Bye-bye Bolsonaro

A Brazilian court is considering whether former President Jair Bolsonaro and several senior officers should be dismissed for attempting a coup  Excerpt from this report:

Brazil's Superior Military Court (STM) notified former president Jair Bolsonaro and three other generals, already convicted for the attempted coup against current head of state Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, on Tuesday, thus beginning the judicial proceedings stemming from allegations of unworthiness raised in early February by the Military Prosecutor's Office for their participation in the coup plot.

“Former President Jair Bolsonaro and Army Generals Paulo Sérgio Nogueira, Augusto Heleno, and Braga Neto have been summoned by their respective investigating judges to submit their written defenses within ten business days from the date of the summons,” the STM reported on its website regarding the retired military officers sentenced by the civil courts to prison terms of 27, 19, 21, and 26 years, respectively.

The court has emphasized that this summons "marks the beginning of the process, as it concludes the preliminary phases and gives way to the formal statement of the accused."

* * * 

The initiative presented by the military attorney general, Clauro Bortolli, called Representation for Declaration of Unworthiness for the Officer Corps, is the mechanism by which the Military Justice must decide whether a member of the Armed Forces sentenced to more than two years in prison, for military or common crime, maintains or does not maintain the necessary condition to continue being part of the officer corps.

Ten of the STM's 15 judges are military officers. 

Worth the read?

The State and the Soldier: A History of Civil-Military Relations in the United States 1st Edition

by Kori Schake (Author)

See all formats and editions

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America’s Founding Fathers feared that a standing army would be a permanent political danger, yet the U.S. military has in the 250 years since become a bulwark of democracy. Kori Schake explains why in this compelling history of civil-military relations from independence to the challenges of the present.

The book begins with General Washington's vital foundational example of subordination to elected leaders during the Revolutionary War. Schake recounts numerous instances in the following century when charismatic military leaders tried to challenge political leaders and explains the emergence of restrictions on uses of the military for domestic law enforcement. She explores the crucial struggle between President Andrew Johnson and Congress after Lincoln’s assassination, when Ulysses Grant had to choose whether to obey the Commander-in-Chief or the law – and chose to obey the law. And she shows how the professionalization of the military in the twentieth century inculcated norms of civilian control.

The U.S. military is historically anomalous for maintaining its strength and popularity while never becoming a threat to democracy. Schake concludes by asking if its admirable record can be sustained when the public is pulling the military into the political divisions of our time.

Where should this case be tried?

Nigerian military officers stand accused of plotting a coup. Court-martial or civilian trial? Femi Falana SAN says it cannot be a military trial. This article explains why. Excerpt:

“Since the indicted civilians are not subject to service law, they cannot be tried in a military court,” he said. 

“Even in the case of Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola v The Federal Republic of Nigeria (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.370) 155, the defendant was charged with treasonable felony at the Federal High Court. Similarly, in the case of Ameh Ebute v State (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt 360) 66, the defendants including Senator Ahmed Bola Tinubu (now President) were charged with treason at the Federal High Court.”

The lawyer recalled several landmark rulings, including the 2025 Supreme Court decision in Uganda, which declared that military courts lack jurisdiction to try civilians. 

He said, “The illegal practice of prosecuting civilians in military courts has just been stopped by the Supreme Court of Uganda in the case of Dr. Kizza Besigye & Another v Attorney General & Another (Miscellaneous Cause 31 of 2025) [2025] UGHCCD 29 (24 February 2025).

Kelly v. Hegseth

The National Lawyers Guild's Military Law Task Force has issued this position paper "in defense of Sen. Mark Kelly." Excerpt:

[Pete] Hegseth’s more recent use of  administrative action , threatening to demote Kelly and reduce his veteran’s benefits, is a retreat from earlier threats to prosecute Kelly, for ‘contemptuous speech” under the rarely-used Article 88. When those threats were made, we were confident that a trial was unlikely, given that career military prosecutors are JAGs, well versed in what UCMJ covers. They’d know that the Army Court of Criminal Review ruled in 1969: “As a matter of law, an order of a subordinate which contravenes the Constitution, a federal statute, a presidential executive order, a departmental regulation or other lawful directive of higher authority can have no lawful validity,” (US v Patton, U.S.A.C.M.R. 1969). And a century earlier, the US Supreme Court  pointed out: “A soldier cannot justify on the ground that he was obeying the orders of his superior officer” if “a person of ordinary intelligence would know that obedience would be illegal and criminal.” Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 189 (1879).That same decision adds that “the established principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the military must always yield.”

 And those JAGs would know that servicemembers and veterans are protected by the First Amendment’s free speech provisions, as  highlighted by the National Institute [of] Military Justice: “Although the military code criminalizes certain types of speech that may affect the military mission, the Senator’s remarks are far from criminal. He simply restated a fundamental principle of military law: service members must obey lawful orders and disobey unlawful orders.”

Military justice reform in Botswana

After years of preparation, the Botswana Defence Force has an updated military justice system. The new system is outlined in this video.

Bad day at the gym

El País has this report on yet another disciplinary case from Spain's Guardia Civil. To set the stage:

It all happened on April 1, 2022. The officer, who was in charge of guarding the gym at the Prime Minister's Office Security Department, was on the afternoon shift. Before starting work, he ate some tapas and drank two beers in the cafeteria. While he was at his post, two colleagues arrived with a bottle of gin, which the three of them drank with Coca-Cola. Thus, the Civil Guard officer "not only allowed the introduction and consumption of alcohol in the gym, but also participated in its consumption," the court emphasizes. Four hours later, around 7:15 p.m., two other uniformed officers arrived, including Sánchez's then-head of security. By then, the sanctioned officer already showed clear signs of having consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. In fact, without the ruling describing any trigger, the officer "lowered his trousers and exposed his buttocks, while dancing and squatting."

What punishment would you impose?

No exit

IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Randy J. GALLIANO, Seaman Apprentice (E-2), U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant

Docket No. 1514

ORDER TO REPRESENT APPELLANT

            On 8 September 2025, Appellant was convicted at special court-martial and sentenced to  reduction to E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. The case was referred to this Court on  20 November 2025.

             On 15 January 2026, Appellate Defense Counsel filed a Notice of No Authority to Represent Appellant, asserting that she had been unable to contact Appellant and did not “intend to file any substantive pleading before this Court.”

             Article 65 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) directs that the record of trial of a case in which a bad-conduct discharge has been adjudged be forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review under Article 66(b)(3), UCMJ. Article 70, UCMJ, requires that appellate defense counsel be detailed and shall represent an accused before the Court of Criminal Appeals when requested by the accused or when the United States is represented by counsel. The appellate rights notice in the record of trial, acknowledged by Appellant’s signature, states that military counsel will be appointed to represent him. Rule 11 of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “Upon docketing of a case, the appropriate Judge Advocate General or designee shall, unless previously done, designate appellate military counsel to represent the parties . . .” Thus the United States, as well as the accused, is represented in every case before the Court of Criminal Appeals.

             In these circumstances, counsel’s authority to represent Appellant stems not solely from the client’s direction or consent but also from counsel’s military duty upon being detailed. This conclusion is supported by United States v. Sink, 27 M.J. 920, 921 (A.C.M.R. 1989) (“[C]ounsel contends that he is precluded from representing the appellant on appeal because he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with him . . . . We disagree. . . . [His] duty of representation can be met effectively in most cases without the appellant’s knowledge or active participation.”); United States v. Harper, 80 M.J. 540, 542 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (“Given . . . the lack of any affirmative action by Appellant either to waive his right to representation or to withdraw his case from appellate review, we conclude that appellate defense counsel not only has the authority, but is statutorily required to represent Appellant, to the best of her ability, notwithstanding her inability to locate or communicate with him.”); United States v. May, 47 M.J. 478, 481-82 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (“Where individual civilian counsel's failure to act is working to the detriment of an appellant, military appellate counsel may not stand by idly, because they remain responsible for protecting the interests of their client. * * * As officers of the court as well as appellate defense counsel, military counsel had an obligation to . . . protect the interests of their client.”)

            Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 22nd day of January 2026,

            ORDERED: 

            That Appellate Defense Counsel shall represent Appellant and file assignments of error and brief not later than thirty days from the date of this order.

Is this Order correct? If you were SA Galliano's appellate defense counsel, what would you do in light of it?