Saturday, May 31, 2025

A request

 Greetings.

I am in the process of putting together a project for NIMJ's summer law student interns based on the concept of Restitution as a consequence of a court-martial conviction.

You can help.

There is no statutory or regulatory provision in the U.S. for restitution adjudged, ordered, or as a consequence of a court-martial conviction. There are some creative ways to provide restitution in guilty plea cases, but these options are limited and ad hoc.

I have the perception that various military justice systems around the world has some mechanism to provide restitution to victims of a court-martial offense.

Does your military justice system have such a mechanism? If it does, could you let me know by email at phildcave@gmail.com. We are interested in understanding how the process works, particularly in the enforcement of restitution after the trial. One of the main objections to court-ordered restitution from a U.S. court-martial conviction is a perceived lack of enforceability once the person has been discharged from the service.

The goal is to compile a comparative law information paper for NIMJ.

Thanks.

Delhi High Court (India) upholds dismissal of an Officer for refusing to attend religious ceremonies of other faiths in a multi-faith unit


The Delhi High Court has upheld the dismissal of an Officer of the Indian Army who refused to enter the innermost parts of places of worship of other religions during official functions/celebrations held on festivals of those religions.

While not taking any side in the matter, it may be clarified for the readers here that the Indian Army, depending upon troop composition of various regiments, jointly celebrates festivals of various faiths such as Diwali, Christmas, Eid, Gurupurab etc, which troop leaders are expected to attend, even if not directly participating in the religious activities.

The judgment has been reported by Bar & Bench here.

Before proceeding to discuss the merits of the issue, in Para 56 of the judgment, the Delhi High Court states the following:

“At the outset, we salute and acknowledge the dedication of those who guard our borders day and night in adverse conditions. The ethos of our Armed Forces places nation before self; and certainly, nation before religion. Our Armed Forces comprise of personnel of all religions, castes, creeds, regions, and faiths, whose sole motto is to safeguard the country from external aggressions, and, therefore, they are united by their uniform rather than divided by their religion, caste, or region.”

While this case might not be the last word on the issue, it remains to be seen if it is challenged before the Supreme Court of India.

Monday, May 26, 2025

COVID-19 (New Zealand)

Following is a statement issued today by the New Zealand Defence Force:

The Supreme Court’s decision represents a significant affirmation of Chief of Defence Force’s (CDF) ability to make important decisions relating to the command of the armed forces - in this case decisions on individual readiness requirements for military personnel. These decisions are essential for ​the New Zealand Defence Force to remain a combat-ready and resilient armed force keeping New Zealand safe and secure. 

The Supreme Court case stemmed from the COVID-19 vaccination requirement that CDF first required of all members of the Armed Forces of New Zealand in March 2021 as part of their individual readiness requirements for deployment.

The Supreme Court said the CDF was appointed under the Defence Act to lead the NZDF and was likely to be in a much better position than the court to evaluate the relevant considerations of orders relating to operational effectiveness and military discipline.

The NZDF continually reviews and determines appropriate baseline medical readiness criteria for personnel including required vaccines in order to protect personnel and enable them to carry out the duties required of them. 

Like a number of other vaccines, the COVID-19 vaccine remains part of the baseline vaccine schedule and is an individual readiness requirement. The Supreme Court’s decision supports the processes under Defence Force orders that apply to a person who cannot meet individual readiness where restrictions on duties and implications for service is considered on a case-by-case basis.

The decision in question is Chief of Defence Force v. Four Members of the Armed Forces, [2025] NZSC 34 (N.Z. Apr. 11, 2025).

Memorial Day 2025

Ball's Bluff National Cemetery
Leesburg, Virginia 

Gag the MAG?

The Jerusalem Post reports here that Israel's Defence Minister has forbidden the Military Advocate General (MAG) to address a bar meeting. Excerpt:

In May 2024, [Maj. Gen. Yifat] Tomer Yerushalmi revealed to the world that the IDF had already opened over 70 criminal probes against its soldiers.

Since then, including recently, the Jerusalem Post has learned that this number is closer to 90, and that there are hundreds of serious operational probes and well over 1,000 preliminary probes.

However, since an interim report in August 2024, the IDF has not issued any public statement on the issue.

In fact, the Post has learned that a public update which was supposed to be issued in early 2025 was also blocked, and there has been no update as to when another public report will be issued.

These moves of preventing public disclosures might serve the government's political fears of being attacked for allowing prosecutions of soldiers, but could also harm Israel in defending itself globally.

Saturday, May 24, 2025

Lawfare post on military justice

Jordan S. Allen, a 2025 graduate of the University of Virginia Law School, has written Maintaining Military Justice in the Face of Presidential Expansionism for Lawfare. The reference to Article 98, UCMJ, is obsolete; the correct reference now is Article 131f(2), UCMJ. Also, both sides appealed Bergdahl v. United States. (Full disclosure: the Editor represents Sgt. Bergdahl.)

High Commissioner speaks out on Ugandan Parliament's action

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has posted the following:

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk on Friday expressed concern at the passing in Uganda’s Parliament of proposed legislation to allow for civilians to be tried in military courts.

The Uganda People’s Defence Forces Amendment Bill 2025, which was passed on 20 May and now awaits presidential signature to become law, among others broadens the jurisdiction of military courts, authorising them to try a wide range of offences against civilians.

“I am concerned that rather than encouraging efforts to implement the Supreme Court’s crystal-clear decision of January this year, Uganda’s legislators have voted to reinstate and broaden military court’s jurisdiction to try civilians, which would contravene international human rights law obligations,” said Türk.

“I respectfully urge President [Yoweri] Museveni to reject the retrogressive bill and take the necessary steps to comply fully and promptly with the Supreme Court’s decision.”

The trial of civilians by military courts is in principle incompatible with international human rights law as it raises serious problems in relation to equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice. Such trials are only permissible in exceptional cases and subject to strict requirements.

In its landmark decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the unconstitutionality of trying civilians in military courts, and ordered the immediate transfer of all criminal charges, ongoing trials or pending cases involving civilians in military courts to ordinary civilian courts of competent authority.

Parliament’s endorsement of the regressive proposals in the amended bill coincides with a troubling rise in arrests and abductions, harassment and intimidation, as well as torture and other ill-treatment of members of the political opposition, in the lead up to presidential and parliamentary elections early next year.

Special Issue of the Canadian Bar Review on Military Law


The Canadian Bar Review – Revue du Barreau canadien of the Canadian Bar Association has recently published on its website a special issue on military law. As put by the publication: “The articles in this special issue devoted to military law – broadly defined – bring to the fore issues which are sometimes neglected in mainstream legal writing, but which have implications for a variety of legal fields.”

Amongst the authors are Rory Fowler, former military lawyer, contributor, and co-editor to this blog, and Afton David, senior legal counsel at Chantier Davie Canada Inc., and a reservist with the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa. In their text “R v Edwards and Independence of Canadian Military Judiciary: A Judgment that Leaves Us Wanting More they offer a different perspective on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Edwards, 2024 SCC 15 (CanLII). They essentially argue that “as long as military judges are subject to the Code of Service Discipline, they remain subordinate to the executive in a manner which is inconsistent with the [Canadian] Charter [of Rights and Freedoms]”.

Also amongst the authors is Michel W Drapeau, another contributor to this blog. In his text “Soldiers’ Grievances: A Morale and Leadership Barometer”, he essentially explains that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is working to address a significant backlog in grievance resolution, potentially marking a shift in their approach to handling these issues.

As another faithful servant of the cause of justice for service members, I also contribute to the issue. In “Pour une association professionnelle de défense des droits des militaires au Canada, I advocate for recognizing the right of CAF members to join a union-type professional association, without granting the right to collective bargaining or the right to strike. Using comparative law, I argue that CAF regulations, having currently the effect of prohibiting such association, infringe the right of association of section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society.

Friday, May 23, 2025

Can this really be happening?

According to this report, the Pakistani armed forces are refusing to release to the Islamabad High Court the record of proceedings in the court-martial case of a senior air force officer. Excerpt:

The PAF officials told the court that according to the PAF Act, the record of the sentence given and the record of the charge sheet could not be provided. The petitioner's lawyer said that this had never happened before under their own law. However, the PAF officials denied that claim.

The petitioner's lawyer pleaded to the court that injustice had been committee in the case against Jawad Saeed, adding that neither he was given the lawyer of his choice, nor the record. He said that Jawad Saeed's family was also not informed.

Court-martial colonialism

NilePost has run this powerful op-ed by Isaac Christopher Lubogo on the latest military justice legislation in Uganda. Highly recommended reading.

Watch for further proceedings in the Supreme Court of Uganda as well as litigation before the East African Court of Justice.

Pakistan's Military Courts Case

The justices' opinions in Pakistan's 5-2 Military Courts Case decision (Khawaja v. Federation) have still not been handed down. For a useful summary of the controversy, including the history, this Wikipedia article is recommended.

Constitutional crisis in Uganda

The Uganda Perliament has passed the Uganda People's Defence Force (Amendment) Act, 2025. Among other things, the measure provides for trial of civilians by court-martial, notwithstanding the recent Kabaziguruka decision of the Supreme Court holding that courts-martial may not do so. Parliament's website provides this useful account of the proceedings. At left, Hon. Anita Among, Speaker.

Assent is a foregone conclusion. Then what?

Major report from The Australia Institute

The Australia Institute has released a major report: War Crimes: Where do Responsibility and Accountability Start and End? Here is the AI's announcement (hyperlinks added):

In dismissing Ben Roberts-Smith’s appeal against the judgement in his defamation action against the Nine network and two journalists, the full court of the Federal Court has confirmed Justice [Anthony] Besanko’s findings that the allegations against him were proven to a civil standard of proof.

But more than that, the full court has cleared the air. The government and the Australian Defence Force can now get on with addressing the systemic issues that surrounded the alleged crimes in the first place.

The government can now rouse the Office of the Special Investigator from its hibernation to pursue its inquiries into events that occurred one and a half decades ago and into Major General [Peter] Brereton’s 2020 report (almost half a decade ago) with determination and energy.

As importantly, it can push the Defence force to address the fundamental command failures that allowed the alleged criminal acts to occur in the first place, and to continue for so long.

“No one knew” just does not wash. And Brereton’s gratuitous exoneration of senior commanders (paragraph 28 of his report, which he demolishes in the immediately following paragraph) fails to answer the question “how did these events occur?”

Today, The Australia Institute has released a report: War Crimes: Where do Responsibility and Accountability Start and End? Are Senior Military Commanders Liable and Culpable?

The report argues that senior commanders are accountable, responsible, liable and culpable for crimes committed by their troops, not criminally but administratively. Commanders are responsible for the systems that constitute the “war machine” that supports the conduct of armed conflict.

“Just as company directors are responsible for financial and management failure in the companies they oversee, so commanders are responsible for failures within the military system”, said Allan Behm, Special Advisor at The Australia Institute and author of the report.

“Criminal responsibility on the part of commanders is a red herring: the real issue is whether there are fail-safe systems, and whether they work. In the case of special forces in Afghanistan, they didn’t.

“When the system fails, those in charge fail. Their failure should be acknowledged. And if they have been rewarded and honoured for success, the rewards and honours are based on falsehood. Rewards and honour should be rescinded, otherwise they undermine the integrity of the system and the value of recognition.”

Thursday, May 22, 2025

The “10 Disciplines” of Chinese Military Law at the Unit (danwei) Level

The following post is a guest contribution by Peter Lamont.

Substantial revisions to the Regulations on Discipline of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) came into force May 1, 2025. Formulated by the Central Military Commission, these rules trace their ancestry back to the venerable “3 Rules of Discipline and 8 Points for Attention” that governed the forerunner of the Chinese PLA, the Chinese Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, as early as 1927. The current rules govern the conduct of members of the PLA at the unit level, both regular and reserve forces, and both officers and other ranks, as well as civilian members. Over the lifespan of the PLA the Discipline Regulation has been amended or revised from time to time, and the last revision was in 2018. 

Many of the changes for 2025 might have been accomplished by ordinary amendments rather than a full-scale revision. For example, prior to this month jurisdiction over reservists was limited to occasions when reservists take part in hostilities. But as of this month reservists are subject to military discipline when called up for training, undertake combat-readiness tasks or take part in military operations other than war (MOOTW) such as disaster relief or the maintenance of public order. The punishment of dismissal from post is abolished, and a new punishment of reduction in pay (called “demotion”) is introduced. Perhaps more significantly, the scheme of probation for non-commissioned members that allowed military authorities a measure of control over undisciplined behaviour short of bringing formal disciplinary charges is also abolished.

But the most significant changes from 2018 merited a full-scale revision because of a substantial recasting of all the disciplinary offences. (A translation of Chapter VI of the 2018 Discipline Regulation, including all of the offences, is available on the website of China Law Translate at https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/Chinese-Peoples-Liberation-Army-Disciplinary-Regulations,-2018,-CHAPTER-VI/).

The disciplinary offences in the 2018 Regulation were presented in a somewhat haphazard manner, but ten new articles in the 2018 version introduced the “10 Disciplines” as a theoretical construct. What was theoretical in 2018 is now explicit. In the current version all disciplinary offences are organized under the “10 Disciplines” - offences against organizational discipline, warfighting discipline, training discipline, work discipline, secrecy discipline, financial discipline, etc. 

In a previous post in November, 2021 [https://globalmjreform.blogspot.com/2021/01/developments-in-chinese-military-law.html] I discussed the substantial changes in Chinese military law at the unit level effected by the 2018 revision of the Discipline Regulation, and noted the increasingly dominant role of political officers in the administration of Chinese military discipline. A number of purely political offences were added to the Discipline Regulation in 2018, and all of these offences are carried forward into the 2025 version. Most are now found in the new Art.93 that lists the offences against “political discipline”. 

This is more than simply repackaging. Each of the “10 Disciplines” includes new specific offences, shedding some light on what is meant by each Discipline and on the kinds of behaviours the Discipline Regulation is expected to address.

The salient characteristic of the 2025 revision of the Discipline Regulation is the lack of precision introduced into the formulation of many of the disciplinary offences. Offences under the 2018 version were often framed to punish the violations of other regulations that govern the behaviour of soldiers - for example, the regulations on the use of the Internet, or training regulations, or the State or army secrecy regulations - and virtually all of the offences in the 2018 version are carried forward into 2025. But many of the newly created offences in 2025 describe punishable behaviours rather than the violation of other specific regulations, and are couched in very vague terms. For example, Art.93(4) item 8. punishes “improper political behaviour that causes harmful effects”, and Art.94 dealing with “organizational discipline” makes it an offence to “violate the principle of democratic centralism, putting one’s own will above the organization, and falling to act in accordance with principles, policies, rules and procedures”. Art.102 groups a number of different offences under the rubric of “life discipline” and in subsection (3) punishes “violating public order and good morals, improper words and deeds in public places or cyberspace, or other behaviour that seriously violates social morality or family values”. As well,  Art.103 punishes behaviours that are merely analogous to many of the enumerated disciplinary offences. This policy approach to the formulation of offences makes it difficult for soldiers to appreciate what kinds of conduct on their part will be considered detrimental to military discipline, and at the same time affords those who are enforcing the rules an enormous latitude to punish behaviour that they simply disapprove of.

Some of the new offences in 2025, especially in Art.95 dealing with warfighting discipline, are inspired by the language of the 1997 Criminal Law that created a number of criminal offences for which only military personnel are liable. For example, under Art.444 of the Criminal Law it is an offence to intentionally abandon the wounded or sick on the battlefield, and Art.95(2) item 4. creates a new disciplinary offence of “failing to come to the aid of wounded or sick personnel when conditions permit”. 

Other new offences continue the practice, first adopted in the 2018 version, of borrowing from the disciplinary regimes that apply to other non-military groups to create disciplinary offences for the military. For example, Art.102((1), punishes “living an extravagant and wasteful life, seeking pleasure or pursuing vulgar interests”, and is taken directly from the Discipline Regulation for Public Prosecutors, 2016. 

On the other hand, some of the new offences are framed with a high degree of specificity. Art.99 punishes several disciplinary offences related to corruption under the rubric of “integrity discipline”. Art.149 of the 2018 Discipline Regulation was a general provision to catch “those who are corrupt or offer or accept bribes”, but the new Art.99 lists a number of much more specific offences, thereby offering some insight into the inventiveness of some who engage in corrupt practices in the PLA. Accepting property such as gifts, cash and consumer cards “that may affect the proper performance of official duties” is a new offence. Subsection 99(1) item 9. punishes “embezzling or privately distributing consolation money or gifts” and is taken from Art.14 of the 2005 Regulations Implementing the Discipline of the Communist Party of China in the Army. And Art.99(2) punishes “those who pay lecture fees, project fees, consulting fees, etc. as a pretext for giving gifts”.

And finally, Art.101 deals with “mass discipline”, addressing the relationship between PLA members and local civilians. Only one offence in this category finds a counterpart in the 2018 Regulation, and that is “failing to come to the rescue when the property of the State or the lives and property of the masses are under serious threat, when able to do so”. A new offence is found in Art.101(3) - “violating the regulations on supporting the government and cherishing the people, the policies on ethnic groups and religion, and failing to respect the customs and habits of the masses in ethnic minority areas”.

Only time will tell whether the new approach to formulating disciplinary offences is workable and effective to address discipline problems in the Chinese PLA.

The New 92?

Those concerned with lawful-oerders issues will want to consider this article by Kyra Ziesk-Socolov from the 2025 Pace Law Review. Among other things, the author "investigates whether alteration of the contemporary framework governing compliance with lawful orders is warranted, given the shifting contemporary normative dimensions of military policy guidance issued by senior civilian officials in the Department of Defense, and proposes some reforms to the existing paradigm to ensure the maintenance of good order and discipline within the military ecosystem and the preservation of constitutional values and ethical policymaking writ large."

Wednesday, May 21, 2025

A general at a general court-martial?

The Armed Forces of the Philippines may take legal action against a senior military officer facing misconduct after it had established prima facie evidence based on an "internal investigation."

The unidentified senior officer was relieved from his post pending a General Court Martial (GCM), headed by Gen. Romeo Brawner, AFP chief.

The case stemmed from two junior officers who filed a complaint for sexual assault against the senior officer.

So reports The Manila Times.

Thursday, May 15, 2025

An interesting panel discussion

We hope that this session was successful in providing a comparative overview, demonstrating that fair military justice systems are not all the same and that the United States at least might consider the approaches of its key allies as it contemplates further revisions to its military justice system.

From this summary of a comparative military justice panel at the 2025 CLE program sponsored by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Other materials from the program can be found here.

Tuesday, May 13, 2025

R v Colonel Kearney

On 8 May 2025, a court martial sentenced a retired Canadian colonel to a fine of $3,000.00 and a severe reprimand following a guilty plea to a single charge of "conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline" contrary to s 129 of the National Defence Act (NDA).  The judgment has not yet been notoriously published, but the proceeding was the subject of brief reporting in the news media, including by two reporters who regularly cover matters of National Defence: Murray Brewster of the CBC ("Retired army colonel fined, reprimanded for insulting British senior officer") and David Pugliese of the Ottawa Citizen ("Canadian officer fined $3,000 for derogatory comment about British general").

Colonel Rob Kearney was a former officer of the regular force who retired in 2012, and then returned to service as a member of the reserve force a few years later, in order to serve in senior advisory positions at National Defence Headquarters.  He was then posted to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) based out of Innsworth, United Kingdom a few years ago.  At the time, he was serving on a 'Class C' period of service as a reserve force officer. [For our American cousins, this is roughly analogous to 'Active Duty' status for an officer of the Reserves or the National Guard.]

According to a Canadian Forces News Release in April 2024, Colonel Kearney was initially charged on 23 April 2024 with five separate charges, each under s 129 of the NDA, with the dates of the allegations ranging from December 2021 to November 2023.  A complaint was first made in November 2023, and following a military police investigation, charges were laid five months later.  However, by the time that a court martial was convened before military judge, Colonel Nancy Isenor, only a single charge was presented.  Colonel Kearney pled guilty to the single charge.  And, while the judgment has not yet been published, and news reports did not indicate whether this was a joint submission within the framework established under the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in R v Anthony Cook, 2016 SCC 43, it appears that this may have been the case.

Shortly after the charges were laid in April 2024, Colonel Kearney, who had been posted to the United Kingdom, was repatriated back to Canada.  he then retired for a second time.

By virtue of subs 60(2) of the NDA, the Canadian Forces retained jurisdiction to try Colonel Kearney by court martial, even though he had retired prior to his court martial being convened.  Former members of the CF remain liable for prosecution under the Code of Service Discipline for any alleged service offence that they are alleged to have committed while subject to the Code of Service Discipline, provided that the alleged offence fell within the jurisdiction of the Code of Service Discipline at the time that it was purported to have arisen. 

In light of the sentence imposed, pursuant to s 249.47 of the NDA, this will not give rise to a criminal record.

Uganda Parliament to consider UPDF Act amendments

The government of Uganda has introduced the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (Amendment) Bill, 2025 in Parliament. The measure is intended to respond, in part, to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Attorney General v. Kabaziguruka [2025] UGSC 1.

The military justice portions of the bill merit close study. It appears to suffer from at least one of the main defects in prior law: subjecting civilians to trial by court-martial. This is barred by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and strongly disfavored by global human rights jurisprudence.

The bill would give renewable three-year terms to legally-trained court-martial members, whose rulings on legal issues would be binding in unit and divisional courts-martial, but not in the general court-martial. The bill also makes provision for appellate review in the civilian courts.

If the bill passes as introduced, watch for renewed proceedings in the Supreme Court.

NilePost has this report on the bill.

Monday, May 12, 2025

Head of Royal Navy under investigation

The professional head of the Royal Navy, Adm Sir Ben Key KCB CBE is under investigation for an alleged breach of the Values of the Royal Navy involving an extra-marital affair with a junior, female officer. The allegation is unlikely to be dealt with via a Court Martial, which would have probably made him the most senior naval officer to face a Court Martial since Adm Byng, indeed as First Sea Lord he would be senior to Adm Byng. However, instead Key will be dealt with using Major Administrative Action a form of work place discipline administered by the chain of command. Whilst he will be able to instruct a lawyer to write representations on his behalf he will not be able to have legal representation in any hearing/meeting. 

As a single service policy it is hard to see who would form Key's chain of command. The Secretary of State for Defence is likely to be involved but the decision maker is likely to be Key's predecessor as First Sea Lord and now Chief of the Defence Staff, Adm Sir Tony Radakin KCB ADC. In that case, Key can expect little mercy as Radakin is an enthusiastic supporter of the Unacceptable Sexual Behaviours policy which mandates termination of service for those found on the balance of probabilities to have displayed unacceptable sexual behaviour: a lewd remark addressed to person A which offends person B will suffice. 

Key's routes of appeal are limited. He may lodge a Service Complaint, an internal complaints process described a neither 'efficient, effective or fair' in a recent parliamentary report. If he believes he was discriminated against (unlikely in the circumstances) he could bring a claim in the Employment Tribunal. Otherwise his only avenue would be a judicial review. A complicated and expensive process which would see the former professional head of His Majesty's Navy litigating against His Majesty's Secretary of State for Defence. The prohibitive costs and reputational impact of such an action are well known and no doubt relied upon by those who do not wish due process brought into their internal system. 

For an officer like Key whose pension is secure and who will not be reliant on Service accommodation the implications are limited; an ignominious end to a successful career. For more junior ranks though this process can lead to the loss of their home and hundreds of thousands of pounds of lost pay, resettlement and pension. Major Administrative Action is an important tool for the chain of command but those at the top of the chain are beginning to experience the system from the sharp end. It is to be hoped it will lead to some reform. 

ADDENDUM: Meanwhile the BBC alleges Key's likely replacement as First Sea Lord, Gen Sir Gwyn Jenkins KCB OBE RM, has been complicit in the covering up of war crimes by the SAS. If true (the allegations are hotly denied) it would unquestionably amount to a breach of the Values of the Royal Navy, not to mention Misconduct of Public Office and conspiracy to Pervert the Course of Justice. Meanwhile, the former Chief of the General Staff, the professional head of the British Army, Gen (Rtd) Sir Mark Carleton-Smith KCB CBE ADC faces less serious but related allegations of failing to report evidence of the same war crimes. Carleton-Smith denies the allegations.

Saturday, May 10, 2025

An insightful article: Disservice to the military Florence Nightingale undone by the Supreme Court (LiveLaw.in)

The portal LiveLaw.in has carried an insightful article authored by Ananya Sharma and Roopan Atwal on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court of India granting veteran benefits to officers of the Military Nursing Service, earlier covered by this blog. The same can be accessed here and is reproduced below:

Disservice to the military Florence Nightingale undone by the Supreme Court

Ananya Sharma and Roopan Atwal

 A SNAPSHOT

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice PS Narsimha and Justice Manoj Misra recently paved the way for the first ex-Military Nursing Service (MNS) Short Service Commissioned Officer (SSCO) to be inducted into the Punjab Civil Services under the Ex-Servicemen (ESM) category (Civil Appeal 5235/2025 Irwan Kour Vs Punjab Public Service Commission & Ors decided on 16-04-2025). Captain Gurpreet Kaur, a retired MNS officer took the Punjab Civil Services (PCS) Examination – 2020 under the ESM category, sans the apprehension that an uphill and long legal battle awaited her. It is yet another story that despite women now being an integral part of the mainstream Defence Services, the terminology “Ex-ServiceMAN” has still not been changed into a gender-neutral term, such as “Ex-Servicemember” or “Ex-Service Personnel”, but we will leave that for another day.

Capt Kaur’s candidature for the PCS was rejected by the Punjab Public Service Commission on the ground that being an officer of the MNS, she could not be considered an ESM in terms of some correspondence received from the Kendriya Sainik Board. On the last working day of the then Acting Chief Justice, Justice Ritu Bahri (before she joined as the Chief Justice of the Uttarakhand High Court), a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court comprising her and Justice Aman Chaudhary had ruled Capt Kaur to be fully falling within the definition of ESM as per the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-servicemen Rules, 1982 (“State Rules, 1982”). The Bench directed the State of Punjab to appoint her as a PCS officer with notional benefits of service (LPA  636/2022 Gurpreet Kaur Vs Punjab Public Service Commission decided on 03-02-2024).

A private Respondent before the High Court, namely, Ms Irwan Kour, (a retired officer from the Army Medical Corps who had also applied under the ESM category and was appointed as a PCS officer), had impleaded herself as a party before the High Court and challenged the decision through a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court on various grounds, including that it had been clarified by the Central Government that the Central Ex-Servicemen Amendment Rules, 2012 (“Central Amended Rules, 2012”) would not cover MNS officers in the definition of ESM, and further, that the directions of the High Court in appointing Capt Kaur would endanger the Appellant’s position as an already serving PCS officer.

THE HISTORY OF MILITARY NURSING SERVICE AND THE UNNECESSARY ARTIFICALLY CREATED CONTROVERSY

The MNS has its origins in 1888. The MNS in the current form was raised as an “Armed Force” of the Union of India as part of the Indian Army vide an Ordinance in the year 1943 and is duly recognized as an integral part of the Armed Forces of India. The members of MNS are appointed by the Central Government with a commissioned rank of the Indian Army. The MNS is the only all-woman branch of the Defence Services in India.

Historically, retired MNS officers were provided ESM benefits under the Central Ex-Servicemen Rules, 1979 which defined “Ex-Servicemen” as those who retired or were released on competition of terms from the “Armed Forces” of the Union of India. The pensioners from the MNS from the Permanent Commission Cadre were treated as ESM and so were the SSCOs of the MNS who were compulsorily released after a minimum 5 years of service. However, over the years, the Central Rules were amended and the term “Armed Forces” was replaced with “Regular Army” (See the Central Ex-Servicemen Amendment Rules, 2012/”Central Amended Rules, 2012”) with the purpose of distinguishing Defence Services (Army, Navy and the Air Force) from other Armed Forces, such as the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), such as the BSF, CRPF etc., which are also officially categorized as “Armed Forces” of the Union of India.

Hyper-technically picking on this change in terminology, the Kendriya Sainik Board, which functions under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued letters in 2019 and 2021 stating that the MNS officers are not ESM since the MNS did not fall within the “Regular Army”. This despite the fact that in 2014, the same Kendriya Sainik Board had clarified that MNS would, in fact, fall under the definition of ESM. It was only from 2019 onwards that their stance seemed to switch from the logical to the absurd, just because apparently some MNS officers had applied to be appointed for posts under various Sainik Boards. What was interesting to note in this was that the Kendriya Sainik Board has no standing to comment on statutory rules under the Constitutional Rules of Business and is merely a board looking after various welfare activities under the MoD.

Interestingly, as far as the Central Amended Rules, 2012 were concerned, the matter was thereafter taken up by the Chiefs of Staff Committee which is the apex body of the Defence Services, which agreed with an earlier High-Level Committee on the subject under the MoD, on its findings that the ESM status of MNS officers was “well-established”. The observation of the committee was ultimately approved by the Defence Minister. Despite the approval, the Kendriya Saink Board continued to refuse issuance of ESM cards to MNS Officers.

The worst effect of this was on SSCOs of the MNS who now, after their release from MNS in five or more years without pension, became unemployable for civil government jobs since they were now being released on completion of their contractual service in middle age without any reservations or benefits of their military service and without any age relaxation as is applicable to ESM, thus leading to an uncertain future at a time when familial responsibilities are at peak. Military service, hence, became a disqualification rather than a qualification as compared to their peers who joined other services and organizations, and also male and female officers joining branches of the Army other than the MNS who faced no such disqualification. Not only was this discriminatory and illogical, but also highly exploitative of young women who served in the MNS during the times of their lives only to be discarded and left unemployable, having crossed the prime of their lives and rendered ineligible due to age and other criteria due to time spent in the military.

THE CASE AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE HIGH COURT AND THE SUPREME COURT

The argument of Capt Kaur before the Courts was that Central Amended Rules, 2012 would not apply to recruitments made under the State of Punjab, as the State Rules of 1982 were enacted by the State in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution, and the State Rules, 1982 which were substantially different than the Central Amended Rules, 2012, provided for the requirement of a person to have served in the “Military” and the “Armed Forces” to be eligible for ESM status, and not the “Regular Army” which was a term used in the Central Amended Rules, 2012. Capt Kaur had also argued, that in any case, the MNS would also very much fall within the definition of “Regular Army” since the branch was recognized by the Army Act as a part of the Regular Army and also by the Defence Services Regulations.

The High Court and the Supreme Court agreed with such contention and rejected the ground urged by the State of Punjab that the clarifications issued by the Kendriya Sainik Board, an advisory body for re-settlement and welfare of retired personnel, would have any bearing over the Punjab State Rules, 1982.

The Supreme Court finally found Capt Kaur eligible to be appointed in the PCS and also clarified that the Appellant’s (Ms Irwan Kour’s) appointment already effectuated would not be affected by the appointment of Capt Gurpreet Kaur, protecting the interests of both the parties.

More importantly, the Court noted that the restrictive interpretation of rules and insistence on denial of ESM status to retired personnel of the Military Nursing Service (MNS) would demoralize the youth from joining the Defence Forces, knowing that their future would be bleak after their eventual release from military service. Such a practice, especially in Punjab, which contributes 7% to the military despite making up only 2% of the population of the country, would, no doubt, be a discouraging exercise.

THE IRONY

Though the MNS is celebrated as a form of “nari shakti” in ceremonies and parades, the irony in the entire episode is the uncalled-for roadblocks created for MNS officers through the years- not because of systemic discrimination by the government, but due to wanton prejudice based on hyper-technical interpretation of rules and contradictory letters issued by various authorities, which the senior hierarchy, despite its good intentions, has not been able to control or curtail, at times even after assurances and orders issued by the highest political executive. Even in the past, pin-pricks have been initiated which resulted in litigation, which seemed more of personality-oriented ego battles. One such issue was denial of salutations, precedence, star-plates corresponding to their military rank, and ancillary respect to the military rank held by MNS officers by other members of defence services. Despite Regulation 733(b) specifically laying down the inter se precedence, policy letters were issued to deny precedence and status to such officers. The regulation runs as under:

“Women officers serving in the Army Medical Corps and officers in the Military Nursing Service will rank equally with male officers of the same titular rank, e.g., a captain (woman officer) in the Army Medical Corps, will rank equally with a captain in the Artillery or Engineers.”

At one time, the rules provided for compulsory retirement of MNS officers if they got married. Examining this issue, the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs Ex-Lt Selina John (Civil Appeal 1990/2019) decided on 14-02-2024, had observed the following:

“This rule, it is accepted, was applicable to only women nursing officers. Such rule was ex-facie manifestly arbitrary, as terminating employment because the woman has got married is a coarse case of gender discrimination and inequality. Acceptance of such patriarchal rule undermines human dignity, right to non-discrimination and fair treatment. Laws and regulations based on gender-based bias are constitutionally impermissible. Rules making marriage of women employees and their domestic involvement a ground for disentitlement would be unconstitutional.”

Despite the many hurdles in their long path to justice, MNS officers have performed their duty with utmost dedication. In an ideal situation, it was not the MNS officers who should have been fighting for their rights, and a serious thought should have been rendered to resolving their genuine grievances in-house without resort to litigation or adversarial stands in courts. Egotistical stands should have yielded to real camaraderie.

In the crusade against prejudice and gender discrimination, the Constitutional Courts have repeatedly come to the rescue of women and ensured substantive equality in the forces, but more than that, it is the duty of the defence services themselves, and the society at large, to effectively ensure the adherence to the avowed principles our nation stands for.

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Ananya Sharma, a law graduate, is currently working with an American company as an in-house counsel.

Roopan Atwal is a practicing advocate at the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

Wednesday, May 7, 2025

Pakistan's Military Courts Case decided, 5-2, for the government

The Supreme Court of Pakistan today handed down its "Short Order" decision in Shuhada Forum, Balochistan v. Khawaja, ICA No. 5/2023. By a 5-2 vote, the Constitutional Bench allowed the intra-court appeals in the Military Courts Case and set aside the Oct. 23, 2023 contrary 4-1 decision of a regular panel of the Supreme Court. Excerpt:

vi. In our view, the provisions merely accentuating the right to a fair trial and due process in any statute and its actual application and proper implementation during the trial are two distinct features and situations. If an independent right of appeal is provided in the High Court for challenging the original order or internal departmental appellate order of conviction, then obviously, the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as conferred under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, may examine whether an equal and fair opportunity to defend the charges was afforded to the convict, whether sufficient evidence was available to substantiate the charges, and whether proper procedure in the trial was followed in letter and spirit.

vii. It is expansively evident from the impugned judgment, including the additional note, that during the original proceedings, the learned AGP, time and again, requested for time to seek instructions from the government on whether an independent right of appeal may be provided to the persons not otherwise subject to the Army Act, who are accused of the offences of (i) seducing or attempting to seduce any person subject to this Act from his duty or allegiance to Government, or (ii) having committed in relation to any work of defence, arsenal, naval, military or air force establishment or station, ship or aircraft or  I.C.A. 5/2023 & connected Appeals otherwise in relation to the naval, military or air force affairs of Pakistan, an offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 as provided under clause (d) of Section 2 (1) of Army Act, and even in the concluding session on 5th May, 2025, the learned AGP reiterated that if this Constitutional Bench refers the matter to the Government/Parliament to amend the law and create a window of an independent right of appeal over and above the provision of appeal already provided under Section 133-B of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, that will be respected and considered seriously. In support of this contention, he also cited the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Jurist Foundation versus Federal Government (PLD 2020 SC 1).

viii. While restoring the provisions of Army Act, that were struck down by means of the impugned judgment in the original proceedings before this Court, we, in unison, sensitize the need of legislative changes, which will also be compliant to the requirements laid down under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for maintaining and preserving the constitutional and societal norms in the existing legal framework. Therefore, the matter is referred to the Government/Parliament for considering and making necessary amendments/legislation in the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and allied Rules within a period of 45 days in order to provide an independent right of appeal in the High Court against the conviction awarded to the persons by the Court Martial/Military Courts under sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of Clause (d) of subsection (1) of Section 2 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, read with sub-section (4) of Section 59 of the Pakistan Army Act, 1952.

ix. Subject to clause (viii) of this Short Order, the limitation period for filing an  appeal by the convicts against their conviction before the High Courts shall be reckoned and applied from the date of notifying the amendments under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952, and their conviction shall be subject to the final outcome/decision in appeal by the High Court.

The Constitutional Bench has thus ruled that if Parliament now provides a right of appeal to the High Court, it was acceptable for the civilian defendants to have been tried by court-martial. 

Justices Jamal Khan Mandokhail and Naeem Akhter Afghan dissented, writing:

For the reasons to be recorded later on, we dismiss these appeals on the following grounds:

(a) The Pakistan Army Act, 1952 (‘PAA’) is a disciplinary statute, relates to members of the Armed Forces, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties or the maintenance of discipline amongst them, as provided by clause (a) of sub-Article (3) of Article 8 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (‘Constitution’), hence, does not offer fundamental rights to persons under the military discipline.

(b) To the contrary, clause (d) added to subsection (1) of section 2 of the PAA relates to persons not otherwise subject to the PAA (‘Civilians’). It does not relate to members of the Armed Forces, nor serves the aforesaid purpose, as provided by sub-clause (a) of sub-Article (3) of Article 8 of the Constitution, as such, it does not qualify for exemption from fundamental rights, hence, cannot be retained as part of the PAA.

(c) Article 175 of the Constitution provides the establishment and jurisdiction of courts. It requires that in order to fully secure the independence of judiciary, it must be separated from executive in all respects. The courts martial comprising of executive, being outside the scope of Article 175(3) of the Constitution cannot prosecute the civilians.

(d) The trial of civilians by courts martial offends the fundamental principle of independence of judiciary, fundamental rights of security of person, safeguard as to arrest and detention, fair trial and due process, right to information, equality of citizens and Injunctions of Islam, as guaranteed by Articles 2A, 9, 10, 10A, 19A, 25 and 227(1) of the Constitution, respectively.

(e) Denial of right of appeal to civilians against the conviction and sentence by courts martial before an independent and impartial forum is also violative of fundamental right of fair trial and due process.

(f) The trial of civilians by courts martial presided over by active military officers, is violative of the recognized covenants of the United Nations Human Rights Commission ("UNHRC’) as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (‘ICCPR’) and treaties, to which Pakistan is a signatory.

(g) The trial of civilians by courts martial is in excess of the functions assigned to the Armed Forces by Article 245 of the Constitution.

2. The convictions and sentences awarded to civilians by the courts martial for the occurrence of 9th May, 2023, are declared to be without jurisdiction, hence, the same are set aside. They shall be dealt with as follows:

(i) The accused under custody shall be treated as under-trial prisoners. Their cases stand transferred to the concerned courts of competent jurisdiction for trial. Upon receipt whereof, the concerned courts should proceed with their trials expeditiously and decide the same at the earliest, in accordance with law.

(ii) The persons who have completed/undergone their sentences or have been acquitted of the charge by the courts martial or Forum of Appeal under the PAA, shall have the effect of their discharge under section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’).

The majority's decision is preposterous and flies in the face of settled human rights jurisprudence, which strongly disfavors the trial of civilians by military courts. It also cannot be reconciled with the fact that the last time Pakistan used its military courts to try civilians, it was deemed necessary to amend the Constitution to authorize it -- a temporary amendment that ultimately expired.

This decision is likely to embolden those in Uganda who have resisted compliance with that country's Supreme Court's decision in the landmark Kabaziguruka decision.

Tuesday, May 6, 2025

A prediction

News accounts this afternoon report Indian attacks on Pakistan in response to a recent attack on tourists in Kashmir. It would not be surprising if this has the effect of delaying a decision in Pakistan's Military Courts Case.

ICJ briefing paper on "a glaring surrender of human rights"

The International Commission of Jurists has just issued a new briefing paper on Pakistan's misuse of military courts to try civilians. You can find the ICJ's summary here. Excerpt:

Proceedings before Pakistani military courts fall well short of national and international standards requiring fair trials before independent and impartial courts:

  • Judges are part of the executive branch of the State and continue to be subjected to military command;
  • The right to appeal to civilian courts is not available;
  • The right to a public hearing is not guaranteed;
  • A duly reasoned, written judgment, including the essential findings, evidence and legal reasoning, is denied; and
  • The procedures of military courts, the selection of cases to be referred to them, the location and timing of trial, and details about the alleged offences are kept secret.

The ICJ has urged Pakistan to undertake a comprehensive review of its laws, policies and practices in the administration of justice, with a view to ensuring that military courts only have competency to try military personnel for exclusively military offences. Pakistan should also ensure military courts in no manner have jurisdiction over civilians, including for security-related offences, and military courts should, in law and practice, meet all fair trial standards in accordance with Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

The full text of the ICJ's briefing paper appears here.

Decision this week in Pakistan's Military Courts Case

Oral argument has finally concluded in the Supreme Court of Pakistan's Military Courts Case. According to this reprt from Dawn, a ruling is expected to be handed down this week.

Monday, May 5, 2025

U.S. Army Veteran and ICC Prosecutor Eric Iverson Sues Trump Administration over ICC Sanctions

Human Rights First just filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the Trump administration's EO 14203 which sanctions the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its senior officials. 

The plaintiff is Eric Iverson, who served as a U.S. Army JAG officer, then for the past 15 years as a prosecutor with the ICC in The Hague. Mr. Iverson's ICC work focuses on war crimes and other atrocities committed in Sudan. 

Defendants are Donald Trump, Pamela Bondi, Marco Rubio, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. 

The complaint alleges that the Trump administration's sanctions against the ICC and its senior officials exceed statutory authority, make it impossible for Iverson to do his job, and violate his First Amendment rights. 

DDC case number 25-cv-01353.