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IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Randy J. GALLIANO, Seaman Apprentice (E-2), U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant

Docket No. 1514

ORDER TO REPRESENT APPELLANT

            On 8 September 2025, Appellant was convicted at special court-martial and sentenced to  reduction to E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. The case was referred to this Court on  20 November 2025.

             On 15 January 2026, Appellate Defense Counsel filed a Notice of No Authority to Represent Appellant, asserting that she had been unable to contact Appellant and did not “intend to file any substantive pleading before this Court.”

             Article 65 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) directs that the record of trial of a case in which a bad-conduct discharge has been adjudged be forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review under Article 66(b)(3), UCMJ. Article 70, UCMJ, requires that appellate defense counsel be detailed and shall represent an accused before the Court of Criminal Appeals when requested by the accused or when the United States is represented by counsel. The appellate rights notice in the record of trial, acknowledged by Appellant’s signature, states that military counsel will be appointed to represent him. Rule 11 of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “Upon docketing of a case, the appropriate Judge Advocate General or designee shall, unless previously done, designate appellate military counsel to represent the parties . . .” Thus the United States, as well as the accused, is represented in every case before the Court of Criminal Appeals.

             In these circumstances, counsel’s authority to represent Appellant stems not solely from the client’s direction or consent but also from counsel’s military duty upon being detailed. This conclusion is supported by United States v. Sink, 27 M.J. 920, 921 (A.C.M.R. 1989) (“[C]ounsel contends that he is precluded from representing the appellant on appeal because he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with him . . . . We disagree. . . . [His] duty of representation can be met effectively in most cases without the appellant’s knowledge or active participation.”); United States v. Harper, 80 M.J. 540, 542 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (“Given . . . the lack of any affirmative action by Appellant either to waive his right to representation or to withdraw his case from appellate review, we conclude that appellate defense counsel not only has the authority, but is statutorily required to represent Appellant, to the best of her ability, notwithstanding her inability to locate or communicate with him.”); United States v. May, 47 M.J. 478, 481-82 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (“Where individual civilian counsel's failure to act is working to the detriment of an appellant, military appellate counsel may not stand by idly, because they remain responsible for protecting the interests of their client. * * * As officers of the court as well as appellate defense counsel, military counsel had an obligation to . . . protect the interests of their client.”)

            Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 22nd day of January 2026,

            ORDERED: 

            That Appellate Defense Counsel shall represent Appellant and file assignments of error and brief not later than thirty days from the date of this order.

Is this Order correct? If you were SA Galliano's appellate defense counsel, what would you do in light of it?