New judge of Peruvian military-police court

 Brigadier General Paola Peggy Polanco Ponce, has been sworn in as Alternate Supreme Justice of the Supreme Review Chamber of the Supreme Military-Police Court. Details here. Congratulations!

Death / disability in long-term ongoing operations led by the Indian Defence Forces cannot be excluded to refuse enhanced pension to soldiers: Indian Supreme Court

Livelaw reported the recent clarification issued by the Supreme Court of India on whether ongoing operations in Jammu and Kashmir (Operation Rakshak) and Operation Rhino (Assam) would be included under Category E(i) of a government policy which grants an enhanced form of pension, namely, War Injury Pension to soldiers who become disabled while participating in operations notified by the Government of India from time to time.

The Respondent-soldier had previously been granted War Injury Pension by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for his disability incurred while serving in a High Altitude Area in Kargil (Jammu and Kashmir) between 2002 and 2005, as part of Operation Rakshak. The Union of India challenged the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana before the Indian Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held the circumstances leading to death / disability mentioned in the policy as "not exhaustive" and rejected the Union of India's plea to discriminate between soldiers who become disabled / deceased in long-term running operations such as Operation Rakshak. A distinction sought to be drawn by the Union of India between those who become injured due to border skirmishes etc. and those who are disabled due to illnesses aggravated by operational conditions was also rejected. The said principle was also previously held by the Indian Supreme Court in Union of India Vs Saroj Devi.

The complete decision is available here.

AFT: IAF noncom has right to bail pending review of court-martial

India's Armed Forces Tribunal has ruled that a noncom convicted by court-martial may be released on bail pending action by statutory confirming authorities. Details here. Excerpt from The Tribune:

“The pendency of confirmation proceedings cannot be permitted to result in continued detention without due consideration of the applicant’s right to personal liberty, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,” the Tribunal’s Bench, comprising Justice Rajendra Menon and Lt Gen CP Mohanty, ruled.

“Merely because the process of confirmation of the findings and sentence awarded by a court martial is pending, the same cannot operate as an impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Tribunal to consider suspension of the sentence and grant of bail,” the Bench said.

Observing that the applicant had already undergone detention for a period of 35 days, which is more than half of the total sentence of two months’ detention, the Bench said that the period of detention already undergone shall necessarily be taken into account while computing the total period of sentence.

“Taking note of the aforesaid circumstances, we are satisfied that this is a fit case in which the sentence of detention deserves to be suspended and the applicant granted bail, pending confirmation of the findings and sentence by the competent authority, the Bench ruled while directing that the execution of the sentence of detention shall remain suspended pending confirmation, and the applicant be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond.

The Bench, however, made it clear that the suspension of sentence is confined to the punishment of detention only. Insofar as the punishment of reduction in rank is concerned, the same shall be given effect immediately upon confirmation of the findings and sentence by the competent authority, in accordance with law. There shall be no stay on the implementation of the said punishment, the Bench said.

Another civiian tried by court-martial in Uganda

Uganda stil hasn't gotten the memo. Its general court-martial has tried a civilian cab driver found wearing military clothing. Details here. African Charter jurisprudence forbids the trial of civilians by military courts.

Jury Selection Is Underway in the USS Cole Bombing Case, First Capital Case at Guantanamo Bay

That is the headline for a piece by Carol Rosenberg on Just Security.

Jury selection began Monday in the first capital case at Guantanamo Bay, with the court questioning the first 18 of up-to 200 U.S. military officers about their ability to sit impartially at the trial of a Saudi prisoner who is accused of conspiring in a terror attack on a U.S. Navy ship that killed 17 American sailors a quarter-century ago.

Suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole on Oct. 12, 2000, while it was on a refueling stop in Aden, Yemen. Besides those killed, 37 other sailors on the 312-member crew were injured.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 61, is accused of war crimes for allegedly helping to orchestrate the attack, and two others, at the behest of Osama bin Laden. He has been in U.S. custody since 2002 but was held by the CIA in black sites for the first four years, during which time he was tortured repeatedly. His treatment in U.S. custody has meant protracted pretrial hearings about which evidence can be used at the trial and whether he is even competent to be tried. Those pretrial hearings ended last week.

Empaneling 12 jurors and six alternates could take weeks. A total of 36 military officers were brought to the base over the weekend from a pool of 200 drawn from U.S. military bases around the world.

Monday, Col. Matthew Fitzgerald, the judge, told the first 18 candidates that the trial could last four-to-six months, or longer, but that he would recess for Thanksgiving and Christmas vacation.

Civilian convicted of offences against state cannot claim fundamental rights, govt says in report to LHC

That is the title of an article by Wajih Ahmad Sheikh, Dawn, November 2, 2026.

The Punjab government has told the Lahore High Court that civilians convicted of offenses against the state cannot claim constitutional protection of their fundamental rights.

The argument arose in the case of Hassaan Khan Niazi, nephew of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. A military court sentenced Niazi to ten years' imprisonment for his alleged involvement in the May 9, 2023, disturbances at Jinnah House, the residence of Lahore's Corps Commander.

Niazi challenged his transfer to military custody and subsequent court-martial. The government urged the High Court to dismiss his petition. It argued that Niazi owed his first duty of loyalty to the state and could not pursue a constitutional challenge after his conviction.

The Ministry of Defence separately argued that Pakistan's Constitution bars the High Court from reviewing proceedings involving persons subject to the Pakistan Army Act. It also maintained that Niazi must pursue his pending appeal through the military appellate system.

The government relied on a May 2025 Supreme Court decision that upheld military trials of civilians while retaining a statutory right of appeal. It contended that the decision did not authorize a separate constitutional challenge.

The case raises a fundamental question: Does conviction by a military court merely restrict a civilian's avenues of appeal, or does it extinguish constitutional protections against unlawful state action?

The Lahore High Court has yet to resolve that question.

AFL Deserves Commendation, But Military Discipline Must Go Beyond Administrative Dismissal

That's the headline to a piece in the The New Dawn (Liberia), 28 October 2026.

The decision by the High Command of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to dishonorably discharge two soldiers following the physical abuse of a civilian woman in Thinkers Village, Paynesville, deserves public commendation. It demonstrates an important commitment to military discipline professional accountability, and the protection of civilians against the abuse of military authority.

According to the reported circumstances, [two] soldiers abandoned their assigned duties to intervene in a private disagreement involving Sergeant Menyon’s girlfriend. What should have remained a minor civilian dispute allegedly escalated into an unacceptable demonstration of military intimidation and physical violence.

Major General Forleh and the AFL High Command therefore deserve recognition for refusing to tolerate misconduct simply because the perpetrators wore military uniforms.

Nevertheless, an important legal and institutional question remains: Why were the soldiers immediately transferred to the Liberia National Police for criminal investigation instead of first being subjected to the applicable military justice procedures under Liberia’s Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)?

The article takes issue with the decision to administratively separate them rather than court-martial them.

Major General Davidson Forleh and the AFL High Command deserve commendation for demonstrating that military uniforms do not place soldiers above accountability.

Their swift condemnation of the alleged abuse sends an important message that the Armed Forces of Liberia must never become an instrument of intimidation against the very citizens they are sworn to protect.

Nevertheless, Liberia must move beyond the symbolism of disrobing soldiers before cameras.

The real test of military professionalism is not how quickly a commander removes a uniform, but how faithfully the institution applies the law governing those who wear it.

The National Defense Act of 2008 and Liberia’s applicable Uniform Code of Military Justice must remain central to military discipline and accountability.

Administrative dismissal should never be treated as an automatic substitute for military prosecution where military law requires or permits such proceedings.

HRW statement on Indonesian Constitutional Court ruling

Human Rights Watch has issued this statement on the recent landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia concerning military court jurisdiction. Excerpt:

The petitioners challenged articles 9(1), 43(3), and 127 of the law, which allow active duty military personnel to be tried in military courts even for crimes ordinarily prosecuted in civilian courts. The Constitutional Court found that the distinction between military offenses and ordinary criminal offenses must be clearly defined. Justice Enny Nurbaningsih said that when an offense has no military character but accountability for it remains within a command-based system, “there is a structural risk that military’s institutional interests will conflict with the need to ensure independent and impartial legal proceedings.”

The Constitutional Court also noted that the military judiciary is not fully integrated into the judicial system overseen by the Supreme Court and urged lawmakers to create a single system. Military judges are active duty soldiers, and investigation, prosecution, and adjudication all take place within the military chain-of-command.

Revisions to the Military Justice Law have been pending for decades. As part of structural reforms that followed the end of authoritarian rule under President Soeharto from 1965 to 1998, the 2004 Armed Forces Law made soldiers subject to civilian courts for ordinary crimes. However, that provision would only take effect when a new military justice law was enacted. The Constitutional Court’s ruling imposes a two-year time frame for those revisions, which successive Indonesian governments have deferred.

The court's 568-page decision can be found here.

Happy St. Crispin's Day

Mark Rylance's version is the Editor's favorite.

Tunisian military court jails a civilian opposition leader

Reuters has the story here. Excerpt:

A Tunisian military court sentenced opposition politician Olfa Hamdi to four ‌years in prison on charges of plotting against ‌state security and inciting the military to disobey orders, her lawyer ​said on Wednesday, the latest move against opponents of President Kais Saied.

Hamdi, the leader of the Third Republic Party who holds US citizenship, was detained at Tunisia's main airport ‌after disembarking from ⁠a flight in February.

Human rights jurisprudence strongly disfavors the prosecution of civilians in military courts. Add Tunisia to the list of states that violate this fundamental principle.

Will the US file a protest?

Condonation of a grounding defense rejected

A Trinidad & Tobago Coast Guard officer is on trial for running his ship aground and related offenses. The High Court had previously stayed the case while considering the officer's claim that his superior had condoned the offense by saying the grounding would be treated as an operational matter. The stay was later lifted and the court-martial is proceeding.

Social media post lands Russian civilian in jail following military court trial

Why was this case tried in a Russian naval court?

The Northern Fleet Military Court has sentenced a 46-year-old resident of Arkhangelsk, a city in north-western Russia, to a fine of 500,000 roubles (approximately US$5,700) under the article on public justification of terrorism on the internet (Part 2, Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code). According to investigators, the man posted comments in a messenger in support of the activities of Ukrainian nationalist organisations.

Should Türkiye reintroduce military courts?

Retired Brigadier General Erdoğan Baykal thinks so. He writes:

The issue of the re-establishment of the military judiciary and military courts is in danger of being forgotten by the public. The fact that it is not being discussed or featured on the agenda should not be taken to mean that this need has disappeared or has become a matter of course. This issue is of the utmost critical importance for the discipline and success of the heroic Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) whilst carrying out their duties under wartime conditions. The re-establishment of the military justice system and military courts must be debated in the public sphere and kept on the agenda.

Military justice requires specialisation. What is important is the establishment of a system capable of fulfilling this function. The judges or prosecutors serving within this system may be in civilian or military uniform. The institutions or mechanisms (civilian or military) to which this system would be answerable are open to discussion. ‘However, provided that they are limited solely to military personnel and military offences, there is an absolute need for specialised first-instance military courts in this regard.’

Taking into account the principle of the unity and oneness of the judiciary, there may be no need for a second-tier military judiciary, that is, a separate High Military Court. In line with the need for specialisation, the function of reviewing military judicial decisions could be carried out by units established within the (civilian) Court of Cassation and the Council of State.

Major ruling in Indonesia

Indonesia's Constitutional Court has handed down a landmark decision invalidating parts of the military justice system and giving the government an opportunity to pass remedial legislation. Human Rights Monitor reports on the decision here. Excerpt:

On 15 October 2026, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court delivered Decision No. 260/PUU-XXIII/2025 on Law No. 31/1997 on the Military Judiciary. The Court declared the Act conditionally inconsistent with Article 24(1) and Article 28D(1) of the 1945 Constitution. Those provisions guarantee an independent judiciary and equality before the law. The case was brought by two petitioners, Mr Lenny Damanik and Mrs Eva Melina Br. Pasaribu, through judicial review of the Act.

The Act remains unconstitutional unless the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Government amend it within two years of the ruling, that is by October 2028. The amendments must clarify the distinction between military offences and general criminal offences, define which court has jurisdiction over cases involving personnel of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and reform the military justice system as a whole.

The ruling is significant. Under the current Act, jurisdiction follows the status of the accused rather than the nature of the offence. Military personnel accused of an ordinary crime against a civilian, such as assault or murder, is tried by a military court, not a civilian one.

Kompas.com has this additional report. Excerpt:

According to Abdul Fickar, the MK's ruling reinforces the principle that TNI personnel accused of military crimes should be tried in military courts, while those charged with common crimes should be prosecuted in civilian courts. He noted that historically, both military-related crimes and general offenses committed by TNI personnel have been adjudicated in military courts. This situation, he argues, has drawn public attention, as general crimes committed by TNI personnel should be handled through the civilian judicial system. 

"Yes, it is indeed a momentum. Because up until now, whether it’s a military crime or a common crime like that of Andri Yunus and others, all have been tried in military courts. They should be tried in civilian courts," Abdul Fickar stated in an interview with Kompas.com on Friday (16/10/2026). 

Abdul Fickar explained that changing the judicial system requires an amendment to the Military Justice Law. The MK's ruling is seen as a catalyst to expedite the development of fairer regulations. “The Constitutional Court's decision also urges the Parliament to swiftly amend the Military Justice Law to ensure that it focuses solely on adjudicating military offenses committed by military personnel,” he said.

Where should this case be tried?

Gang rape investigation in Chile's Rapa Nui -- consider this report from T13. The accused are Chilean marines. Should they be in civilian or military pretrial confinement? Where should the case be tried? Stand by for a ruling from the Constitutional Court.

Not military justice, but . . .

The Hill has just posted a column by Major General (ret) Steven J. Lepper, LTC (ret) Dan Maurer, and the Editor, titled Plan B for Trump’s election intimidation: An iron fist in a velvet glove. Excerpt: "[I]f resistance fails and the president and his Office of Legal Counsel concoct legal and factual justifications for deploying troops to polling sites, military commanders and their judge advocates can mitigate the impacts of these actions by exercising good judgment."

Is live-streaming a military execution legal?

Prof. Dan Maurer examines rhe question here. Bottom line: probably not. He "concludes that there is a viable Eighth Amendment argument that these deviations from established rules and practices constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment.'”

What do you think? Comments are welcome (real names, please; no pseudonyms.)

Major Hasan's case

All eyes have been on Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army psychiatrist sentenced to death for multiple murders at Fort Hood. President Donald J. Trump has approved the death sentence and the Army has indicated that it intends to livestream video of the execution by firing squad. The New York Times has this report. 

Will Mr. Trump veto the livestreaming? Will Dr. Hasan seek habeas corpus? Stay tuned.

Australian DF Personnel Can Apply To Have Historical Homosexual Convictions Expunged

The Star Observer (AU) reports that current and former Australian Defense Force (ADF) personnel can now apply to have historical convictions for consensual same-sex activity extinguished from their service records, following changes to military discipline law.

Until 1992, consensual homosexual activity could be prosecuted as a service offence. Decades after those activities were decriminalised, affected personnel have continued to carry convictions on their official records.

Amendments to the Defense Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) now allow eligible convictions to be formally extinguished, meaning they are treated as though they never happened.

ROK JA fights city hall -- and wins

SBS News has this interesting tale of a South Korean judge advocate whose promotion was unfairly withheld. Excerpt:

A military judge advocate whose promotion was put on hold under the allegation of involvement in drafting the so-called Ministry of National Defense "suspicious document" surrounding the death of the late Corporal Chae Su-geun has won an appeal lawsuit.

The Seoul Administrative Court's Administrative Division 10 (Presiding Judge Jung Eun-young) recently ruled in favor of the plaintiff in a lawsuit filed by military judge advocate A against the Minister of National Defense, seeking to cancel the withholding of his promotion appointment.

* * *

A filed an administrative lawsuit, arguing, "Because the Minister of National Defense requested disciplinary deliberation for unjust purposes at the demand of lawmakers, the promotion withholding decision based on this is illegal."

The court sided with A, ruling that the Ministry's measure was illegal both procedurally and substantively.

The tribunal pointed out, "Before taking the measure, the defendant did not notify the plaintiff of the facts causing the measure, the details of the measure, and the legal basis, nor did the defendant provide an opportunity to submit opinions," adding, "It restricted the party's rights and interests without going through prior notification or opinion-hearing procedures."

It also noted that A's actions did not constitute grounds for major disciplinary action.

The tribunal judged, "The grounds for requesting disciplinary deliberation merely state that A agreed to use the material he drafted as an external briefing document, and that content alone is not enough to conclusively determine that the degree of wrongdoing was severe and intentional."

New legislation in Algeria

El Moudjahid reports:

Military Justice Code:

The Foundations of the Rule of Law Consolidated

The adoption on Thursday of the law establishing the Military Justice Code is part of a comprehensive revision designed to support the momentum of changes introduced by the 2020 Constitution, within the framework of reforms initiated by the President of the Republic, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and Minister of National Defence, Abdelmadjid Tebboune.

Presenting the text to the members of the National People's Assembly (APN), the Minister of Justice explained that it aims to strengthen the foundations of the rule of law and address certain practical shortcomings revealed by military judicial activity in the field, while preserving the gains achieved, particularly following the 2018 revision and the adoption of the principles of a fair trial, two levels of jurisdiction, and the widespread use of information and communication technologies in military justice.

The new code defines military justice as a specialized criminal justice system, administered by military courts under the supervision of the Supreme Court, in accordance with the principles of legality, a fair trial, and respect for human dignity and rights. It organizes military jurisdictions into military courts of first instance and military courts of appeal at the level of each military region, elevates to the rank of court president, at least, the magistrate seconded from the Ministry of Justice to preside over the military court of appeal, and addresses the practical difficulties related to replacing military magistrates to complete the composition of the criminal court. The text also creates the positions of First Deputy Military Prosecutor General and First Deputy Military Prosecutor of the Republic, granting the Military Prosecutor General hierarchical authority over all personnel under the Ministry of National Defense operating within the structures of the military justice system.

Speaking of trying civilians in military courts . . .

. . .  Consider this report about secret military trials and executions in eastern Libya. Excerpt:

Amnesty said military courts in eastern Libya had repeatedly violated defendants' rights to a fair trial, including access to lawyers, sufficient time to prepare a defence, the right to remain silent and the right to a public hearing before an independent and impartial court.

The organisation added that military prosecutors and judges in the east are not independent because they are affiliated with the LAAF or allied armed groups.

In 2017, Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives passed a law giving military courts jurisdiction over civilians accused of terrorism and crimes committed in “military areas”. The law was later declared unconstitutional by Libya’s Constitutional Chamber. 

Executions have resumed as UN-led efforts to unify Libya’s rival institutions and prepare the country for national elections continue.

Amnesty said the eastern authorities should halt all executions and conduct independent and impartial investigations into allegations of torture and other ill-treatment.

The executions come as the country remains split between rival administrations, with the internationally recognised Government of National Unity controlling the west and an administration allied with Haftar’s forces controlling the east and much of the south.

The country's courts have been engaging in a prolonged tug of war, as this report indicates. 

Afghanistan Supreme Court denies civilians are being tried in military courts

The court responded to charges in a recent UNAMA report. Details here. Excerpt:

Last week, UNAMA, in a 28-page report, expressed concern over what it described as continuing gaps in transparency and accountability within the security institutions.

In the report, UNAMA also raised concerns about the jurisdiction of military courts to try civilians, stressing that under international human rights standards, civilians should ordinarily be tried before independent civilian courts.

Khalil Ahmad Nadem, a legal expert, said: “This should also be observed in Afghanistan because if civilians are tried in military courts, justice may not be ensured.”

Fazl Rahman Orya, a political analyst, said: “Military courts are established to try military personnel. That is what distinguishes them from ordinary courts. For this reason, I do not think civilians have been tried in such courts.”

The UNAMA report can be found here. 

Tragic plane crash in DRC

Two senior military justice officials, incuding the auditor general, were among the victims of a plane crash in the DRC. Details here.

Business as usual in Uganda

Despite a clear contrary ruling by the country's Supreme Court, Uganda continues to prosecute civilians by court-martial. Here is the Peoples' Defence Forces press release on the latest such cases.

New military court proposed for Fiji

The Fiji Times reports here about a Constitution Review Commission proposal that would create a military court that would be equivalent to the High Court and make other important changes in Fiji's military justice system.

Significantly, cases before the proposed Military Court would be heard by sitting High Court judges assigned on an ad hoc basis, rather than judges operating within the military command structure.

The Commission said this was intended to maintain the court’s independence from the military and ensure that constitutional protections under the Bill of Rights also apply to military personnel facing prosecution.

It has also recommended that Military Court hearings be open to the public under the same standards applying to civilian courts.

Duty to disobey unlawful orders -- a case from South Korea

What to do when an order is unlawful? A recent decision from South Korea addresses this timely question:

The court stated, “Colonel Yu was clearly aware that the superior’s order was illegal, and it appears he only brought a minimal number of personnel for a formal deployment,” adding, “It is not reasonable to evaluate that he followed an illegal order merely based on the fact that he deployed.” The court further stated, “Passive resistance is also a way to confront illegal orders.” The court added, “Realistically, it is difficult to expect all soldiers to risk danger and firmly refuse orders,” and “They can choose not to properly cooperate by delaying or scaling down the execution of orders.”

Steve Vladeck on "Reining in Military Jurisdiction"

On Prof. Steve Vladeck's One First Supreme Court blog, an overview of issues around the scope of military court jurisdiction can be found here.

Did they know, and does it matter? : US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to decide on permissive inference of a positive marijuana drug test

 

The Marijuana Herald reported that the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is set to hear the review of an Air Force member to determine whether a positive marijuana drug test of a service member is sufficient to prove that the member knowingly consumed marijuana.

The two questions of law to be considered by the court are as follows:

I. Whether the permissive inference is unconstitutional for marijuana cases, both facially and as applied to this case. 

II. Whether Appellant's conviction for marijuana use is legally insufficient.

Read more here. 

Suicide bombing case from Nigeria

The Supreme Court of Nigeria has handed down an interesting unanimous decision on dereliction of duty arising out of a suicide bombing that occurred in 2012. Passing over the question why it took 14 years for the matter to be investigated and adjudicated, the decision reveals some serious weakness. The government's evidence consisted of hearsay testimony by the investigting officer and out-of-court admissions by the accused. There were three issues, the first two of which were, in the Editor's opinion, frivolous and properly rejected. The third went to whether the government had proven the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Held, per Adamo Jauro, J.S.C., "[t]he evidence established that the respondent had completed his sentry duty and was taking his breakfast when the attack occurred. There is no evidence of any duty that the respondent neglected to perform or negligently performed after 12 noon on 7th February, 2012." The case is Nigerian Army v. Friday, No SC/CR/987/2017 (Nigeria Sup. Ct. July 10, 2026).

Reform proposal in Spain

The Spanish State Attorney General's Office is proposing a project for the reform of military justice. Details can be found here. (Google Translate will help.)

The overall thrust seems to be to modernize Spanish military justice and bring it into closer alignment with civilian criminal procedure.

Global Military Justice Reform hopes to follow this matter closely. Readers are invited to comment as the project unfolds. (No anonymous comments, please.)

For your comparative military justice bookshelf

This just in from a friend in New Delhi.

There's a comprehensive new volume titled Supreme Court on Military Law: Leading Judgments That Shape the Rights, Duties and Honour of the Armed Forces. The treatise has been co-authored by two veterans of the Judge Advocate General’s Department (Indian Army): Col Manmohan Jaswal (Retd), former Deputy Judge-Advocate General (Army), and Col Manmohan Sood (Retd), former Deputy Judge-Advocate General (Army) and former Registrar of the Armed Forces Tribunal (Chandigarh Bench).

"Following more than six months of rigorous compilation, the authors have systematically mapped landmark judgments of the Supreme Court of India directly to the relevant statutory provisions of the Army Act, 1950, and the Army Rules. The work meticulously covers disciplinary proceedings, court-martial procedures, constitutional guarantees, command responsibility, service disputes, and pensionary jurisprudence.

While rooted in Indian military jurisprudence, the volume serves as an invaluable reference tool for comparative military law practitioners, scholars, and judicial officers worldwide. In particular, it illustrates how the Apex Court of the world’s largest democracy harmonizes operational discipline and command authority with constitutional guarantees of due process and fairness—a balance that resonates across common-law jurisdictions and armed forces globally."

The book is available from Shandilya Publications in New Delhi.

Hearty congratulations to the authors!

U.S. Courts-Martial, British Victims, and the NATO SOFA

 

Who Gave Away the Case?

There has been considerable public discussion about the recent court-martial of a U.S. Air Force officer in the United Kingdom, and why British authorities did not prosecute.

The question is hardly new.

This week, the Ilford Recorder published an account of the case of Private Leroy Henry, an African-American U.S. soldier accused of raping a British woman near Bath in 1944. British authorities arrested Henry and turned him over to the U.S. Army. An American court-martial convicted him and sentenced him to death.

The evidence raised substantial questions. The complainant could not identify Henry at trial. A review found that the prosecution had not proved force, investigators found no knife despite the complainant's allegation that Henry had threatened her with one, and identification remained uncertain. The review even acknowledged the possibility of prejudice. Henry nevertheless faced execution.

British citizens objected. Residents of Bath organized the “Coloured Soldier's Appeal,” which reportedly attracted 30,000 signatures. Stanley H. Ellisdon of Ilford wrote directly to U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant seeking reconsideration of the sentence.

Ellisdon's June 8, 1944 letter contains a remarkable sentence:

I am aware that the U.S. authorities have full power to deal with offences by American soldiers in this country in their own way....

Henry's death sentence was eventually commuted. He was later released, finished the war as a sergeant, and died in 1971.

Eighty-two years later, Britain is again asking who should prosecute American servicemembers accused of serious crimes against British civilians.

Today, however, a treaty, British legislation, and written bilateral guidance govern that question.

The recent court-martial of Air Force Captain Jacob Wulfson raises a more specific one:

Who gave away the case?

A Note About the Acquittals

Captain Wulfson was acquitted of the sexual-offense allegations against him. Nothing in this post questions those acquittals or suggests that he committed an offense of which the court-martial found him not guilty.

Our subject is different: how British and American authorities decided which country would investigate and prosecute the allegations.

The court-martial convicted Wulfson of strangling his victim and violating an order not to contact her. Because the adjudged sentence included dismissal from the Air Force, those findings and the sentence are subject to automatic appellate review by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. See Article 66, UCMJ. Nothing in this post treats the convictions as final or prejudges that appellate review.

The Wulfson Court-Martial

Captain Jacob Wulfson was a U.S. Air Force pilot assigned to RAF Lakenheath. In December 2023, he met his victim, a British academic, after the two connected through a dating app.

Their encounter took place at Wulfson's private apartment in Cambridge. He was off duty.

He was accused of drugging the victim, sexually penetrating her without consent, and strangling her.

Cambridgeshire Constabulary initially had the case. British police then allowed the U.S. military to assume what the police later called “investigative primacy.”

The Guardian's detailed investigation reports that American investigators told Cambridgeshire police that the victim did not want contact with British police. She disputes that account. She says she never told anyone that she did not want to speak with British police. Cambridgeshire police apparently did not contact her before allowing American investigators to take over.

The Air Force prosecuted Wulfson at a general court-martial at RAF Lakenheath in April 2026.

An eight-member panel of Air Force officers acquitted him of the sexual offenses but convicted him of strangulation and violating an order. The panel sentenced him to six months' confinement, a reprimand, and dismissal from the Air Force. A dismissal is the officer equivalent of a dishonorable discharge. It is a punitive separation that can be adjudged only by a general court-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a).

The verdicts are not the important point for present purposes. The forum is.

The alleged offenses occurred in Cambridge. Wulfson was off duty, and his victim was a British civilian. Yet the case apparently never reached a British prosecutor.

Downing Street subsequently called it “very concerning” that a case of this nature never reached the Crown Prosecution Service.

Having Jurisdiction Is Not the Same as Having the Primary Right to Exercise It

It is easy to say that the United States had jurisdiction because Wulfson was an American servicemember. It did. But so did Britain.

The United States had jurisdiction over Wulfson under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Britain had jurisdiction because the alleged crimes occurred in Britain. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement addresses what happens when both countries have jurisdiction.

Article VII gives the sending state—the United States here—the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. Those include offenses arising from an act or omission performed in official duty and certain offenses directed against the sending state, its property, its personnel, or their dependents.

For the remaining offenses subject to concurrent jurisdiction, the receiving state has the primary right.

Nothing publicly reported about Wulfson suggests that he was performing an official military duty in his Cambridge apartment. The alleged victim was a British civilian.

On the publicly known facts, Britain therefore appears to have held the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

That does not mean the Air Force could not prosecute him. Article VII permits the state possessing the primary right to waive it. The treaty also requires that state to give “sympathetic consideration” to a waiver request when the other state considers waiver particularly important. Further, the U.S. Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect him from dual prosecution here.

So the question is not whether the United States could court-martial Wulfson. It could. The question is how Britain surrendered—or failed to exercise—its primary right to prosecute him.

And that distinction matters because we do not yet know that Cambridgeshire Constabulary's transfer of “investigative primacy” constituted a formal British waiver under Article VII.

There Is a Written Process for This

The Attorneys General of the United Kingdom and United States adopted written Guidance for Handling Criminal Cases with Concurrent Jurisdiction between the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The Guidance begins with a simple proposition: early contact between prosecutors allows the two countries to agree on strategies for handling investigations and proceedings.

For the most serious, sensitive, or complex criminal cases presenting concurrent-jurisdiction issues, the Guidance calls for prosecutors to consider whether their counterparts in the other country may have an interest in prosecuting the case.

It also says investigators should discuss concurrent-jurisdiction issues with prosecutors as soon as they arise. That makes sense. Investigators investigate. Prosecutors decide whether and where to prosecute.

The CPS's current jurisdiction guidance reinforces the point. It directs prosecutors to consider competing jurisdictions from the earliest possible stage and requires jurisdictional decision-making to be clearly recorded.

The CPS also identifies a general principle for choosing a forum: a prosecution should ordinarily be brought where most of the criminality or most of the loss or harm occurred. It specifically directs prosecutors handling cases with a factual nexus to the United States to the UK-US concurrent-jurisdiction agreement.

All of which makes one fact about Wulfson difficult to overlook: the CPS apparently never saw the case.

“Investigative Primacy” Is Not Necessarily Jurisdiction

The phrase “investigative primacy” risks obscuring three different questions: Who investigates? Who decides whether to prosecute? Which sovereign exercises its primary right under Article VII?

Those questions may eventually produce the same answer. They are not the same question.

The bilateral Guidance appears to recognize the distinction. Investigators start the process, but serious concurrent-jurisdiction questions should reach prosecutors early.

That raises a troubling possibility in Wulfson: a police decision about who would investigate may have effectively determined who would prosecute before British prosecutors became involved.

We do not yet know whether that is what happened. Apparently, neither does the British government.

Baroness Bennett asked the Government to explain the justification for transferring Wulfson's case, how many similar transfers had occurred during the previous five years, and whether the Government intended to prevent them. The Government's July 14, 2026 answer did not provide the explanation.

Instead, Lord Coaker said government officials were working closely with Cambridgeshire police to establish the full facts of how jurisdiction was enacted. He called the case “extremely concerning.”

The Government also noted that the Visiting Forces Act framework is implemented in practice by the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, and the UK courts as part of the criminal justice system.

That answer came more than two years after the alleged offenses and months after the American court-martial. The British government was still trying to establish what happened.

Parliament Has Noticed the Problem

Wulfson's case has also reached the House of Lords. During a July 6 debate, Lord Thomas of Gresford addressed the case and the concurrent-jurisdiction problem directly.

His formulation was that, prima facie, an off-duty American servicemember accused of an offense against a British civilian outside an American base should be investigated by UK police and prosecuted in the Crown Court.

That is a parliamentarian's view, not a judicial holding. But it captures the issue. The controversy is not over whether American courts-martial exist or whether they possess jurisdiction over American servicemembers. It concerns why British authorities did not exercise Britain's own jurisdiction over an alleged off-duty crime against a British civilian in a British city.

The Harry Dunn Case Shows the Other Side

The death of Harry Dunn provides a striking contrast.

On August 27, 2019, 19-year-old Dunn was riding his motorcycle near RAF Croughton when a car driven by Anne Sacoolas struck him. Dunn died from his injuries.

Sacoolas was the wife of a U.S. government employee assigned to RAF Croughton. Her case involved unusual diplomatic-immunity arrangements applicable to Croughton personnel and their families rather than the ordinary NATO SOFA allocation of primary criminal jurisdiction.

The United States asserted that Sacoolas possessed diplomatic immunity. Britain sought a waiver. The United States refused. Sacoolas returned to the United States.

The CPS later charged her with causing death by dangerous driving. Britain requested her extradition. The United States refused that too.

Then-Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab publicly called the American refusal a “denial of justice” and said Sacoolas should return to Britain.

The dispute continued for years. In 2022, Sacoolas appeared remotely before the Old Bailey, pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving, and received an eight-month suspended sentence.

The High Court's decision in R (Dunn) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs provides a detailed account of the unusual immunity arrangements at RAF Croughton.

Dunn and Wulfson present different legal issues. But the contrast is hard to miss.

When diplomatic immunity prevented Britain from prosecuting Sacoolas, the British government spent years demanding that she face British justice.

In Wulfson, Britain apparently possessed the primary right to prosecute. British authorities nevertheless allowed the American military to take the investigation. Why?

Britain Has Fought for Jurisdiction Before

The prosecution of U.S. Air Force member Mikayla Hayes provides an even closer comparison because it involved Article VII of the NATO SOFA.

Hayes was stationed at RAF Lakenheath. In August 2022, she left the base in her private car after a physical-training session and drove toward her home. Her car collided with a motorcycle. The rider, Matthew Day, died.

The jurisdictional issue turned on whether Hayes was acting in the performance of official duty. If she was, the United States held the primary right to prosecute under Article VII.

This time, the issue reached a British court. In Rex v. Mikayla Hayes, Deputy Senior District Judge Tan Ikram examined the NATO SOFA and the Visiting Forces Act 1952. He rejected Hayes's argument that British courts lacked jurisdiction.

Britain prosecuted her. A British jury later acquitted her.

That acquittal does not show that Britain made the wrong jurisdictional decision. Verdict and forum are separate questions. The forum decision comes first.

Hayes also establishes something important about Wulfson: British courts and prosecutors know how to confront an Article VII jurisdictional issue when it reaches them. The unanswered question is why Wulfson's case apparently never did.

Wulfson Is Not Alone

The Guardian's investigation has identified other cases in which British police transferred investigations involving American servicemembers accused of serious off-duty conduct.

Two British women accused Airman Tyrion Davis of rape and sexual assault. Suffolk police initially investigated the allegations before the case moved to the Air Force. An American court-martial ultimately convicted Davis of one sexual assault while acquitting him of the remaining sexual allegations.

Then there is James Loubeau. British women accused Loubeau, then an American airman stationed in Britain, of serious sexual offenses. Suffolk police transferred the investigation to U.S. military authorities. Loubeau faced an American court-martial in 2020 and was acquitted of the sexual-offense allegations.

Years later, an unrelated American federal prosecution involving another woman resulted in Loubeau's conviction for abusive sexual contact arising from separate conduct at RAF Mildenhall. The Department of Justice summarized that later prosecution here.

Again, the point is not that an American acquittal establishes that Britain should have prosecuted. It does not. The point is that British authorities repeatedly faced the same threshold decision: who gets the case?

Staff Sergeant Hannes Marschalek provides another example. Cambridgeshire police investigated allegations that Marschalek exposed himself to several women and a 16-year-old girl. Police arrested him, interviewed him, and gathered witness statements. The case then moved to American military authorities.

The Air Force prosecuted Marschalek under Article 134, UCMJ. The forum decision had consequences familiar to military-justice practitioners: the case eventually produced a distinctly American charging question over whether Article 120c preempted the Article 134 offense used to prosecute him.

He plead guilty at his court-martial. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) set aside his guilty plea because of what we know as the "preemption doctrine." See, Marschalek. Upon motion for reconsideration, the bottom line was affirmed again.  See Marschalek (recon), That litigation continues. On 16 June 2026, CAAF received notification of certification by the AF TJAG. No. 26-0221/AF, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 558 (C.A.A.F. June 29, 2026). The docket shows Appellee has until 4 September 2026 to file its brief. It is likely that the loser in Wolfsun at AFCCA will either petition or certify the case to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). The CAAF is mandated to consider a certified issue, but has discretion to hear an Appellant's issue.

Marschalek illustrates a practical consequence of the initial forum decision. Once Britain hands an investigation to American military authorities, American substantive law, charging decisions, rules of evidence, plea procedures, sentencing law, and military appellate doctrine govern the prosecution.

Like Marschalek, Wulfson is not is the same position--the appeal. His case is not yet listed on the AFCCA docket. (The speed of post-trial case processing is a separate issue--one of his issues at trial was speedy trial.) If you want to review some of the trial documents, this link to the AF Trial Docket should take you there: Wulfson Case Documents. (Another separate issue of public and media access to trial documents.)

That does not make the American system illegitimate. It makes the initial decision about forum consequential.

And with Wulfson, Davis, Loubeau, and Marschalek, we are no longer looking at a single unusual case. We are looking at a practice worth examining.

The forum decision therefore reaches beyond the trial itself. Once British authorities allowed the American military justice system to take the case, American military appellate courts also became responsible for determining whether the surviving findings and sentence stand.

After AFCCA acts, the case could reach the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Wulfson may petition CAAF for review, and the Judge Advocate General may also certify issues to that court. CAAF review is not automatic merely because the sentence includes a dismissal.

Under Article 66, UCMJ, a sentence that includes dismissal of a commissioned officer receives automatic review by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. AFCCA will therefore review the findings and sentence without Wulfson having to petition the court for that initial appellate review.

The dismissal makes one point clear: Wulfson’s court-martial is not yet final.

This Is Not an Argument Against Courts-Martial

None of this means that an American court-martial cannot fairly adjudicate a serious criminal offense. Nor does it mean that the Air Force lacked jurisdiction over Wulfson. It had jurisdiction.

American courts-martial routinely try serious crimes. Servicemembers do not cease being subject to the UCMJ when they leave an American installation or travel overseas.

The issue comes earlier.

The United States and United Kingdom agreed upon rules governing cases in which both sovereigns can prosecute. Those rules distinguish between having jurisdiction and having the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

The two governments also adopted written guidance calling for early involvement by prosecutors in serious concurrent-jurisdiction cases.

That distinction matters most when the alleged crime has little connection to military duties.

An American servicemember stationed in Britain does not carry a portable island of exclusive American criminal jurisdiction everywhere he goes.

When an off-duty servicemember allegedly commits a serious offense against a British civilian in Cambridge, Britain has interests of its own. The alleged crime occurred on British soil. The alleged victim is British. Witnesses, medical providers, and investigators may be British. British law defines offenses that may apply to the conduct. And British law provides its own protections to victims and witnesses who enter its criminal justice system.

The NATO SOFA recognizes those interests. That is why it allocates a primary right to exercise jurisdiction rather than simply declaring that American servicemembers belong to American courts.

Leroy Henry and Jacob Wulfson stand eighty-two years apart.

Their cases arose under different legal arrangements. Henry's wartime court-martial does not tell us how Article VII of the NATO SOFA should operate today.

But Stanley Ellisdon's letter captures something that has not changed. American military justice exercised in Britain affects British citizens. That makes its exercise a legitimate concern of both countries.

In 1944, Ellisdon understood that American authorities possessed the power to try an American soldier accused of a crime against a British woman. He nevertheless demanded that they exercise that power justly.

The Wulfson controversy presents a different problem.

The United States unquestionably had jurisdiction to court-martial Captain Jacob Wulfson. But on the publicly known facts, Britain apparently had the primary right to prosecute him.

The NATO SOFA permitted Britain to waive that right. The United States and United Kingdom had written guidance for handling serious cases in which both countries possessed jurisdiction. That guidance contemplated early involvement by prosecutors.

Yet Wulfson's case apparently never reached a British prosecutor.

More than two years after the alleged offenses—and after the American court-martial had ended—the British government said it was still trying to establish the full facts of how jurisdiction was enacted.

Perhaps the ultimate explanation will show that British and American authorities followed the applicable process and made a deliberate decision that the United States should prosecute. Perhaps it will not.

For now, the distinction between investigative primacy and jurisdictional primacy remains unexplained.

Disability developed after 14 years of service attributable to Military service

LiveLaw reports that the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, India, has refused to interfere with an order passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal ("AFT"), which released Disability element of Pension to a soldier who had developed a disability during the course of his service, which although initially deemed as "attributable to service" was subsequently deemed as "not attributable to service" by the Release Medical Board, without any reasoning.  

The Respondent who was enrolled in the Indian Army in July 1977, developed an eye disease namely, "Hypermetropic Amblyopia" of the right eye, due to which he was placed in a permanent low medical category. While the Initial Medical Board observed that the above disability was contracted during service, the release medical board assessed the disability at 15-19% for 2 years and shockingly deemed it as "neither attributable nor aggravated by military service" without assigning any reasons. The Court rejected these findings and upheld the AFT's Order granting disability element. 

This approach of Release Medical Boards, denying attributability of disabilities before the release of the personnel without any cogent reasoning is frequent and deeply concerning. The burden of multiple rounds of litigation on disabled soldiers for grant of disability pension, which is due to them in such cases, is nothing short of appalling. 

Military duty in accordance with law trumps ephemeral anger in the heat of battle : Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, India

 

The Indian Express reported the Indian Armed Forces Tribunal’s refusal to entertain an appeal by an Indian Army Brigadier held guilty of custodial killings of civilians in the Kashmir region.

The officer had been awarded the censure of “several displeasure” by the Army over killings of 3 civilians in custody for an interrogation to look into the deaths of 4 soldiers of the Indian Army who were ambushed by militants and killed in action in the Indian Kashmir region.

Citing several irregularities and lapse in procedure, the senior officer challenged the award of punishment in appeal, however, it was rejected by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench by interpreting the killings as an emotional overreach by the officer and also a blatant violation of the Armed Forces (Jammu & Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 and the Geneva Conventions.

The complete judgment is available here.