A centennial

Baseball great Jackie Robinson was born 100 years ago today. As a Second Lieutenant in the then-segregated wartime U.S. Army, he figured in a famous court-martial after objecting to being told to go to the back of the bus. He was acquitted. A powerful, moving special section of today's New York Times is dedicated to him, and notes the case on page F4.

Why is this Russian case in military court?

A judge hits a pedestrian with his car, then throws his weight around. Why is a military court involved? To punish him, or with a view to removing him from the bench? Details here.

Landmark decision in Kathmandu

The Supreme Court of Nepal has handed down a landmark ruling on military jurisdiction, reported in detail here in the Himalayan Times. The court asserted habeas jurisdiction over military courts and rejected a soldier's claim that he had to be tried in a military court rather than a civilian one for a violation of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, 2029 (1973). The decision holds that the Army has jurisdiction only over offenses enumerated in the Army Act, not offenses arising under the country's general criminal laws, notwithstanding Art. 66(1) of the Army Act, 2063 (2006) (excluding homicide and rape).

An English-language version of the opinion is not yet on the court's website. Excerpt from the news account:

Our constitution does not allow granting of judicial powers to a body which cannot dispense its duties in independent, impartial and competent manner. The SC stated that Nepal guaranteed the right of fair hearing principles that could only be upheld by an independent, impartial and competent court.

The SC quoted UN Updated Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, which states, “The jurisdiction of military tribunals must be restricted solely to specify military offences committed by military personnel, to the exclusion of human rights violations, which shall come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary domestic courts or, where appropriate, in the case of serious crimes under international or internalised court.”

The SC observed that all the specialised courts also needed to respect people’s right to fair hearing.

“Democracy expects judicial bodies to work in an independent, impartial, competent, transparent and responsible manner. Any privilege must be sanctioned by the law. Discipline may be important for the army, but justice cannot be less important,” the apex court observed, adding, “If a thing is not a matter of military control or direction, then it must be accepted that such a thing should be adjudicated by an ordinary court.” It stated that people should also feel that army personnel were not above the law.

The SC added that if the military court was given jurisdiction over offences committed by military personnel not related to military service, that would be against democracy, the rule of law, civil rights and supremacy of the civilian government.

Many countries' military justice codes, including those with British roots, turn civilian offenses into military offenses (with some exceptions for major crimes of violence). The United States is among them. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (Art. 134, UCMJ). In Canada, the Supreme Court will determine this year whether such provisions violate the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Military trial for nervy retired Egyptian general

Egypt, which regularly violates human rights norms by trying civilians in military court, has just tried a retired general in such a court. He had the chutzpah to run for president. Details here.

Supreme Court of India sets aside the conviction of a Lieutenant General

The Supreme Court of India has set aside the conviction of a Lt Gen of the Indian Army and also the subsequent order in his appeal passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal wherein he had only been granted partial relief.

Lt Gen Avadhesh Prakash was dismissed on the ground of financial impropriety by way of a General Court Martial in what came to be known as the ‘Sukna Land Scam’.

Although the Armed Forces Tribunal, on his appeal, had granted him his pension benefits from the date of pronouncement of the order, and had also set aside two grounds of his conviction, it had still retained one ground and had upheld the conviction. The tribunal had repelled the argument put forth by the General that the composition of the Court Martial was faulty since the Members of the GCM (except the Presiding Officer) were of an inferior rank and no attempt had been made by the Army to convene it with officers of his rank.

The Supreme Court has however found favour with the challenge made to the AFT decision and has held that since the GCM itself was faulty and that he had been acquitted on the more severe and grave charges, the appeal was bound to succeed. The Supreme Court has set aside the conviction and has granted him all consequential benefits pertaining to his rank.