Canadian Military Police Oversight Body’s Challenges

This summer, the Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada (MPCC)^[1] has been active on two fronts. On the first one, it requested in its annual report more powers to improve the oversight regime for Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) military police. On the second front, the MPCC started a public interest hearing concerning an active shooter exercise, despite opposition from the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPM) over its jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry on a matter of training.

1.       Annual Report of the Military Police Complaints Commission

In a press release,[2] the MPCC announces that it has issued its annual report for 2023-2024.[3]

1.1.   Key Findings and Challenges

In 2024, the MPCC received an increasing number of complaints about military police conduct,[4] resulting in a significant workload for the commission. Despite this, the MPCC states it improved its efficiency and timeliness in processing complaints. However, the commission faced challenges due to resistance from the OPM of the CAF, which hindered the MPCC's ability to exercise its oversight mandate.

1.2.   Operational Highlights & Statistics[5]

In 2024, the MPCC:

• Published nine final reports detailing the results of investigations into allegations of military police misconduct
• Conducted eight public interest investigations, which are complex and resource-intensive
• Improved its complaint handling processes and reduced processing times
• Provided training to staff on trauma-informed approaches and leveraged technology to enhance investigation efficiency

The MPCC's annual report includes statistics on complaints received, processed, and investigated. These statistics provide insight into the types of complaints received and the outcomes of investigations.

1.3.   Resistance to Oversight[6]

According to MPCC, the OPM's resistance to its oversight took the form of refusing to disclose information, restrictive interpretations of the MPCC's mandate, and a decline in accepted recommendations. This resistance - writes the MPCC - has persisted and worsened over time, with the OPM interpreting the National Defence Act[7] in a way that avoids civilian oversight. The MPCC is concerned that this resistance may undermine the commission's ability to fulfill its mandate.

1.4.   Recommendations for Legislative Reform[8]

The MPCC proposes several recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its mandate and to strengthen public trust in the military police. Among these recommendations are:

• Expanding the MPCC's mandate to include review of complaints related to the conduct of members of the Canadian Armed Forces who are not military police officers, but who are involved in military police operations.
• Improving transparency and accountability within the military police by requiring that investigations be conducted more thoroughly and that findings be communicated to complainants.
• Strengthening the MPCC's powers to enable it to conduct more thorough investigations and to take more effective action to address problems identified.

Consequently, the MPCC proposed a Bill in 2024 to the Minister of National Defence and stakeholders.[9] For readers who would like to know more, the essence of the legislative reform proposals in the Bill are explained in a comprehensive matrix.[10]

1.5.   Public Confidence and Trust

Overall, the MPCC emphasizes the importance of maintaining public confidence and trust in the military police. The commission believes that independent civilian oversight is crucial in ensuring that military police conduct is transparent, accountable, and respectful of human rights. The MPCC's efforts to improve its processes and address challenges are aimed at maintaining the trust and confidence of the public, complainants, and military police members.

2.       Public Interest Hearing into a Simulation Exercise

More than a month later, the MPCC announced[11] that it will hold a public interest hearing to investigate the conduct of members of the military police during a simulation exercise of an active shooter at the Canadian Forces Base Longue-Pointe in Montreal. According to the complaint, the exercise allegedly went awry, and a civilian employee was detained and treated inappropriately.

2.1.   Context

The simulation exercise was intended to prepare military personnel and the military police to respond to active shooter situations. However, it appears that the exercise degenerated, and the civilian employee was subjected to inappropriate treatment, according to the complaint.

2.2.   Objective of the Hearing

The hearing aims to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident and identify responsibilities. The MPCC indicated that it will examine the conduct of the military police members involved in the incident and assess whether their actions were justified.

2.3.   Importance of the Hearing

According to MPCC, the hearing is important to ensure that the CAF and the military police act responsibly and respectfully towards civilians, even in the context of simulation exercises. The MPCC indicated it will work to provide an objective and impartial report on the circumstances surrounding the incident.

2.4.   The Hearing is Indicative of a Broader Issue: MPCC’s Jurisdiction

But prior to the hearing, there was a debate between MPCC and OPM on whether an inquiry should be conducted and, if so, by which organization. Here is a chronology to help understand the issue:

• November 12, 2024: A civilian employee was painting on a Canadian Forces. He was aware of the exercise, but wasn't participating and didn't know the timing. As he left the painting room on the morning of the exercise, three or four police officers pointed their guns at him, ordered him to lie down, and searched him. The officer allegedly used aggressive language, dragged him, and tore his clothes. The employee felt like he was a suspect in a real incident, not just an exercise. He claims he was left outside in cold temperatures (around 1°C) in torn clothing, feeling shocked to have been humiliated and mistreated.[12]
• November 21-26, 2024: As per the National Defence Act[13] and regulations,[14] a complaint is filled on behalf of the civilian employee to the MPCC by the employee’s union representative. The civilian employee is on leave since the incident and claims that is ashamed to talk about it with his family and friends. He adds it had a negative impact on him as he belongs to a vulnerable group, which made him to be retraumatized, considering his background.[15]
• November 27, 2024: As MPCC was considering its jurisdiction, it advises the Canadian Forces Provost Marshall (CFPM) of the complaint and asks additional information on the incident. In response, the CFPM asks MPCC to provide a copy of the complaint.[16]
• November 29, 2024: The CFPM asks MPCC that the complaint be transferred to him.[17]
• December 3, 2024: The MPCC asks again the CFMP to provide more information about the incident.[18]
• December 6, 2024: In response, the CFPM again asks a copy of the complaint and refuses to provide the information asked by the MPCC.[19]
• December 24, 2024: The Chairperson of the MPCC (Chairperson) determines that even though the performance of training function is excluded from the definition of “policing duties or functions”, [20] the complaint nevertheless appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the MPCC. Although the exercise was part of a training program, the civilian employee was not participating in it. On that point, the Chairperson does not think it was Parliament’s intent to exclude a complainant “not taking part in an exercise and who are allegedly mistreated by members of the military police, simply because an exercise was in progress at the time of the incident”.[21] However, the Chairperson is not in a position to determine if it was in the public interest to launch a public interest investigation into this matter, as additional information on the event was not provided. Consequently, the Chairperson transfers the complaint to the office of the CFPM for processing in the first instance.[22]
• January 30, 2025: The Deputy CFPM decides that the complaint didn't fall under the MPCC's jurisdiction. He states that the incident was part of "training," which is excluded from military police duties.[23]
• February 24, 2025: Dissatisfied with CFPM’s decision, the complainant asks MPCC to review the matter.[24]
• March 5, 2025: MPCC sends a notice of review to CFPM and asks to be provided with the disclosure of the file.[25]
• May 9, 2025: In a response letter to MPCC, the newly appointed CFPM states that the complaint can't be reviewed under the National Defence Act because it doesn't involve conduct that falls under the Act. She claims that training is clearly excluded from policing duties.[26]
• July 18, 2025: The Chairperson disagrees with CFPM’s opinion and decides that MPCC has jurisdiction over the matter. For the Chairperson, the military exercise is not “training” in the sense of the regulations. Even if it was, the alleged violent conduct against the civilian employee is not. From his point of view, he was detained in the meaning of Section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Chairperson based her decision on a purposive interpretation of the National Defence Act to determine that MPCC has jurisdiction and that it was in the public interest to examine the complaint in a public hearing.[27]

Conclusion

The MPCC public hearing will likely shed more light on the matter. Considering the debate prior to the hearing, the MPCC might face other challenges in the future, although no case has been filed in Federal Court.

Key aspects to watch out for include:

• Allegations of misconduct: Evidence and testimonies will be crucial in understanding the circumstances surrounding the incident.
• Systemic implications: The MPCC may examine military police policies and procedures to prevent similar incidents in the future.
• Military police response: The reaction of military authorities to allegations and MPCC recommendations will be vital in determining next steps.

It's worth keeping an eye on this case to understand potential implications for Canada's military police. Transparency and accountability are essential for maintaining public trust in law enforcement institutions.

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[1] According to its mission statement, the MPCC is an independent civilian oversight body, in the form of an administrative tribunal, established by Parliament of Canada to review complaints about the conduct of military police members of the CAF. The commission's mandate is to promote and ensure the highest standards of professional conduct among military police, deter interference in military police investigations, and increase public confidence in the military police. See Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Mission, Vision, Values and Mandate”, Ottawa, 2024, online: <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/the-commission-la-commission/mission-statement-enonce-de-mission-eng.html>.

[2] Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada Issues 2024 Annual Report“, Ottawa, June 17, 2025 online: <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/newsroom-nouvelles/annual-report-rapport-annuel/newsroom-ar-nouvelles-ra-2024-eng.html>.

[3] Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, 2024 Annual Report, Ottawa, 2025, Catalogue No. DP1E-PDF, ISSN 1910-8249, online <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/corporate-organisation/reports-rapports/annuel-report-rapport-annuel/annual-report-rapport-annuel-2024-eng.html> [MPCC Report].

[4] Military Police Professional Code of Conduct (SOR/2000-14), online : <laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2000-14/index.html>.

[5] MPCC Report, supra note 3, at 11-13.

[6] Id., at 14-18.

[7] RSC, 1985, c N-5, Part IV « Complaints About or by Military Police », ss 250-250.49, online: <laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/n-5/page-35.html#h-378808> [NDA].

[8] MPCC Report, supra note 3, at 5-6, 18.

[9] Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Proposed Bill“, Ottawa, 2025, online: <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/legislative-issues-questions-legislatives/mpcc-bill-cppm-projet-de-loi-eng.html>.

[10] Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Legislative Reform Proposals to Enhance Civilian Oversight of the Military Police“, Ottawa, 2023, online: <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/legislative-issues-questions-legislatives/national-defence-act-loi-sur-la-defense-nationale/third-independent-review-troisieme-examen-independant/evergreen-matrix-proposals-reform-matrice-perenne-propositions-reforme-eng.html>.

[11] Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Military Police Complaints Commission announces Public Interest Hearing into alleged detention and treatment of a civilian“, Ottawa, July 23, 2025, online: <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/public-interest-investigations-and-hearings-enquetes-et-audiences-dinteret-public/goulet-hearing-audience/pii-eip-2024-051-index-eng.html>.

[12] Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Decision to Conduct a Public Interest Hearing (MPCC-2024-051)“, Ottawa, July 18, 2025, paras 4-6, online: < mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/public-interest-investigations-and-hearings-enquetes-et-audiences-dinteret-public/goulet-hearing-audience/pii-eip-2024-051-decision-to-conduct-a-hearing-decision-de-tenir-une-audience-eng.html> [Decision to Conduct Hearing].

[13] NDA, supra note 7, s 250.18.

[14] Complaints About the Conduct of Members of the Military Police Regulations, PC 1999-2065 18 November 1999, QR&O : Volume IV – Appendix 7.2, online : <canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/queens-regulations-orders/vol-4-appendices/appendix-7-2-complaints-about-conduct-members-military-police-regulations.html> [Complaints Regulations].

[15] Decision to Conduct Hearing, supra note 12, paras 7-8; Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada, “Jurisdiction Decision (MPCC-2024-051) Decision on MPCC Jurisdiction Regarding File No. MPCC 2024-051“, Ottawa, 2024, “Context”, online: <mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/case-summaries-resumes-des-dossiers/decisions/decision-2024-051-eng.html> [Jurisdiction Decision].

[16] Id., Decision to Conduct Hearing, supra note 12, paras 9.

[17] Id., para 10.

[18] Id., para 11.

[19] Id., para 12.

[20] Jurisdiction Decision, supra note 15, « Analysis ».

[21] Id.

[22] NDA, supra note 7, subs 250.26 (1).

[23] Decision to Conduct Hearing, supra note 12, paras 15-16.

[24] NDA, supra note 7, subs 250.31(1); Decision to Conduct Hearing, supra note 12, para 19.

[25] Id.

[26] Id., para 20.

[27] Id., paras 21-69.