Does international human rights law apply in armed conflict?

To what extent does international human rights law (IHRL) apply in armed conflict? There's no expert consensus. Hawks tend to embrace lex specialis (that international humanitarian law (IHL) is meant for war, so IHRL should get out of the way) while doves advocate a belt-and-suspenders approach (that IHL and IHRL are mutually reinforcing).

My article "Discipline and Punishment" with Belmont Law Review explores this chasm through the lens of a specific issue: the standards for disciplining and punishing soldiers who misbehave in war. While IHL demands that armed forces employ swift and robust disciplinary measures, IHRL insists on nonderogable procedural rights and fair trial standards.

Those two views are often in tension. While most (all?) military justice scholars adhere to the IHRL view, I argue that the IHL position is more persuasive and correct. That's not because I'm a hawk. Rather, because the IHRL view should account for more than just fair-trial rights. Another strand of IHRL emphasizes the rights of civilians be free from illegal military violence. When courts can't be easily convened (such as during armed conflict), fair-trial insistence results in impunity, which harms victims.