Institute for Constitutional Military Law v. Trump

ICML is a nonpartisan institute (NGO) that defends the constitutional rights of service members and veterans before the boards, in the courts, and in Congress. Its work rests on three pillars: research, advocacy, and litigation.

The Defense Department posts the administrative law decisions of its discharge review boards and boards for correction of military and naval records on one website, boards.law.af.mil. On October 6, 2026, the Institute tested the site’s search functionality on each of the six boards for decisions containing the word “the.” Across the six boards of the Army, the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Air Force, the search returned about 38,600 of the 286,719 published files. It did not return the other 87 percent. At the Naval Discharge Review Board the search reported 237 results for “the” and the same 237 for “discharge,” out of 35,940 files. And many of the decisions the boards post cannot be read on the screen. About one in three files, and nearly all Naval Discharge Review Board decisions, are Rich Text or Word documents, which a web browser cannot display. Clicking one does not open the decision. It downloads the file to the reader’s computer, where it must be opened in a word processor, one decision at a time. These are legal decisions of the federal government. A correction board’s correction is, by statute, except when procured by fraud, “final and conclusive on all officers of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(4)(A). Yet nearly four in five of the boards’ files are plain-text, Rich Text or Word files, and every file is listed only by file name and date, with no summary and no index.

Its advocacy

The Institute carries that evidence to the people who can change the law, in Congress, the military departments, and the states. Through the 50-State Initiative, it is working to repeal the state and local rules that punish veterans for an administrative discharge given without a trial. It provides model language to any legislature or agency that wants to fix its rules.

ICML v. Trump.

On November 10, 2026, the Marine Corps birthday, the Institute sued the President and the Defense Department in federal court in Springfield, Illinois, to make the military review boards’ decisions public and searchable, as Congress required.CourtU.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield DivisionCase numberNo. 3:26-cv-03388-CRL-DJQFiledNovember 10, 2026JudgeColleen R. LawlessStatusOpen

New judge of Peruvian military-police court

 Brigadier General Paola Peggy Polanco Ponce, has been sworn in as Alternate Supreme Justice of the Supreme Review Chamber of the Supreme Military-Police Court. Details here. Congratulations!

Death / disability in long-term ongoing operations led by the Indian Defence Forces cannot be excluded to refuse enhanced pension to soldiers: Indian Supreme Court

Livelaw reported the recent clarification issued by the Supreme Court of India on whether ongoing operations in Jammu and Kashmir (Operation Rakshak) and Operation Rhino (Assam) would be included under Category E(i) of a government policy which grants an enhanced form of pension, namely, War Injury Pension to soldiers who become disabled while participating in operations notified by the Government of India from time to time.

The Respondent-soldier had previously been granted War Injury Pension by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for his disability incurred while serving in a High Altitude Area in Kargil (Jammu and Kashmir) between 2002 and 2005, as part of Operation Rakshak. The Union of India challenged the order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana before the Indian Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held the circumstances leading to death / disability mentioned in the policy as "not exhaustive" and rejected the Union of India's plea to discriminate between soldiers who become disabled / deceased in long-term running operations such as Operation Rakshak. A distinction sought to be drawn by the Union of India between those who become injured due to border skirmishes etc. and those who are disabled due to illnesses aggravated by operational conditions was also rejected. The said principle was also previously held by the Indian Supreme Court in Union of India Vs Saroj Devi.

The complete decision is available here.

AFT: IAF noncom has right to bail pending review of court-martial

India's Armed Forces Tribunal has ruled that a noncom convicted by court-martial may be released on bail pending action by statutory confirming authorities. Details here. Excerpt from The Tribune:

“The pendency of confirmation proceedings cannot be permitted to result in continued detention without due consideration of the applicant’s right to personal liberty, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,” the Tribunal’s Bench, comprising Justice Rajendra Menon and Lt Gen CP Mohanty, ruled.

“Merely because the process of confirmation of the findings and sentence awarded by a court martial is pending, the same cannot operate as an impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Tribunal to consider suspension of the sentence and grant of bail,” the Bench said.

Observing that the applicant had already undergone detention for a period of 35 days, which is more than half of the total sentence of two months’ detention, the Bench said that the period of detention already undergone shall necessarily be taken into account while computing the total period of sentence.

“Taking note of the aforesaid circumstances, we are satisfied that this is a fit case in which the sentence of detention deserves to be suspended and the applicant granted bail, pending confirmation of the findings and sentence by the competent authority, the Bench ruled while directing that the execution of the sentence of detention shall remain suspended pending confirmation, and the applicant be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond.

The Bench, however, made it clear that the suspension of sentence is confined to the punishment of detention only. Insofar as the punishment of reduction in rank is concerned, the same shall be given effect immediately upon confirmation of the findings and sentence by the competent authority, in accordance with law. There shall be no stay on the implementation of the said punishment, the Bench said.

Another civiian tried by court-martial in Uganda

Uganda stil hasn't gotten the memo. Its general court-martial has tried a civilian cab driver found wearing military clothing. Details here. African Charter jurisprudence forbids the trial of civilians by military courts.

Jury Selection Is Underway in the USS Cole Bombing Case, First Capital Case at Guantanamo Bay

That is the headline for a piece by Carol Rosenberg on Just Security.

Jury selection began Monday in the first capital case at Guantanamo Bay, with the court questioning the first 18 of up-to 200 U.S. military officers about their ability to sit impartially at the trial of a Saudi prisoner who is accused of conspiring in a terror attack on a U.S. Navy ship that killed 17 American sailors a quarter-century ago.

Suicide bombers attacked the USS Cole on Oct. 12, 2000, while it was on a refueling stop in Aden, Yemen. Besides those killed, 37 other sailors on the 312-member crew were injured.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, 61, is accused of war crimes for allegedly helping to orchestrate the attack, and two others, at the behest of Osama bin Laden. He has been in U.S. custody since 2002 but was held by the CIA in black sites for the first four years, during which time he was tortured repeatedly. His treatment in U.S. custody has meant protracted pretrial hearings about which evidence can be used at the trial and whether he is even competent to be tried. Those pretrial hearings ended last week.

Empaneling 12 jurors and six alternates could take weeks. A total of 36 military officers were brought to the base over the weekend from a pool of 200 drawn from U.S. military bases around the world.

Monday, Col. Matthew Fitzgerald, the judge, told the first 18 candidates that the trial could last four-to-six months, or longer, but that he would recess for Thanksgiving and Christmas vacation.

Civilian convicted of offences against state cannot claim fundamental rights, govt says in report to LHC

That is the title of an article by Wajih Ahmad Sheikh, Dawn, November 2, 2026.

The Punjab government has told the Lahore High Court that civilians convicted of offenses against the state cannot claim constitutional protection of their fundamental rights.

The argument arose in the case of Hassaan Khan Niazi, nephew of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. A military court sentenced Niazi to ten years' imprisonment for his alleged involvement in the May 9, 2023, disturbances at Jinnah House, the residence of Lahore's Corps Commander.

Niazi challenged his transfer to military custody and subsequent court-martial. The government urged the High Court to dismiss his petition. It argued that Niazi owed his first duty of loyalty to the state and could not pursue a constitutional challenge after his conviction.

The Ministry of Defence separately argued that Pakistan's Constitution bars the High Court from reviewing proceedings involving persons subject to the Pakistan Army Act. It also maintained that Niazi must pursue his pending appeal through the military appellate system.

The government relied on a May 2025 Supreme Court decision that upheld military trials of civilians while retaining a statutory right of appeal. It contended that the decision did not authorize a separate constitutional challenge.

The case raises a fundamental question: Does conviction by a military court merely restrict a civilian's avenues of appeal, or does it extinguish constitutional protections against unlawful state action?

The Lahore High Court has yet to resolve that question.

AFL Deserves Commendation, But Military Discipline Must Go Beyond Administrative Dismissal

That's the headline to a piece in the The New Dawn (Liberia), 28 October 2026.

The decision by the High Command of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to dishonorably discharge two soldiers following the physical abuse of a civilian woman in Thinkers Village, Paynesville, deserves public commendation. It demonstrates an important commitment to military discipline professional accountability, and the protection of civilians against the abuse of military authority.

According to the reported circumstances, [two] soldiers abandoned their assigned duties to intervene in a private disagreement involving Sergeant Menyon’s girlfriend. What should have remained a minor civilian dispute allegedly escalated into an unacceptable demonstration of military intimidation and physical violence.

Major General Forleh and the AFL High Command therefore deserve recognition for refusing to tolerate misconduct simply because the perpetrators wore military uniforms.

Nevertheless, an important legal and institutional question remains: Why were the soldiers immediately transferred to the Liberia National Police for criminal investigation instead of first being subjected to the applicable military justice procedures under Liberia’s Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)?

The article takes issue with the decision to administratively separate them rather than court-martial them.

Major General Davidson Forleh and the AFL High Command deserve commendation for demonstrating that military uniforms do not place soldiers above accountability.

Their swift condemnation of the alleged abuse sends an important message that the Armed Forces of Liberia must never become an instrument of intimidation against the very citizens they are sworn to protect.

Nevertheless, Liberia must move beyond the symbolism of disrobing soldiers before cameras.

The real test of military professionalism is not how quickly a commander removes a uniform, but how faithfully the institution applies the law governing those who wear it.

The National Defense Act of 2008 and Liberia’s applicable Uniform Code of Military Justice must remain central to military discipline and accountability.

Administrative dismissal should never be treated as an automatic substitute for military prosecution where military law requires or permits such proceedings.

HRW statement on Indonesian Constitutional Court ruling

Human Rights Watch has issued this statement on the recent landmark decision of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia concerning military court jurisdiction. Excerpt:

The petitioners challenged articles 9(1), 43(3), and 127 of the law, which allow active duty military personnel to be tried in military courts even for crimes ordinarily prosecuted in civilian courts. The Constitutional Court found that the distinction between military offenses and ordinary criminal offenses must be clearly defined. Justice Enny Nurbaningsih said that when an offense has no military character but accountability for it remains within a command-based system, “there is a structural risk that military’s institutional interests will conflict with the need to ensure independent and impartial legal proceedings.”

The Constitutional Court also noted that the military judiciary is not fully integrated into the judicial system overseen by the Supreme Court and urged lawmakers to create a single system. Military judges are active duty soldiers, and investigation, prosecution, and adjudication all take place within the military chain-of-command.

Revisions to the Military Justice Law have been pending for decades. As part of structural reforms that followed the end of authoritarian rule under President Soeharto from 1965 to 1998, the 2004 Armed Forces Law made soldiers subject to civilian courts for ordinary crimes. However, that provision would only take effect when a new military justice law was enacted. The Constitutional Court’s ruling imposes a two-year time frame for those revisions, which successive Indonesian governments have deferred.

The court's 568-page decision can be found here.

Happy St. Crispin's Day

Mark Rylance's version is the Editor's favorite.

Tunisian military court jails a civilian opposition leader

Reuters has the story here. Excerpt:

A Tunisian military court sentenced opposition politician Olfa Hamdi to four ‌years in prison on charges of plotting against ‌state security and inciting the military to disobey orders, her lawyer ​said on Wednesday, the latest move against opponents of President Kais Saied.

Hamdi, the leader of the Third Republic Party who holds US citizenship, was detained at Tunisia's main airport ‌after disembarking from ⁠a flight in February.

Human rights jurisprudence strongly disfavors the prosecution of civilians in military courts. Add Tunisia to the list of states that violate this fundamental principle.

Will the US file a protest?

Condonation of a grounding defense rejected

A Trinidad & Tobago Coast Guard officer is on trial for running his ship aground and related offenses. The High Court had previously stayed the case while considering the officer's claim that his superior had condoned the offense by saying the grounding would be treated as an operational matter. The stay was later lifted and the court-martial is proceeding.

Social media post lands Russian civilian in jail following military court trial

Why was this case tried in a Russian naval court?

The Northern Fleet Military Court has sentenced a 46-year-old resident of Arkhangelsk, a city in north-western Russia, to a fine of 500,000 roubles (approximately US$5,700) under the article on public justification of terrorism on the internet (Part 2, Article 205.2 of the Criminal Code). According to investigators, the man posted comments in a messenger in support of the activities of Ukrainian nationalist organisations.

Should Türkiye reintroduce military courts?

Retired Brigadier General Erdoğan Baykal thinks so. He writes:

The issue of the re-establishment of the military judiciary and military courts is in danger of being forgotten by the public. The fact that it is not being discussed or featured on the agenda should not be taken to mean that this need has disappeared or has become a matter of course. This issue is of the utmost critical importance for the discipline and success of the heroic Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) whilst carrying out their duties under wartime conditions. The re-establishment of the military justice system and military courts must be debated in the public sphere and kept on the agenda.

Military justice requires specialisation. What is important is the establishment of a system capable of fulfilling this function. The judges or prosecutors serving within this system may be in civilian or military uniform. The institutions or mechanisms (civilian or military) to which this system would be answerable are open to discussion. ‘However, provided that they are limited solely to military personnel and military offences, there is an absolute need for specialised first-instance military courts in this regard.’

Taking into account the principle of the unity and oneness of the judiciary, there may be no need for a second-tier military judiciary, that is, a separate High Military Court. In line with the need for specialisation, the function of reviewing military judicial decisions could be carried out by units established within the (civilian) Court of Cassation and the Council of State.

Major ruling in Indonesia

Indonesia's Constitutional Court has handed down a landmark decision invalidating parts of the military justice system and giving the government an opportunity to pass remedial legislation. Human Rights Monitor reports on the decision here. Excerpt:

On 15 October 2026, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court delivered Decision No. 260/PUU-XXIII/2025 on Law No. 31/1997 on the Military Judiciary. The Court declared the Act conditionally inconsistent with Article 24(1) and Article 28D(1) of the 1945 Constitution. Those provisions guarantee an independent judiciary and equality before the law. The case was brought by two petitioners, Mr Lenny Damanik and Mrs Eva Melina Br. Pasaribu, through judicial review of the Act.

The Act remains unconstitutional unless the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Government amend it within two years of the ruling, that is by October 2028. The amendments must clarify the distinction between military offences and general criminal offences, define which court has jurisdiction over cases involving personnel of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), and reform the military justice system as a whole.

The ruling is significant. Under the current Act, jurisdiction follows the status of the accused rather than the nature of the offence. Military personnel accused of an ordinary crime against a civilian, such as assault or murder, is tried by a military court, not a civilian one.

Kompas.com has this additional report. Excerpt:

According to Abdul Fickar, the MK's ruling reinforces the principle that TNI personnel accused of military crimes should be tried in military courts, while those charged with common crimes should be prosecuted in civilian courts. He noted that historically, both military-related crimes and general offenses committed by TNI personnel have been adjudicated in military courts. This situation, he argues, has drawn public attention, as general crimes committed by TNI personnel should be handled through the civilian judicial system. 

"Yes, it is indeed a momentum. Because up until now, whether it’s a military crime or a common crime like that of Andri Yunus and others, all have been tried in military courts. They should be tried in civilian courts," Abdul Fickar stated in an interview with Kompas.com on Friday (16/10/2026). 

Abdul Fickar explained that changing the judicial system requires an amendment to the Military Justice Law. The MK's ruling is seen as a catalyst to expedite the development of fairer regulations. “The Constitutional Court's decision also urges the Parliament to swiftly amend the Military Justice Law to ensure that it focuses solely on adjudicating military offenses committed by military personnel,” he said.

Where should this case be tried?

Gang rape investigation in Chile's Rapa Nui -- consider this report from T13. The accused are Chilean marines. Should they be in civilian or military pretrial confinement? Where should the case be tried? Stand by for a ruling from the Constitutional Court.

Not military justice, but . . .

The Hill has just posted a column by Major General (ret) Steven J. Lepper, LTC (ret) Dan Maurer, and the Editor, titled Plan B for Trump’s election intimidation: An iron fist in a velvet glove. Excerpt: "[I]f resistance fails and the president and his Office of Legal Counsel concoct legal and factual justifications for deploying troops to polling sites, military commanders and their judge advocates can mitigate the impacts of these actions by exercising good judgment."

Is live-streaming a military execution legal?

Prof. Dan Maurer examines rhe question here. Bottom line: probably not. He "concludes that there is a viable Eighth Amendment argument that these deviations from established rules and practices constitute 'cruel and unusual punishment.'”

What do you think? Comments are welcome (real names, please; no pseudonyms.)

Major Hasan's case

All eyes have been on Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army psychiatrist sentenced to death for multiple murders at Fort Hood. President Donald J. Trump has approved the death sentence and the Army has indicated that it intends to livestream video of the execution by firing squad. The New York Times has this report. 

Will Mr. Trump veto the livestreaming? Will Dr. Hasan seek habeas corpus? Stay tuned.

Australian DF Personnel Can Apply To Have Historical Homosexual Convictions Expunged

The Star Observer (AU) reports that current and former Australian Defense Force (ADF) personnel can now apply to have historical convictions for consensual same-sex activity extinguished from their service records, following changes to military discipline law.

Until 1992, consensual homosexual activity could be prosecuted as a service offence. Decades after those activities were decriminalised, affected personnel have continued to carry convictions on their official records.

Amendments to the Defense Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth) now allow eligible convictions to be formally extinguished, meaning they are treated as though they never happened.