy J. GALLIANO, Seaman Apprentice (E-2), U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant
Docket No. 1514
ORDER TO REPRESENT APPELLANT
On 8 September 2025, Appellant was convicted at special court-martial and sentenced to reduction to E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. The case was referred to this Court on 20 November 2025.
On 15 January 2026, Appellate Defense Counsel filed a Notice of No Authority to Represent Appellant, asserting that she had been unable to contact Appellant and did not “intend to file any substantive pleading before this Court.”
Article 65 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) directs that the record of trial of a case in which a bad-conduct discharge has been adjudged be forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review under Article 66(b)(3), UCMJ. Article 70, UCMJ, requires that appellate defense counsel be detailed and shall represent an accused before the Court of Criminal Appeals when requested by the accused or when the United States is represented by counsel. The appellate rights notice in the record of trial, acknowledged by Appellant’s signature, states that military counsel will be appointed to represent him. Rule 11 of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “Upon docketing of a case, the appropriate Judge Advocate General or designee shall, unless previously done, designate appellate military counsel to represent the parties . . .” Thus the United States, as well as the accused, is represented in every case before the Court of Criminal Appeals.
In these circumstances, counsel’s authority to represent Appellant stems not solely from the client’s direction or consent but also from counsel’s military duty upon being detailed. This conclusion is supported by United States v. Sink, 27 M.J. 920, 921 (A.C.M.R. 1989) (“[C]ounsel contends that he is precluded from representing the appellant on appeal because he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with him . . . . We disagree. . . . [His] duty of representation can be met effectively in most cases without the appellant’s knowledge or active participation.”); United States v. Harper, 80 M.J. 540, 542 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (“Given . . . the lack of any affirmative action by Appellant either to waive his right to representation or to withdraw his case from appellate review, we conclude that appellate defense counsel not only has the authority, but is statutorily required to represent Appellant, to the best of her ability, notwithstanding her inability to locate or communicate with him.”); United States v. May, 47 M.J. 478, 481-82 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (“Where individual civilian counsel's failure to act is working to the detriment of an appellant, military appellate counsel may not stand by idly, because they remain responsible for protecting the interests of their client. * * * As officers of the court as well as appellate defense counsel, military counsel had an obligation to . . . protect the interests of their client.”)
Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 22nd day of January 2026,
ORDERED:
That Appellate Defense Counsel shall represent Appellant and file assignments of error and brief not later than thirty days from the date of this order.
Is this Order correct? If you were SA Galliano's appellate defense counsel, what would you do in light of it?
Friday, January 23, 2026
Government Accountability Project military whistleblowing guide
The Government Accountability Project has released a Military Whistleblowing Guide to help military personnel understand their whistleblowing rights and protections. GAP helped write and amend the Military Whistleblower Protection Act. Last year, it realized how few resources existed explaining the mechanics of what whistleblowing looks like for service members. "This guide’s our attempt to fill that gap by walking through the laws, how they’re enforced, and what to expect when a service member needs to report wrongdoing or challenge retaliation."
Thursday, January 22, 2026
How's this for an op-ed headline: "Lt Samuel Kamalesan’s dismissal for religious stand shows colonial mindset. Army must end it"
Lt Gen (ret) H.S. Panag of the Indian Army has written this thoughtful column about a recent Supreme Court case involving religious observance in the armed forces. Excerpt:
Since around 1990, religion has been dominating the national discourse. It has polarised politics and society, and there has been a very assertive and visible resurgence of the majority religion in the public domain. The minorities, forever perceiving an existential threat, have followed suit.
Despite the younger generation of the armed forces being a product of this society, the macro-level secular military ethos, rules and regulations, and military law have prevented any adverse fallout, even with the flawed composition and religious practices.
However, there should be no doubt that the secular military ethos is under stress, which is compounded by the unethical conduct of a section of the military hierarchy.
Either for personal gains in the form of promotions or post-retirement benefits, or what is even more disturbing, due to conviction, a number of senior officers are publicly identifying with political ideology seeped in civilisational past and religion. They are literally in competition with each other to be seen in religious places, hobnobbing with religious leaders, linking military events to mythological religious past, and giving new religious names to organisations.
This is a very dangerous trend for an institution in which it is expected that a soldier shed his personal beliefs and identity to be subsumed by the organisation’s collective apolitical and secular ethos.