Jury Selection Is Underway in the USS Cole Bombing Case, First Capital Case at Guantanamo Bay

That is the headline for a piece by Carol Rosenberg on Just Security.

Jury selection began Monday in the first capital case at Guantanamo Bay, with the court questioning the first 18 of up-to 200 U.S. military officers about their ability to sit impartially at the trial of a Saudi prisoner who is accused of conspiring in a terror attack on a U.S. Navy ship that killed 17 American sailors a quarter-century ago.

Suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole on Oct. 12, 2000, while it was on a refueling stop in Aden, Yemen. Besides those killed, 37 other sailors on the 312-member crew were injured.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 61, is accused of war crimes for allegedly helping to orchestrate the attack, and two others, at the behest of Osama bin Laden. He has been in U.S. custody since 2002 but was held by the CIA in black sites for the first four years, during which time he was tortured repeatedly. His treatment in U.S. custody has meant protracted pretrial hearings about which evidence can be used at the trial and whether he is even competent to be tried. Those pretrial hearings ended last week.

Empaneling 12 jurors and six alternates could take weeks. A total of 36 military officers were brought to the base over the weekend from a pool of 200 drawn from U.S. military bases around the world.

Monday, Col. Matthew Fitzgerald, the judge, told the first 18 candidates that the trial could last four-to-six months, or longer, but that he would recess for Thanksgiving and Christmas vacation.

Civilian convicted of offences against state cannot claim fundamental rights, govt says in report to LHC

That is the title of an article by Wajih Ahmad Sheikh, Dawn, November 2, 2026.

The Punjab government has told the Lahore High Court that civilians convicted of offenses against the state cannot claim constitutional protection of their fundamental rights.

The argument arose in the case of Hassaan Khan Niazi, nephew of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. A military court sentenced Niazi to ten years' imprisonment for his alleged involvement in the May 9, 2023, disturbances at Jinnah House, the residence of Lahore's Corps Commander.

Niazi challenged his transfer to military custody and subsequent court-martial. The government urged the High Court to dismiss his petition. It argued that Niazi owed his first duty of loyalty to the state and could not pursue a constitutional challenge after his conviction.

The Ministry of Defence separately argued that Pakistan's Constitution bars the High Court from reviewing proceedings involving persons subject to the Pakistan Army Act. It also maintained that Niazi must pursue his pending appeal through the military appellate system.

The government relied on a May 2025 Supreme Court decision that upheld military trials of civilians while retaining a statutory right of appeal. It contended that the decision did not authorize a separate constitutional challenge.

The case raises a fundamental question: Does conviction by a military court merely restrict a civilian's avenues of appeal, or does it extinguish constitutional protections against unlawful state action?

The Lahore High Court has yet to resolve that question.

AFL Deserves Commendation, But Military Discipline Must Go Beyond Administrative Dismissal

That's the headline to a piece in the The New Dawn (Liberia), 28 October 2026.

The decision by the High Command of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to dishonorably discharge two soldiers following the physical abuse of a civilian woman in Thinkers Village, Paynesville, deserves public commendation. It demonstrates an important commitment to military discipline professional accountability, and the protection of civilians against the abuse of military authority.

According to the reported circumstances, [two] soldiers abandoned their assigned duties to intervene in a private disagreement involving Sergeant Menyon’s girlfriend. What should have remained a minor civilian dispute allegedly escalated into an unacceptable demonstration of military intimidation and physical violence.

Major General Forleh and the AFL High Command therefore deserve recognition for refusing to tolerate misconduct simply because the perpetrators wore military uniforms.

Nevertheless, an important legal and institutional question remains: Why were the soldiers immediately transferred to the Liberia National Police for criminal investigation instead of first being subjected to the applicable military justice procedures under Liberia’s Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)?

The article takes issue with the decision to administratively separate them rather than court-martial them.

Major General Davidson Forleh and the AFL High Command deserve commendation for demonstrating that military uniforms do not place soldiers above accountability.

Their swift condemnation of the alleged abuse sends an important message that the Armed Forces of Liberia must never become an instrument of intimidation against the very citizens they are sworn to protect.

Nevertheless, Liberia must move beyond the symbolism of disrobing soldiers before cameras.

The real test of military professionalism is not how quickly a commander removes a uniform, but how faithfully the institution applies the law governing those who wear it.

The National Defense Act of 2008 and Liberia’s applicable Uniform Code of Military Justice must remain central to military discipline and accountability.

Administrative dismissal should never be treated as an automatic substitute for military prosecution where military law requires or permits such proceedings.

HRW statement on Indonesian Constitutional Court ruling

Human Rights Watch has issued this statement on the recent landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia concerning military court jurisdiction. Excerpt:

The petitioners challenged articles 9(1), 43(3), and 127 of the law, which allow active duty military personnel to be tried in military courts even for crimes ordinarily prosecuted in civilian courts. The Constitutional Court found that the distinction between military offenses and ordinary criminal offenses must be clearly defined. Justice Enny Nurbaningsih said that when an offense has no military character but accountability for it remains within a command-based system, “there is a structural risk that military’s institutional interests will conflict with the need to ensure independent and impartial legal proceedings.”

The Constitutional Court also noted that the military judiciary is not fully integrated into the judicial system overseen by the Supreme Court and urged lawmakers to create a single system. Military judges are active duty soldiers, and investigation, prosecution, and adjudication all take place within the military chain-of-command.

Revisions to the Military Justice Law have been pending for decades. As part of structural reforms that followed the end of authoritarian rule under President Soeharto from 1965 to 1998, the 2004 Armed Forces Law made soldiers subject to civilian courts for ordinary crimes. However, that provision would only take effect when a new military justice law was enacted. The Constitutional Court’s ruling imposes a two-year time frame for those revisions, which successive Indonesian governments have deferred.

The court's 568-page decision can be found here.

Happy St. Crispin's Day

Mark Rylance's version is the Editor's favorite.