Thursday, August 20, 2026

Permanent Commission denied to Women Officers due to inadequate Infrastructure : Indian Coast Guard submits before the Supreme Court of India

In a rather peculiar exchange reported by Livelaw, it appears that the Indian Coast Guard has been unable to extend the benefit of Permanent Commission to its women officers on account of "qualitative" differences between the Indian Coast Guard ("ICG") and the Indian Navy when it comes to "infrastructure". The petitioner who approached the Supreme Court of India highlighted that the ICG also denies having a policy for grant of Permanent Commission to women officers. 

The Petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Commandant (General Duty Women) in the year 2009 and subsequently was promoted to the post of Commandant (JG) in the year 2021, when she submitted her request for permanent absorption into the ICG. No action was taken on her request for over a year after which she was informed that the Ministry of Defence Letter dated 25 February 2019, which extended the grant of permanent commission to women, did not apply to the ICG and that no procedure existed for induction of women in the permanent cadre at the time of her enrolment. Consequently, the Petitioner was released in December, 2023. 

Pertinently, the petitioner has around 4500 hours of flying experience which is more than both men and women officers. She also highlighted that the ICG denied her Child Care Leave while she was in service and she had to leave her 15 month old baby behind to join service in the Andamans and Nicobar Islands during her tenure. 

While the above sad state of affairs show nothing short of pervasive institutional discrimination against women officers, the submissions by the State during the proceedings reveals a mindset problem and direct discrimination. The State blatantly submitted that permanent commission was being denied to women officers due to "certain special facilities required for women" being absent in ICG. 

Unimpressed by the above submission, the Supreme Court of India observed in no uncertain terms that "If she (Petitioner) is absorbed by them (ICG) themselves, fine. If not, we will pass an order. We can't allow an officer to be humiliated like this. From the list of eligible officers, we find she is the senior most. Let them show sportsmanship." 

On the alleged lack of infrastructure when compared to the Indian Navy, the Apex Court noted that - It (the difference) is not of such nature that they can be deprived completely" and that "Hyper-technical objections will not work. If you have a system for men officers, how can you deny [PC] to women officers?

Old Wine In New Bottle: British Military Justice System Remains Broken

A recently leaked British Ministry of Defense report details how (at least according to the BBC, which fails to link to the actual report it cites) its new-ish Defence Serious Crime Command (DSCC) is plagued by similar issues that led to its creation:  primarily, the lack of sufficiently trained and resourced investigators as well as insufficient support to victims, particularly in the arena of military sexual assaults. 

The creation of the DSCC in 2022 was animated by the need to "to investigate serious crimes independently, outside the military's chain of command." Unlike in the U.S. military justice system, in which commanders still (despite structural conflicts of interest plus lack of training and experience) retain prosecutorial discretion over the bulk of crimes found in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Brits rightly moved prosecutorial discretion away from commanders to lawyers outside of the chain of command starting back in 1996, with additional statutory reform in 2006. 

Despite being far ahead of the U.S. in recognizing & remedying the dysfunction and unfairness of military commanders wielding prosecutorial discretion,  the Brits are apparently still struggling with the need for greater resourcing & professionalization of criminal investigations. 

As with the U.S. military, the deleterious effects of such mismanagement are felt by individual British service members, who for example -- at least according to this reporting -- don't feel confident that their allegations will be taken seriously. 

At least the British military is seemingly supported by its leadership in fixing these issues to a far greater degree than across the pond, where the U.S.military is commanded by a president who was found by a jury to to have committed sexual assault and has joked about grabbing women by their genitalia -- and further "led" (I use the word loosely) by a Secretary of Defense who was credibly accused (just read the report) of sexual assault and is more worried about how much testosterone American troops have than about making those in uniform more confident that their allegations of sexual assault will be taken seriously (ps:  what I believe was criminally reckless behavior by U.S. Navy military commanders led to a young U.S. service woman's brutal murder at the hands of a fellow Navy service member last year; murderer went to jail, but same leadership & same broken system will, I fear, lead to more sexual assaults and murders of young American women in uniform ... far more needs to be done in the memory of Vanessa Guillen and Angelina Resendiz, and for all who volunteer to wear the American military uniform).

Whelan v Canada, 2026 FC 923: Is this a chink in the Crown's justiciability armour?

A little over a month ago, Madam Justice Nowak of the Federal Court (now retired) handed down a decision regarding the justiciability of actions against the Crown brought by members (or former members) of the Canadian Forces (CF).  In light of intervening developments, the significance of this decision remains uncertain, but Justice Nowak's decision and reasons are worth examining:

Whelan v Canada, 2026 FC 923

Some background will assist in understanding the trajectory of this litigation.

Friday, August 14, 2026

2025 edition of Chief Judge Maggs's compendium of UCMJ amendments

Thanks to GW Law's Jacob Burns Law Library's handy Military Justice Research Guide, readers can access CAAF Chief Judge Gregory E. Maggs's compendium of Amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice Since 1950 (2025 edition). The document, available here, was last updated June 25, 2025.

Saturday, August 8, 2026

The forgotten half of the duty to disobey: Knowing illegality

I have studied and taught the law of superior orders in military criminal law for the past five years. When first encountering it, I remember being surprised at its complexity—a complexity largely unknown to the public, or even to most JAGs with whom I discussed it. Most seemed to know that there were lawful orders and unlawful orders, and that this distinction mattered. But few knew much beyond this. The statements provided by some of the six lawmakers in the now-infamous “Don’t give up the ship” video reflect this, with Representative Chris Deluzio erroneously claiming that servicemembers “must” disobey unlawful orders.

What is conceptually elusive to most observers, and to Representative Deluzio, is that there is a legal “gray” zone in which an unlawful order can be either disobeyed or obeyed, with both options resulting in a criminal law defense. This is the zone of orders that are apparently lawful but technically unlawful; another way of describing this is the zone of orders that do not rise to the level of patently unlawful orders. Here, obedience results in a criminal law excuse for the conduct commanded, while disobedience results in acquittal at trial once a judge has adjudicated that the order was unlawful. Thus, it is not true that “unlawful” orders must be disobeyed. This is only true of patently unlawful orders (as well as another category to be discussed below). In the wake of the video’s released, critical reaction has centered on this error.

Public attention on the Caribbean boat strikes at times focuses, appropriately, on this question: did the orders rise to the level of manifest or patent illegality, as in the case of the My Lai Massacre?

While I am glad that the public conversation is now accounting for the nuance between patently unlawful orders and technically unlawful orders, I have noticed that there is something missing: The duty to disobey applies even to non-patently unlawful orders if the defendant (I will use this term instead of “accused”) knew the orders were unlawful. As stated in the canonical case, United States v. Calley:


"The acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him by his superior are excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superior's order is one which a man of ordinary sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if the order in question is actually known to the accused to be unlawful."

United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (1973) (emphasis added). This is appropriate for a mistake-of-law-based excuse in criminal law: There can be no mistake, after all, if the defendant knows the order is unlawful. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 224 (1982).

One can forgive most commentators for forgetting about this half of the duty to disobey: There are no reported military cases in which a court found that a defendant possessed subjective knowledge of orders’ illegality. It is unlikely, after all, that those who are on the receiving end of an order—lower-level officers and enlisted—would be privy to the determination of an order’s lawfulness vel non.

There is one class of servicemembers, though, who are uniquely privileged on this count: military lawyers, and especially military lawyers who are involved in the decision-making leading up to the issuance of the order. These lawyers are able to witness and participate in the deliberation that results in an unlawful order, including any willful distortions of fact or law. Since they are trained in law, they will know, more than the lower-level servicemember, if an order is technically unlawful even though it is not patently unlawful. In such a case, military lawyers have a duty to disobey that order and have a duty to not facilitate its promulgation. Since military lawyers will more likely possess actual knowledge regarding an order’s illegality, they will more often be held to the higher standard that is imposed on most others only in cases of patently unlawful orders.

It is said that the military “‘is the executive arm’ whose ‘law is that of obedience,’” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974), but this cannot be true with respect to military lawyers. No lawyer, even a lawyer in uniform, can be permitted to turn off his or her brain when it spots illegality. In doing so, she would cease to be a lawyer in any real sense. In recognizing the duty to disobey orders one knows to be unlawful, the law reflects this higher burden.