DFC--no, not the medal

Beth Sullivan, Navy fires CO of reserve readiness center in San Diego. Military Times, 12 August 2025.

[He] was relieved of his duties as REDCEN San Diego’s commanding officer by [the C]ommander, Naval Information Force Reserve, or CNIFR, “due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command,” the Navy said in a brief release.

The Navy term for this action is a Detachment for Cause (DFC). The Air Force and Army call the personnel action a Relief for Cause. Navy folks will understand why the term "Relief" is not used--too confusing when we routinely use Relief when the Officer of the Deck or commanding officer is relieved. Anyway, back to the story. For those of us who represent persons DFC'd or RFC'd, the following article rings true in many respects.

On the same day as the Sullivan article, we read, Michael Furay,  A Loss of Confidence. RealClear Defense, 12 August 2025.

It is difficult to rise to command in the United States Navy. The military remains, by and large, a meritocracy aimed at ensuring that only the best attain “command at sea” of the nation’s submarines, aircraft squadrons, and ships. Of all officers commissioned as ensigns in 1983, only 3% attained that goal. The road they travelled was intensely competitive, difficult, and littered with the thousands who failed to meet the Navy’s given standard of “sustained superior performance at sea,” further defined as “performance exemplified by a consistent record of exceeding expectations while demonstrating leadership and expertise at sea.”

As for the promotion system used to winnow the field, it features annual, ranked assessment of fitness in the performance of duty, along with rigorous multiple administrative and statutory boards. For those who do successfully attain and succeed in their first, or O5 command, only a relative few will subsequently be selected for a second, or O6 command, more commonly known as “major command.” “Major,” which is an even larger combatant command, is the last gate through which a few of these officers will pass prior to selection to flag rank. The entire aim of this system is to ensure that not only do the most qualified get to command the Navy’s combat units, but that the best of the best are prepared to become admirals. 

Yet, despite whatever expectation might arise based upon this culling, many will fail dramatically once in command. Every year a number of these elect will be relieved of their duties via “Detachment for Cause” (DFC). A DFC indicates that an officer did something so fundamentally egregious that they were shown the door. In view of the gauntlet an officer must run to even get to command in the first place, as well as the fact that these dismissals inevitably become national news, one might sensibly ask why exactly, on average, 16 of our “best and brightest” fail each year. . . . 

The number of officers in command at sea at any one time varies; however, in 2023 there were a total of 70 submarines, 103 aircraft squadrons, and 281 battle force ships, totaling some 454 commands. In that same year, 16 commanding officers were DFC’d. While as a percentage, the number of officers fired in any given year may be statistically low, it is a topic of enormous anxiety to Navy leadership. In 2004, following an observed increase in the number of commanding officers being detached, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed the Naval Inspector General to conduct an in-depth review of commanding officer DFC cases between the years 1999 and June 2004. The intent of the “Commanding Officer Detach for Cause Study,” was to determine whether there were unanticipated or unidentified systemic factors that contributed to the removals. [The study, covering a 4.5 year period, found that 78 officers were detached for cause during the examined period, averaging 16 per year. Since then, while the number of commanding officers fired, year-to-year, has varied, 16 has remained a generally consistent benchmark. In other words, between 3 and 4% of commanding officers are fired annually.]

Captain Furay deployed on every tour and to operational areas in the Middle East, Western and Eastern Asia, Europe, and South America while serving on numerous cruiser and destroyer-type ships. He commanded an Aegis destroyer, and an Aegis cruiser as Air Warfare Commander. He also completed multiple Pentagon tours and attained a master’s from the Kennedy School at Harvard.

I have no idea of its merit so this is not a recommendation of Worth the Read book, but the writer recommends reading Michael Junge, Crimes of Command in the United States Navy 1945-2015. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018.