The “10 Disciplines” of Chinese Military Law at the Unit (danwei) Level

The following post is a guest contribution by Peter Lamont.

Substantial revisions to the Regulations on Discipline of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) came into force May 1, 2025. Formulated by the Central Military Commission, these rules trace their ancestry back to the venerable “3 Rules of Discipline and 8 Points for Attention” that governed the forerunner of the Chinese PLA, the Chinese Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, as early as 1927. The current rules govern the conduct of members of the PLA at the unit level, both regular and reserve forces, and both officers and other ranks, as well as civilian members. Over the lifespan of the PLA the Discipline Regulation has been amended or revised from time to time, and the last revision was in 2018. 

Many of the changes for 2025 might have been accomplished by ordinary amendments rather than a full-scale revision. For example, prior to this month jurisdiction over reservists was limited to occasions when reservists take part in hostilities. But as of this month reservists are subject to military discipline when called up for training, undertake combat-readiness tasks or take part in military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as disaster relief or the maintenance of public order. The punishment of dismissal from post is abolished, and a new punishment of reduction in pay (called “demotion”) is introduced. Perhaps more significantly, the scheme of probation for non-commissioned members that allowed military authorities a measure of control over undisciplined behaviour short of bringing formal disciplinary charges is also abolished.

But the most significant changes from 2018 merited a full-scale revision because of a substantial recasting of all the disciplinary offences. (A translation of Chapter VI of the 2018 Discipline Regulation, including all of the offences, is available on the website of China Law Translate at https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/Chinese-Peoples-Liberation-Army-Disciplinary-Regulations,-2018,-CHAPTER-VI/).

The disciplinary offences in the 2018 Regulation were presented in a somewhat haphazard manner, but ten new articles in the 2018 version introduced the “10 Disciplines” as a theoretical construct. What was theoretical in 2018 is now explicit. In the current version all disciplinary offences are organized under the “10 Disciplines” - offences against organizational discipline, warfighting discipline, training discipline, work discipline, secrecy discipline, financial discipline, etc. 

In a previous post in November, 2021 [https://globalmjreform.blogspot.com/2021/01/developments-in-chinese-military-law.html] I discussed the substantial changes in Chinese military law at the unit level effected by the 2018 revision of the Discipline Regulation, and noted the increasingly dominant role of political officers in the administration of Chinese military discipline. A number of purely political offences were added to the Discipline Regulation in 2018, and all of these offences are carried forward into the 2025 version. Most are now found in the new Art.93 that lists the offences against “political discipline”. 

This is more than simply repackaging. Each of the “10 Disciplines” includes new specific offences, shedding some light on what is meant by each Discipline and on the kinds of behaviours the Discipline Regulation is expected to address.

The salient characteristic of the 2025 revision of the Discipline Regulation is the lack of precision introduced into the formulation of many of the disciplinary offences. Offences under the 2018 version were often framed to punish the violations of other regulations that govern the behaviour of soldiers - for example, the regulations on the use of the Internet, or training regulations, or the State or army secrecy regulations - and virtually all of the offences in the 2018 version are carried forward into 2025. But many of the newly created offences in 2025 describe punishable behaviours rather than the violation of other specific regulations, and are couched in very vague terms. For example, Art.93(4) item 8. punishes “improper political behaviour that causes harmful effects”, and Art.94 dealing with “organizational discipline” makes it an offence to “violate the principle of democratic centralism, putting one’s own will above the organization, and falling to act in accordance with principles, policies, rules and procedures”. Art.102 groups a number of different offences under the rubric of “life discipline” and in subsection (3) punishes “violating public order and good morals, improper words and deeds in public places or cyberspace, or other behaviour that seriously violates social morality or family values”. As well,  Art.103 punishes behaviours that are merely analogous to many of the enumerated disciplinary offences. This policy approach to the formulation of offences makes it difficult for soldiers to appreciate what kinds of conduct on their part will be considered detrimental to military discipline, and at the same time affords those who are enforcing the rules an enormous latitude to punish behaviour that they simply disapprove of.

Some of the new offences in 2025, especially in Art.95 dealing with warfighting discipline, are inspired by the language of the 1997 Criminal Law that created a number of criminal offences for which only military personnel are liable. For example, under Art.444 of the Criminal Law it is an offence to intentionally abandon the wounded or sick on the battlefield, and Art.95(2) item 4. creates a new disciplinary offence of “failing to come to the aid of wounded or sick personnel when conditions permit”. 

Other new offences continue the practice, first adopted in the 2018 version, of borrowing from the disciplinary regimes that apply to other non-military groups to create disciplinary offences for the military. For example, Art.102((1), punishes “living an extravagant and wasteful life, seeking pleasure or pursuing vulgar interests”, and is taken directly from the Discipline Regulation for Public Prosecutors, 2016. 

On the other hand, some of the new offences are framed with a high degree of specificity. Art.99 punishes several disciplinary offences related to corruption under the rubric of “integrity discipline”. Art.149 of the 2018 Discipline Regulation was a general provision to catch “those who are corrupt or offer or accept bribes”, but the new Art.99 lists a number of much more specific offences, thereby offering some insight into the inventiveness of some who engage in corrupt practices in the PLA. Accepting property such as gifts, cash and consumer cards “that may affect the proper performance of official duties” is a new offence. Subsection 99(1) item 9. punishes “embezzling or privately distributing consolation money or gifts” and is taken from Art.14 of the 2005 Regulations Implementing the Discipline of the Communist Party of China in the Army. And Art.99(2) punishes “those who pay lecture fees, project fees, consulting fees, etc. as a pretext for giving gifts”.

And finally, Art.101 deals with “mass discipline”, addressing the relationship between PLA members and local civilians. Only one offence in this category finds a counterpart in the 2018 Regulation, and that is “failing to come to the rescue when the property of the State or the lives and property of the masses are under serious threat, when able to do so”. A new offence is found in Art.101(3) - “violating the regulations on supporting the government and cherishing the people, the policies on ethnic groups and religion, and failing to respect the customs and habits of the masses in ethnic minority areas”.

Only time will tell whether the new approach to formulating disciplinary offences is workable and effective to address discipline problems in the Chinese PLA.