HRW statement on Jordanian executions

Human Rights Watch has issued this statement concerning a recent mass execution of civilians who were convicted by the National Security Court in Jordan. Excerpt:

Human Rights Watch opposes the creation and use of special courts to try national security crimes, because such courts are frequently authorized by law to conduct trials in a manner that restricts the rights of defendants beyond what is permissible under international human rights law. In many countries, regular criminal courts have proven effective in prosecuting terrorism offenses in accordance with international due process standards. Jordan should restrict its security court’s jurisdiction over civilians as a step toward abolishing the court, Human Rights Watch said.

SOFA watch

The Guardian has published this edifying article on practice and procedure under the US-UK Status of Forces Agreement. Excerpt:

The American military personnel can sometimes bypass the British legal system, even when their alleged offences took place when they were off duty. So why is this happening? And are UK law enforcement authorities abandoning their responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes that have occurred on UK soil?

And here is The Guardian's article on the case that has brought the SOFA to the fore. Further attention to the case and the SOFA seems likely.

NDAA alert

Will the pending National Defense Authorization Act include a free-speech provision limiting the application of court-martial jurisdiction over retirees? Here's a report from The Hill.

Bill C-11 receives Royal Assent

Here is the government's statement concerning the Military Justice System Modernization Act. We'll have more on the changes in due course.

"A key reform removes Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) investigative and prosecutorial jurisdiction over Criminal Code sexual offences committed in Canada, while retaining jurisdiction outside of Canada. This change is intended to simplify processes for victims, reduce confusion caused by overlapping systems, and provide greater independence from the chain of command in sensitive cases. It marks a deliberate step in the continued evolution of the military justice system to strengthen clarity, confidence, and trust."

Where should human rights violations be tried?

Peru is fixing to change its system to permit military courts to try such cases. There's blowback from the UN and elsewhere. Salma Ben Mariem has written this Jurist News column on the controversy. Excerpt:

If it comes into force, the bill would bar members of the armed forces or police from being tried in a civil court for the same facts if proceedings have already been opened before a military or police court. The draft law still requires a second vote in a plenary session before its promulgation by the Executive.

Peru has previously faced criticism for its handling of justice and the prosecution of human rights violations. In August 2025, UN human rights experts criticized a national law that granted amnesty to security forces accused of committing serious violations of international law during the internal armed conflict between 1980 and 2000, describing it as a violation of international law. The UN also expressed concern about the erosion of the rule of law in the country following the dismissal of a Peruvian judge from his post for comments he made regarding alleged institutional interference in the judiciary. Additionally, the UN raised concerns about the release of a former military officer who was convicted of the murder of a journalist in 1988.

More summer (and longer-term) reading

Professor Alison Duxbury of Melbourne Law School has written an important and timely article: Applying human rights law to the 'characteristics of military life': square pegs and round holes?, 15 Cambridge Int'l L.J. 5 (2026). It analyzes recent decisions -- some widely-known, some not -- from a variety of jurisdictions. "This case law is part of the increasing trend towards the civilianisation of the legal frameworks that apply to armed forces." 

Congratulations to the author on this major contribution to the literature.

The Commonwealth Military Justice Principles (2026) modify the controversial Stellenbosch draft principle (2023) on military summary proceedings

Stellenbosch Principles Workshop participants (2023) 

The 56 countries of the British Commonwealth, through the Commonwealth Secretariat, recently finalized their military justice principles and model law for smaller armed forces. The ten principles built upon an earlier draft developed in Stellenbosch, South Africa in 2023. 

Of note is Principle 10, which governs summary proceedings (military justice for minor offenses that does not involve formal court proceedings). 

Commonwealth Military Justice Principle 10 (2026) states: 

10. Summary Proceedings

a. Where summary proceedings that involve penal sanctions of consequences are heard by commanders against military personnel, ensure that sufficient protections exist, including the right to elect trial in a military court which provides access to the internationally recognised rights set out in Principle 7 above, or an unfettered appellate procedure to such a court. 

b. Ensure that summary proceedings are only used to adjudicate less serious cases and to impose sanctions which are proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender, and which do not involve sentences of imprisonment or any other deprivation of liberty for a significant period of time, violation of human rights, or dismissal from service.

Stellenbosch Principle 10 (2023) stated: 

10. Summary Proceedings 

a. Where summary proceedings are initiated by commanders against military personnel, ensure that sufficient protections exist, including the right to elect trial in a military court which provides access to the internationally recognised rights set out in Principle 7 above, or an unfettered appellate procedure to such a court. 

b. Ensure that summary proceedings are only used to adjudicate minor offences and to impose minor sanctions which are proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender, and which do not involve sentences of imprisonment or any other significant deprivation of liberty, violation of human rights, or dismissal from service. 

Stellenbosch Principle 10(a) was controversial for mandating an accused's choice to "turn down" disciplinary proceedings and elect a military trial without limitation. Commonwealth Principle 10 limits the turn-down right to only when the summary proceedings include penal sanctions. 

Military disciplinary proceedings and constitutional law

Giovanni Matos writes here in Diario Libre:

The recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of the Dominican Republic on the disciplinary regime of lawyers has reopened one of the most important debates for contemporary Dominican constitutionalism: the limits of the regulatory power of the Executive Branch when fundamental rights are at stake .

This is no small matter. In a constitutional democracy , the state 's power to impose sanctions cannot be exercised outside the principles of legality and statutory reservation. Precisely for this reason, the recent decisions of the Constitutional Court regarding the disciplinary regime of the Dominican Republic Bar Association have prompted reflection that transcends the professional sphere of law and extends to other state institutions subject to special disciplinary regimes, particularly the Armed Forces .

The question is as simple as it is momentous: can a presidential decree create disciplinary sanctions that involve arrest or confinement, or do such measures necessarily require a formal law approved by the National Congress?

So the question seems to be whether military justice must be regulated by legislation or executive branch decree.

Today is Juneteenth

 

Impunity issues raised by Peruvian legislation

Attorney Carlos M. Rivera Paz has written this detailed criticism of changes in Peruvian military justice. From Servindi's introduction:

Since 2024, the Congress of the Republic has initiated a strategy for crimes committed by police or military personnel to be judged by the military-police jurisdiction to the detriment of the ordinary justice system.

The strategy is not new. It is the same one that Fujimorism implemented during the 1980s and 90s to grant impunity to the perpetrators of human rights crimes.

Today, at the behest of Fuerza Popular and Renovación Popular, Peru has entered a maelstrom of congressional regulations that reverse the progress in justice achieved in November 2004, established at that time by the Supreme Court of Justice.

Grooming standards and religious liberty in the U.S. Navy

Rear Admiral
Stephen B. Luce,
U.S. Navy

On June 10, 2026, the Chief of Naval Operations issued updated guidance on grooming standards and religious liberty. The complete message can be found here. Excerpt:

In the complex maritime domain, safety is intrinsically linked to overall mission success. The tactical proficiency, physical resilience, and cognitive readiness of each warfighter form the foundational building blocks of our combat power. Consequently, individual performance is a direct multiplier for the lethality of our Fleet. Individual capability and survivability impacts the life, health, and safety of the overall crew. Force preservation requires deliberate consideration of individual rights in the context of uncompromising operational requirements. Modern threats present an existential risk to the individual warfighter; individual casualties immediately cascade into degraded unit readiness, compromised lethality, and reduced overall survivability. Commanding Officers must objectively weigh the fundamental value of accommodating religious practices against the compelling, life-or-death interest of maintaining an absolute protective posture and ensuring the operational viability of our Fleet.

But see A Brief History of Grooming in the U.S. Navy (USNI 2014) 

Military judiciary legislation approved by South Africa's Parliament

In response to the landmark decision of the South African Constitutional Court in O'Brien N.O. v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans and Others (CCT 14/23) [2024] ZACC 30; 2025 (2) SA 613 (CC); 2025 (4) BCLR 460 (CC) (20 December 2024), the country's parliament has approved two significant measures. DefenceWeb's report observes:

The Defence Amendment Bill, as its title implies, amends sections of the 2002 Defence Act to ensure compliance with a Constitutional Court ruling, while Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Amendment Bill will see a Military Judicial Committee (MJC) established to regulate “assignment and removal” of military judges, also in line with a Constitutional Court ruling.

The relevant Constitutional Court ruling found two sections of the Defence Act unconstitutional in that they permitted what a Parliamentary Communication Services (PCS) statement has as “members of the Executive” to establish boards of inquiry (BoI) to investigate military judges as well as the content of their judicial decisions. The apex South African court ruled these decisions as undermining the separation of powers, inherent in the Constitution, and a threat to judicial independence.

Also relevant to the DoD Legal Services Division headed by Adjutant General, Major General Eric Mnisi, are changes to the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act.

The bills will become law upon approval by the President of South Africa. 

Turning intent into "justice"

Mark W. Castillon has written this Real Clear Defense essay, Counsel to Power: How judge advocates turn command intent into 'justice.' 

Summer reading

Sam Libby has written G.I. Joe Behind Bars: Analyzing Military Sentencing Data, Sentencing Guidelines, and Court-Martial Reform, 34 J. L. & Pol'y 63 (2026). Abstract:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 required the military to restructure its court-martial sentencing procedures to more closely resemble those utilized in federal civilian court. Previously, either judges or court-martial panel members themselves determined an appropriate sentence based on their collective intuition without the aid of specific guidelines. Critics have argued that leaving sentencing in the hands of inexperienced panel members has led to large disparities between servicemembers, especially compared to federal court where the United States Sentencing Guidelines are the lodestar. All the while, no comprehensive dataset exists for researchers to determine the extent of variation across courts-martial. This Article is a first step toward solving these problems and informing policymakers in the Pentagon. Using data obtained via a Freedom of Information Act request to the Navy, this Article analyzes sentences for servicemembers charged with child pornography and drug offenses. The Article then compares these results to the applicable sentencing ranges under the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as under the new military sentencing parameters. Generally, the results show that military sentences are closely comparable to those a defendant would receive in federal civilian court based on the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, this Article argues that the military’s now-promulgated sentencing parameters may not decrease disparities and could lead to greater sentences, particularly given the large variances within the military sentencing parameters themselves. Accordingly, this Article adds crucial empirical analysis to the discourse.

Thoughts for judge advocates in challenging times

Just Security has this morning posted this essay from the Former JAGs Working Group. From the abstract:

The role of military lawyers — judge advocates — has been a subject of often-intense discussion and debate over the past 18 months.  Judge advocates typically advise commanders on the legal limits the international community and the United States have placed on the nature and conduct of military operations.  Today, as boat strikes in the Caribbean continue to raise serious legal, ethical, and moral concerns; the United States’ invasion of Venezuela and war with Iran cast doubt on the legitimacy and wisdom of our decisions to employ military force; and the rhetoric of our civilian leaders call into question the lawfulness of their military orders, the need for judge advocates and the challenges they face are greater than ever.  As former and retired judge advocates, we watch hopefully as the men and women who still serve as legal advisors meet those needs and challenges.  In a sincere effort to help, we respectfully and humbly offer the following thoughts in the hope that they will prove useful to the current generation of senior leaders, the judge advocates who advise them, and the American people who are also watching anxiously from the sidelines.

Operation Resolute Justice

Army’s plan for military death row executions is named ‘Operation Resolute Justice.’

If an execution order is signed by the president, military death row inmates would be transported to Federal Correctional Institution, Terre Haute in Indiana.

The oldest [current] military death row case involves former Army Spc. Ronald Gray, which dates back decades. In 1988, Gray was con­vict­ed by a gen­er­al court-mar­tial of 14 charges, includ­ing pre­med­i­tat­ed mur­der, attempt­ed mur­der, and of raping three women, two of whom were soldiers. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed off on his execution order, but it was later challenged in federal court and in 2016 a judge lifted the hold on his execution order. In 2017, an Army court rejected his final appeal.
. . .
From 1916 to 1961, the military executed 135 people. While a court-martial can result in a death sentence, the last military execution took place in 1961 when Army Pvt. John A. Bennett, a 19-year-old soldier, was hanged at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the rape and attempted murder of an 11-year-old Austrian girl. In addition to the lack of executions carried out in recent decades, the majority of death sentences in the military have also been overturned.

A JAG in trouble

A Finnish judge advocate is facing civilian trial for disseminating a photo of an area where photography is forbidden. According to this YLE report:

A military lawyer working for the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF) has been charged with revealing a national secret as well as a breach of duty offence.

The lawyer is suspected of using a messaging app to share a photo taken in an area where photography was prohibited.

The crime is suspected to have taken place in the autumn of 2024, while the charges were filed at Helsinki District Court last month. The court has not yet set a hearing date.

Revealing a national secret is considered treason in Finland, and the maximum penalty for the crime is four years imprisonment.

Not funny

A Cuban comedian -- yes, he's a civilian -- is to be tried by a military court for taking video of an abandoned Soviet military base. The charge is espionage. Details here.

What's the right sentence for perpetrating an acid attack on a human rights activist?

In an Indonesian military court, no more than three years. The New York Times has the story here.

Also, should human rights violations -- this certainly seems to be one -- ever be tried in a military court?

Final grade: F

If you're going to exert unlawful command influence, do it in public, on video

Good luck to the military commissioon prosecutors who will have to respond to unlawful command influence motions based on this video from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. It is hard to see how the death penalty can remain in the picture given this.

Military trial threatened for Afghan government personnel who use smartphones

The Taliban government of Afghanistan has threatened military trial for government employees who use smartphones. Details here.

A document obtained by Afghanistan International indicates that Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada has issued a new verbal order banning the use of smartphones by the group members and government employees.

The document describes violators as offenders and warns they could face military court proceedings.

U.S. appeals decision granting public access to military court proceedings

The U.S. government filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit in ProPublica v. Butler, case number 22-cv-01455-BTM-KSC (S.D. Cal.).

The decision appealed from is the amended judgment by district court judge Ted Moskowitz, ECF No. 151. It says:

Plaintiff is granted the following declaratory judgment on count one of its second amended complaint: 

Defendants’ policies violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access in Article 32 preliminary hearings and full court-martial proceedings. 

Plaintiff is entitled to notice of Article 32 preliminary hearings that is reasonably suited to facilitate attendance. The Navy shall provide at least ten (10) days’ advance notice to the public of all Article 32 preliminary hearings. The Navy must provide the full first and last name of the charged service member and the charge sheets, at least ten (10) days before the scheduled hearing, unless a compelling reason legally justifies redaction. 

The First Amendment requires the Navy to provide the public access to the documentary evidence, transcripts, filings, reports, and related papers submitted during Navy Article 32 preliminary hearings and court-martial proceedings, including those resulting in an acquittal, subject to redactions and/or withholdings required by statute or based on national security concerns or other valid and compelling reasons. The Navy must provide such access in all cases including Article 32 hearings that do not result in a court-martial and a court-martial ending in an acquittal. Any redactions or withholdings must be consistent with the First Amendment and must further a compelling government interest. The Navy may only redact or withhold such records from the public where a military judge or Article 32 hearing officer finds that the denial of access furthers a compelling government interest, the redaction or withholding is narrowly tailored to further that interest, and there are no less restrictive means available to serve that interest. The Navy must also comply with the procedural requirements of the First Amendment (notice, an opportunity to be heard and specific findings on the record). 

The Navy must provide the public right of access set forth in this judgment as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than sixty (60) days after receipt of a request, except that the Navy shall make the transcripts of public proceedings available as soon as reasonably practicable but no later than thirty (30) days following receipt of a request. Requests must be made to the appropriate office, which the Navy will publish. The person requesting the documents or transcripts shall pay the direct costs of transcription or duplication. 

Withholdings or redactions under FOIA or any statute must be consistent with the First Amendment. 

Plaintiff is otherwise denied judgment on its claim for contemporaneous access to filings and papers in Article 32 hearings and court-martial proceedings. 

Plaintiff is granted judgment in part on count two of its second amended complaint. Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from denying Plaintiff’s First Amendment right of access in Article 32 hearings and court-martial proceedings. 

The Navy must publicly release, no later than April 30, 2026, the court records from United States v. Mays, consistent with the First Amendment. 

Defendants are granted judgment on count three of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. 

Nothing in this judgment requires the Navy to create or release transcripts or documents that were not submitted or prepared in the course of Article 32 or courtmartial proceedings. 

The Navy is required to provide Article 32 reports to Plaintiff.

The district court had also denied the government's emergency motion to stay release of Article 32 hearing records. ECF No. 152. The standard for such a stay comes from Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009). Judge Moskowitz wrote: 

[T]he Government has made no showing—let alone a strong one—that it will likely succeed on appeal. Indeed, the Government does not even claim that the Court erred nor that the Government will in fact appeal. The mere possibility of an appeal— with no showing that the Court may have erred—is insufficient to satisfy the first Nken factor.

The Government also equivocates under the second Nken factor. The immediate release of the Mays records, the Government says, “could cause irreparable injury.” But the mere “possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 427 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Plaquemines Par. v. Chevron United States, Inc., 84 F.4th 362, 376-77 (5th Cir. 2023) (ruling that the “defendants have fallen well short of showing that the second Nken factor weighs heavily in their favor” because they showed no “more than a mere possibility of irreparable injury”).

Of carts and horses

Who could imagine that the president of a very-high-profile court-martial could decide that the government had made out a prima facie case before introducing a scintilla of evidence? Check it out here. 

Not a promising way to commence a trial.

Are the STCs constitutional? (Any bets?)

The Pace Law Review has published Josef Danczuk's The Constitutionality of the Special Trial Counsel Under the Apogee of Judicial Deference. Abstract:

Congress has undertaken some of its broadest reforms of military courts-martial in decades. The creation of the Special Trial Counsels (STCs) intentionally removes nearly all court-martial powers from military commanders for “covered offenses,” some of the most serious prosecutions. Many commentators have expressed concern that this change untethers the court-martial system from its historical anchor of discipline within the military—an anchor that the Supreme Court has used to grant exceptional deference to Congress for its legislation pursuant to the Make Rules Clause. However, the constitutionality of the STCs and the deference federal courts grant Congress in this realm should not be considered in jeopardy. STCs are akin to many prior Congressional exceptions to the command-centric disciplinary model. And under Ortiz v. United States, the Supreme Court’s most recent court-martial case, STCs are neatly within the court-martial’s supporting aims of discipline and justice.

Commonwealth military justice principles and model laws

ENDORSEMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH MILITARY JUSTICE PRINCIPLES AND MODEL LAWS

A Commonwealth milestone in principled and practical reform

By His Honour Judge Alan Large, Judge Advocate General of the UK Armed Forces, and Francisca Pretorius

In many smaller Commonwealth jurisdictions, Defence Acts were enacted at independence and have remained largely unchanged for decades. The result is that military justice systems have not kept pace with developments in international humanitarian law, human rights law, or constitutional jurisprudence. In February 2026, at the Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting in Fiji, Law Ministers formally endorsed the Commonwealth Military Justice Principles and the accompanying Commonwealth Model Law on Military Justice for Smaller Armed Forces.

The initiative was the culmination of a multi-year effort, and reflects sustained collaboration between judges, practitioners, and member country representatives across the Commonwealth, with consistent support from the Commonwealth Lawyers Association and the Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association.

Origins of the Initiative

The Commonwealth Military Justice Transformation Project commenced in 2022 pursuant to a mandate issued by Law Ministers at the Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting that year. The work was undertaken under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat's Office of Civil and Criminal Justice Reform (OCCJR). At the time, Francisca Pretorius served as Head of the OCCJR, working alongside His Honour Judge Alan Large.

The Commonwealth Military Justice Principles

The first phase of the initiative focused on the development of high-level Principles.

An expert working group, led by His Honour Judge Alan Large and supported by Francisca Pretorius, engaged in nearly a year of structured online meetings before convening in Stellenbosch, South Africa, in November 2023. At that meeting, the group finalised a draft set of ten Principles designed to articulate foundational standards for smaller armed forces.

These Principles were subsequently reviewed and refined through a formal intergovernmental Working Group, with the text shaped to reflect both expert insight and member-state ownership.

The Principles are non-binding but function as aspirational benchmarks against which jurisdictions may assess existing systems and orient future reform. They articulate core standards relating to independence and impartiality of military courts, separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial functions, fair trial guarantees and due process, qualifications and security of tenure for judicial officeholders, appellate and review mechanisms, transparency and accountability, and alignment with international legal obligations.

To our knowledge, this is the first time an intergovernmental body has formally endorsed a consolidated set of military justice principles tailored specifically to smaller armed forces, significant for the development of military justice globally.

The Model Law for Smaller Armed Forces

The Model Law constituted a distinct, though complementary, second phase of the project.

Smaller armed forces operate within particular structural constraints. Limited personnel numbers and institutional proximity can make separation of functions more complex to operationalise. Reform must therefore be principled, but also realistic and scalable.

It was against this backdrop that the Model Law was drafted by Christopher Griggs of New Zealand, drawing on comparative Commonwealth practice and informed by the Principles.

The Model Law provides a practical legislative template that is adaptable to different constitutional arrangements, scalable to smaller force structures, and structured to include options in certain areas. It is not a prescriptive instrument; it offers a carefully designed toolkit from which jurisdictions may draw when modernising Defence Acts.

Endorsement by Law Ministers

The endorsement by Law Ministers in Fiji confirms that both the Principles and the Model Law have moved beyond expert recommendation to formal Commonwealth recognition.

This endorsement does not impose binding obligations on member states. It affirms a shared commitment to principled reform and provides a structured pathway for those wishing to undertake legislative review.

The Road Forward: From Endorsement to Implementation

While the endorsement marks a significant milestone, implementation now becomes the central task. Several member states have already expressed interest in technical assistance to review and update their defence legislation in light of the new benchmarks. The Commonwealth Secretariat is engaging with interested jurisdictions to support legislative gap analyses, drafting assistance and adaptation of the Model Law, stakeholder consultations, judicial and practitioner training, and implementation planning. 

For this phase, the Principles provide the normative compass and the Model Law provides the structural blueprint. The pace and depth of reform will ultimately depend on member state engagement and ownership, and early signals are encouraging.

The endorsement of these instruments is not the end of the project; it is the point at which the real work begins.

Does international human rights law apply in armed conflict?

To what extent does international human rights law (IHRL) apply in armed conflict? There's no expert consensus. Hawks tend to embrace lex specialis (that international humanitarian law (IHL) is meant for war, so IHRL should get out of the way) while doves advocate a belt-and-suspenders approach (that IHL and IHRL are mutually reinforcing).

My article "Discipline and Punishment" with Belmont Law Review explores this chasm through the lens of a specific issue: the standards for disciplining and punishing soldiers who misbehave in war. While IHL demands that armed forces employ swift and robust disciplinary measures, IHRL insists on nonderogable procedural rights and fair trial standards.

Those two views are often in tension. While most (all?) military justice scholars adhere to the IHRL view, I argue that the IHL position is more persuasive and correct. That's not because I'm a hawk. Rather, because the IHRL view should account for more than just fair-trial rights. Another strand of IHRL emphasizes the rights of civilians be free from illegal military violence. When courts can't be easily convened (such as during armed conflict), fair-trial insistence results in impunity, which harms victims.

Canada's Military Police Complaints Commission releases Major Cristian Hiestand Public Interest Investigation

Tim Dunne

The previous issue of The Observatory described the tragic suicide of RCAF flying instructor Major Cristian Hiestand.

On 25 November 2021, military police (MP) at Canadian Forces Base Moose Jaw received a complaint that the Complainant (identified as “C”) was twice sexually assaulted by her former boyfriend, Major Hiestand, a Royal Canadian Air Force flight instructor. MPs with the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (Western Region) arrested and charged Major Hiestand with two counts of sexual assault.  On 17 January 2022 he died by suicide.

His mother and sister filed complaints with the Military Police Complaints Commission alleging that the military police investigation was flawed, that investigators did not interview Hiestand before laying charges and failed to gather or consider evidence such as relevant text messages. Surprisingly, a former MP who served at the military police detachment that handled Hiestand's case a filed a third complaint alleging:

1. A warrant officer failed to ask the complainant whether she preferred to be interviewed by a female officer.
2. The warrant officer made an unprofessional remark about why the complainant had not gone to the local civilian police instead.
3. A sergeant returned to assist with the investigation while allegedly off duty and intoxicated.
4. Inexperienced military police members were assigned to conduct the interview and take notes.
5. The victim interview was not audio- or video-recorded even though recording equipment was available.
6. An unidentified support person was allowed to sit in on the interview before being properly identified later.  

On 21 November 2022, almost exactly a year after his death, the MPCC launched a public interest investigation into these complaints and others about how the case was initially handled by a local detachment.  

The MPCC’s review focused on whether the military police conducted an impartial and thorough investigation, including appropriate evidence collection and procedural oversight. Both MPCC’s reports, released 4 February 2026 by Chair Tammy Tremblay, found significant shortcomings in the military police’s handling — describing the investigation as rushed, affected by “tunnel vision” or confirmation bias, seriously flawed and characterized by “undue haste,” and inadequate investigative rigor. It concluded that key investigative steps were missed, such as pursuing relevant witness interviews and properly evaluating evidence before charging, and it called attention to supervisory failures. The MPCC also recommended reforms to improve accountability and investigative standards, including greater consultation with prosecutors in sensitive cases.[1]  

The report found that investigators prematurely formed the belief that a sexual assault had occurred and focused primarily on evidence supporting that conclusion while failing to adequately pursue potentially exculpatory information.

For example, “One of the significant failings in the CFNIS investigation was the lack of systemic examination of key text messages, despite investigators having access to them as of the night of November 29, 2021. 

“[O]n the night of November 29, 2021, at 22:00 hrs, MCpl ***** began downloading the contents of C’s cell phone via a Data Pilot device. Her Security and Military Police Information System (SAMPIS) notes indicate the process took some six hours, completing at 04:00 hrs on the morning of November 30, 2021. As per the disclosure received by the MPCC regarding this information, the text messaging information alone resulted in 1,299 pages of data. Regarding the messages which pertain solely to exchanges with Maj Hiestand, the Forensic Report prepared by Tech Services on January 18, 2022, indicates the extremely high volume of information that was extracted: 121 calls and 7,363 texts.

“MCpl ***** admitted in her interview with PS to conducting only a “cursory” five-minute review of the text messages on the night of November 29, 2021, prior to downloading the data into the Data Pilot.

“MCpl ***** described accessing specific text messages to bolster her grounds for arrest, yet her notebook entries do not reflect this.”[2]

Major Hiestand was given an opportunity to provide a statement to investigators but declined to do so on legal advice. The MPCC determined that investigators nonetheless had an obligation to continue gathering and assessing all available evidence before recommending charges. The report criticized investigators for not interviewing several potentially important witnesses, failing to fully analyze text messages and digital communications, and neglecting to adequately examine contextual evidence relating to consent, intoxication, and the interactions between the complainant and Hiestand before and after the alleged incident. The Commission also found that forensic evidence had not yet been fully processed when the decision to arrest and charge was made.

The MPCC further identified deficiencies in supervisory oversight and case management within the CFNIS. Supervisors failed to ensure investigative objectivity, did not sufficiently challenge assumptions made by investigators, and allowed the case to progress without confirming that investigative standards had been met. The report stated that this lack of oversight contributed to tunnel vision and a “rush to judgment,” undermining both fairness and public confidence in the military justice system.

 

While the Commission did not conclude that the investigation directly caused Major Hiestand’s suicide, it acknowledged the profound personal and professional consequences of the arrest and charging process. The report emphasized that investigators must remain aware of the serious impacts criminal allegations can have on accused persons, complainants, families, and military communities. The MPCC stressed that balanced and thorough investigations are essential not only for accountability and victim support, but also for protecting procedural fairness and the integrity of the justice system.

 

The investigation resulted in 13 recommendations directed at improving military police investigative practices, especially in sexual assault cases. These recommendations included enhanced training on confirmation bias and investigative neutrality, stronger supervisory review, improved documentation practices, more comprehensive evidence assessment requirements, and clearer standards governing when charges should be laid. The MPCC also called for measures to reduce tunnel vision and reinforce investigators’ obligations to seek both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.

 

The final report framed the Hiestand case as a cautionary example of how investigative bias, insufficient oversight, and premature decision-making can compromise justice outcomes. It urged the Canadian military policing system to adopt reforms aimed at restoring confidence, improving professionalism, and ensuring fair, evidence-based investigations in future cases.

 

“I am troubled by the CFPM’s weak and dismissive response to recommendations grounded in clear and serious investigative failings,” Chair Tammy Tremblay commented. “These recommendations were designed to strengthen investigative experience, procedures, supervision, and case management in sexual assault investigations, all of which were plainly deficient here. Yet, in response to 13 recommendations, none were accepted by the CFPM. Despite the extensive problems documented in this report, the CFPM was unable to acknowledge the need for improvement in any of the areas addressed.

 

 “Given the facts of this case, such complacency is astonishing. The family, and indeed the members of the military police, deserve better. Without a willingness to confront these shortcomings and commit to meaningful change, the systemic issues highlighted in this investigation will remain unaddressed, to the detriment of future military police investigators, complainants and the integrity of military policing as a whole. It is imperative that the CFPM swiftly implement these recommendations to ensure that all future investigations are conducted to the high standards of rigour, impartiality, and professionalism that Canadians expect and that members of the Canadian Forces deserve.”^[3]

    

---

[1] https://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/public-interest-investigations-and-hearings-enquetes-et-audiences-dinteret-public/hiestand-investigation-enquete/pii-eip-2022-017-041-fnl-rpt-eng.html

[2] Ibid, p. 29-30.

[3] Ibid, pp. 68-69.