The Reform of China’s Military Procuratorate Since 2016: Exploration and Prospects

Ke Ben of the China University of Political Science and Law's School of Law has written this 2025 article on the country's military procuratorate for the Journal of Politics and Law. Abstract:

The China Military Procuratorate has been reshaped by two major reforms. The 2016 overhaul of the military judicial system created a vertically led, relatively independent procuratorial hierarchy. In 2018, however, the Military Discipline Inspection Commission absorbed all duty crime investigative powers, tilting the balance of legal oversight. Based on the military judicial reform experiences of various countries around the world, this article recommends three corrective steps: (1) formally affirm the procuratorate’s status as a branch of state judicial power; (2) restore dual vertical leadership under the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Central Military Commission; and (3) give the procuratorate statutory authority to supervise the Discipline Inspection Commission. These measures offer practical guidance for strengthening PLA legal supervision and supply a comparative model for global military justice reform and anti corruption efforts.

The author concludes:

From the reform experiences of military justice institutions across countries, we can observe that military power has an inherent tendency toward arbitrariness and expansion – a tendency closely tied to the operational and managerial demands faced by military organizations. Many armed forces have sought to establish judicial bodies subordinated to the military in order to control justice within the ranks. Yet in a democratic state there should be no such “state within a state.” Military judicial organs ought to serve as the last defender of justice, not as tools for disciplining service members on behalf of the command.

Comparative practice shows that carefully designing power boundaries and procedures can minimize these risks: first, insulate the chain of command from investigative and prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases, vesting decisions on whether and how to prosecute in career prosecutors subject to civilian rules; second, place military cases under the unified rules of ordinary justice and meaningful external review, at a minimum ensuring genuine final-review channels – parliamentary oversight, constitutional or supreme court scrutiny – so that military justice always operates within the visibility and accountability of the national legal order; third, retain narrowly tailored military exceptions in extraordinary times but specify clear triggering conditions, time limits, and reversion paths to prevent the normalization of exceptions.

Looking back at China’s Military Procuratorate, it has undergone a shift from leadership by military political organs to dual leadership by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Central Military Commission’s Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Confronted with a military supervisory commission that holds investigative powers over duty-related crimes, and drawing on comparative reforms, this article proposes three pathways: clarifying the legal character of powers, re-shaping the organizational model, and exercising oversight over the military supervisory commission. The Military Procuratorate is a highly specialized institution that must, on the one hand, remain embedded in the state judicial architecture and, on the other, accommodate the demands of military operations. Tracing reforms since 2016, this article identifies issues such as the weakening of the legal-supervision function and recommends strengthening military rule of law by entrenching the Procuratorate’s status in legal supervision and improving mechanisms for overseeing military supervisory bodies. These discussions not only illuminate China’s military-law reforms but also offer a reference point for other countries grappling with judicial independence and checks and balances within the armed forces.