Bye-bye Bolsonaro

A Brazilian court is considering whether former President Jair Bolsonaro and several senior officers should be dismissed for attempting a coup  Excerpt from this report:

Brazil's Superior Military Court (STM) notified former president Jair Bolsonaro and three other generals, already convicted for the attempted coup against current head of state Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, on Tuesday, thus beginning the judicial proceedings stemming from allegations of unworthiness raised in early February by the Military Prosecutor's Office for their participation in the coup plot.

“Former President Jair Bolsonaro and Army Generals Paulo Sérgio Nogueira, Augusto Heleno, and Braga Neto have been summoned by their respective investigating judges to submit their written defenses within ten business days from the date of the summons,” the STM reported on its website regarding the retired military officers sentenced by the civil courts to prison terms of 27, 19, 21, and 26 years, respectively.

The court has emphasized that this summons "marks the beginning of the process, as it concludes the preliminary phases and gives way to the formal statement of the accused."

* * * 

The initiative presented by the military attorney general, Clauro Bortolli, called Representation for Declaration of Unworthiness for the Officer Corps, is the mechanism by which the Military Justice must decide whether a member of the Armed Forces sentenced to more than two years in prison, for military or common crime, maintains or does not maintain the necessary condition to continue being part of the officer corps.

Ten of the STM's 15 judges are military officers. 

Worth the read?

The State and the Soldier: A History of Civil-Military Relations in the United States 1st Edition

by Kori Schake (Author)

See all formats and editions

---

America’s Founding Fathers feared that a standing army would be a permanent political danger, yet the U.S. military has in the 250 years since become a bulwark of democracy. Kori Schake explains why in this compelling history of civil-military relations from independence to the challenges of the present.

The book begins with General Washington's vital foundational example of subordination to elected leaders during the Revolutionary War. Schake recounts numerous instances in the following century when charismatic military leaders tried to challenge political leaders and explains the emergence of restrictions on uses of the military for domestic law enforcement. She explores the crucial struggle between President Andrew Johnson and Congress after Lincoln’s assassination, when Ulysses Grant had to choose whether to obey the Commander-in-Chief or the law – and chose to obey the law. And she shows how the professionalization of the military in the twentieth century inculcated norms of civilian control.

The U.S. military is historically anomalous for maintaining its strength and popularity while never becoming a threat to democracy. Schake concludes by asking if its admirable record can be sustained when the public is pulling the military into the political divisions of our time.

Where should this case be tried?

Nigerian military officers stand accused of plotting a coup. Court-martial or civilian trial? Femi Falana SAN says it cannot be a military trial. This article explains why. Excerpt:

“Since the indicted civilians are not subject to service law, they cannot be tried in a military court,” he said. 

“Even in the case of Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola v The Federal Republic of Nigeria (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.370) 155, the defendant was charged with treasonable felony at the Federal High Court. Similarly, in the case of Ameh Ebute v State (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt 360) 66, the defendants including Senator Ahmed Bola Tinubu (now President) were charged with treason at the Federal High Court.”

The lawyer recalled several landmark rulings, including the 2025 Supreme Court decision in Uganda, which declared that military courts lack jurisdiction to try civilians. 

He said, “The illegal practice of prosecuting civilians in military courts has just been stopped by the Supreme Court of Uganda in the case of Dr. Kizza Besigye & Another v Attorney General & Another (Miscellaneous Cause 31 of 2025) [2025] UGHCCD 29 (24 February 2025).

Kelly v. Hegseth

The National Lawyers Guild's Military Law Task Force has issued this position paper "in defense of Sen. Mark Kelly." Excerpt:

[Pete] Hegseth’s more recent use of  administrative action , threatening to demote Kelly and reduce his veteran’s benefits, is a retreat from earlier threats to prosecute Kelly, for ‘contemptuous speech” under the rarely-used Article 88. When those threats were made, we were confident that a trial was unlikely, given that career military prosecutors are JAGs, well versed in what UCMJ covers. They’d know that the Army Court of Criminal Review ruled in 1969: “As a matter of law, an order of a subordinate which contravenes the Constitution, a federal statute, a presidential executive order, a departmental regulation or other lawful directive of higher authority can have no lawful validity,” (US v Patton, U.S.A.C.M.R. 1969). And a century earlier, the US Supreme Court  pointed out: “A soldier cannot justify on the ground that he was obeying the orders of his superior officer” if “a person of ordinary intelligence would know that obedience would be illegal and criminal.” Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 189 (1879).That same decision adds that “the established principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the military must always yield.”

 And those JAGs would know that servicemembers and veterans are protected by the First Amendment’s free speech provisions, as  highlighted by the National Institute [of] Military Justice: “Although the military code criminalizes certain types of speech that may affect the military mission, the Senator’s remarks are far from criminal. He simply restated a fundamental principle of military law: service members must obey lawful orders and disobey unlawful orders.”

Military justice reform in Botswana

After years of preparation, the Botswana Defence Force has an updated military justice system. The new system is outlined in this video.

Bad day at the gym

El País has this report on yet another disciplinary case from Spain's Guardia Civil. To set the stage:

It all happened on April 1, 2022. The officer, who was in charge of guarding the gym at the Prime Minister's Office Security Department, was on the afternoon shift. Before starting work, he ate some tapas and drank two beers in the cafeteria. While he was at his post, two colleagues arrived with a bottle of gin, which the three of them drank with Coca-Cola. Thus, the Civil Guard officer "not only allowed the introduction and consumption of alcohol in the gym, but also participated in its consumption," the court emphasizes. Four hours later, around 7:15 p.m., two other uniformed officers arrived, including Sánchez's then-head of security. By then, the sanctioned officer already showed clear signs of having consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. In fact, without the ruling describing any trigger, the officer "lowered his trousers and exposed his buttocks, while dancing and squatting."

What punishment would you impose?

No exit

IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Randy J. GALLIANO, Seaman Apprentice (E-2), U.S. Coast Guard, Appellant

Docket No. 1514

ORDER TO REPRESENT APPELLANT

            On 8 September 2025, Appellant was convicted at special court-martial and sentenced to  reduction to E-1 and a bad-conduct discharge. The case was referred to this Court on  20 November 2025.

             On 15 January 2026, Appellate Defense Counsel filed a Notice of No Authority to Represent Appellant, asserting that she had been unable to contact Appellant and did not “intend to file any substantive pleading before this Court.”

             Article 65 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) directs that the record of trial of a case in which a bad-conduct discharge has been adjudged be forwarded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for review under Article 66(b)(3), UCMJ. Article 70, UCMJ, requires that appellate defense counsel be detailed and shall represent an accused before the Court of Criminal Appeals when requested by the accused or when the United States is represented by counsel. The appellate rights notice in the record of trial, acknowledged by Appellant’s signature, states that military counsel will be appointed to represent him. Rule 11 of the Joint Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, “Upon docketing of a case, the appropriate Judge Advocate General or designee shall, unless previously done, designate appellate military counsel to represent the parties . . .” Thus the United States, as well as the accused, is represented in every case before the Court of Criminal Appeals.

             In these circumstances, counsel’s authority to represent Appellant stems not solely from the client’s direction or consent but also from counsel’s military duty upon being detailed. This conclusion is supported by United States v. Sink, 27 M.J. 920, 921 (A.C.M.R. 1989) (“[C]ounsel contends that he is precluded from representing the appellant on appeal because he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with him . . . . We disagree. . . . [His] duty of representation can be met effectively in most cases without the appellant’s knowledge or active participation.”); United States v. Harper, 80 M.J. 540, 542 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (“Given . . . the lack of any affirmative action by Appellant either to waive his right to representation or to withdraw his case from appellate review, we conclude that appellate defense counsel not only has the authority, but is statutorily required to represent Appellant, to the best of her ability, notwithstanding her inability to locate or communicate with him.”); United States v. May, 47 M.J. 478, 481-82 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (“Where individual civilian counsel's failure to act is working to the detriment of an appellant, military appellate counsel may not stand by idly, because they remain responsible for protecting the interests of their client. * * * As officers of the court as well as appellate defense counsel, military counsel had an obligation to . . . protect the interests of their client.”)

            Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 22nd day of January 2026,

            ORDERED: 

            That Appellate Defense Counsel shall represent Appellant and file assignments of error and brief not later than thirty days from the date of this order.

Is this Order correct? If you were SA Galliano's appellate defense counsel, what would you do in light of it?

Government Accountability Project military whistleblowing guide

The Government Accountability Project has released a Military Whistleblowing Guide to help military personnel understand their whistleblowing rights and protections. GAP helped write and amend the Military Whistleblower Protection Act. Last year, it realized how few resources existed explaining the mechanics of what whistleblowing looks like for service members. "This guide’s our attempt to fill that gap by walking through the laws, how they’re enforced, and what to expect when a service member needs to report wrongdoing or challenge retaliation."

How's this for an op-ed headline: "Lt Samuel Kamalesan’s dismissal for religious stand shows colonial mindset. Army must end it"

Lt Gen (ret) H.S. Panag of the Indian Army has written this thoughtful column about a recent Supreme Court case involving religious observance in the armed forces. Excerpt:

Since around 1990, religion has been dominating the national discourse. It has polarised politics and society, and there has been a very assertive and visible resurgence of the majority religion in the public domain. The minorities, forever perceiving an existential threat, have followed suit.

Despite the younger generation of the armed forces being a product of this society, the macro-level secular military ethos, rules and regulations, and military law have prevented any adverse fallout, even with the flawed composition and religious practices.

However, there should be no doubt that the secular military ethos is under stress, which is compounded by the unethical conduct of a section of the military hierarchy.

Either for personal gains in the form of promotions or post-retirement benefits, or what is even more disturbing, due to conviction, a number of senior officers are publicly identifying with political ideology seeped in civilisational past and religion. They are literally in competition with each other to be seen in religious places, hobnobbing with religious leaders, linking military events to mythological religious past, and giving new religious names to organisations.

This is a very dangerous trend for an institution in which it is expected that a soldier shed his personal beliefs and identity to be subsumed by the organisation’s collective apolitical and secular ethos.

Former JAGs Working Group

The Former JAGs Working Group has today launched its website. You can find it here. From the home page:

A number of former and retired judge advocates (JAGs) established the Former JAGs Working Group in February 2025 following the Secretary of Defense’s unprecedented removal of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Judge Advocates General. Originally formed to alert all Americans about that event’s broader adverse impact on the role and rule of law in the military and to counter its effective dismantling of established legal guardrails within the Department of Defense, today our coalition of former military judge advocates is dedicated to serving as an independent, public-service resource grounded in the laws governing the use of the U.S. Armed Forces. Members served on active duty and in the reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, as well as in civilian attorney and leadership positions in the Department of Defense.

The materials presented on this site reflect and incorporate the legal and ethical standards, reasoning, and methodologies JAGs traditionally use when advising commanders on the legality of military actions. Although all factual assumptions rely exclusively on public information, the legal principles articulated in each document, interview, and essay are the same ones that guide real-world operational decision-making.

By publishing these briefs, the Former JAGs Working Group hopes to help policymakers, journalists, and the public evaluate whether current and future uses of the U.S. military are rooted in objective analysis, good-faith arguments, and solid legal principles. Where such rigorous review is absent, these materials are also intended to help identify and measure the likely risks to civilian control of the military, adherence to the rule of law, and the integrity of national security decision-making.

Please share the website with friends and colleagues.

Trump's on-again/off-again threats to seize Greenland

Just Security has this hypothetical legal review of possible U.S. military action to seize Greenland. The authors are Daniel Maurer, Steven J. Lepper, Alberto J. Mora, Franklin D. Rosenblatt, and the Editor. Excerpt:

In summary, neither the Constitution nor any domestic federal law authorizes the President to use the U.S. military and armed force to occupy or annex Greenland without the consent of Denmark or a U.N. Security Council Resolution. By using military force against a fellow member of NATO, the United States would effectively withdraw from theNorth Atlantic Treaty; without an Act of Congress or consent by two-thirds of the Senate, such a withdrawal would violate a U.S. federal statute.

By violating both constitutional and statutory law, any order issued outside the legal authority of the President or Secretary of Defense to employ the U.S. military to occupy or annex Greenland by force or threat of force without the consent of Denmark would be an unlawful order. Moreover, by constituting an act of “aggression” and “use of force” in violation of the UN Charter, any order to employ the U.S. military to occupy or annex Greenland by force or threat of force without the consent of Denmark would be an unlawful order

Inconsistent DoD policy on medical separations

Jack Kaminsky, “Yes, And…”: Federal Court Rebukes Pentagon, Orders New Look At Soldier’s PTSD Retirement Claim. 16 January 2026.

The U.S. Court of Federal Claims

has struck a blow against a Pentagon policy regarding how military boards evaluate mental health claims, ordering the Army to take a second, harder look at a veteran’s request for medical retirement.

In a decision handed down Thursday, Judge Armando O. Bonilla of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) failed to properly evaluate the case of Nathan D. White, a former soldier seeking to convert his disability separation into a medical retirement. The distinction is financially significant: a medical retirement offers lifelong pension payments, while a separation provides only a one-time lump sum.

The ruling in White v. United States specifically targeted a 2024 Pentagon policy directive—known as the "Vazirani Memo"—which instructed military boards to apply "liberal consideration" to discharge upgrades but not to medical fitness determination.

Judge Bonilla rejected that separation as "contradictory and unworkable."

White's case has been remanded to the Army Board for Correction of Military Records for a do-over, with some detailed instructions on what that do-over must address and how that must be documented.

R v Calderon, 2026 CMAC 2 - A lesson in statutory interpretation (in Canada)

On 15 January 2026, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada (CMAC) handed down its first determinative judgment of 2026. [In R v Cadieux, 2026 CMAC 1, Chief Justice Gleason granted a motion permitting the appellant to resurrect a previously abandoned appeal.]

The judgment in R v Calderon, 2026 CMAC 2, written by Chief Justice Gleason, was largely an exercise in statutory interpretation.  The central issue was whether military judges had the discretion to impose a sentence that is not expressly provided for in the National Defence Act (NDA).  Whether that was the case turned principally on the proper interpretation of s 132(2) of the NDA.

The Tragic Case of Major Cristian Hiestand

Military police are embroiled in yet another controversy about Canadian military justice, but it is a controversy that is regrettably fading from the public consciousness.

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) flying instructor at Canadian Forces Base Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, and Afghan war veteran Major Cristian Hiestand concluded a brief and turbulent relationship with a civilian woman. She then accused him of two counts of sexual assault after their breakup. Military police arrested and charged Major Hiestand in Saskatchewan provincial court in November 2021.

CBC’s highly respected military affairs journalist Murray Brewster reported that, in response, Canadian military authorities removed him from duty, directed him to have no contact with the complainant and a number of his co-workers, and to work remotely. This led to feelings of “isolation and amplified feelings of anxiety, stress and hopelessness." His family says he became isolated and depressed.

Major Hiestand took his own life on 17 January 2022 — some six weeks after he was charged.

The Hiestand family’s lawyer said the Major was never interviewed before being charged and was ignored when he asked the military police investigator if he could explain his side of the story and show a text exchange between himself and the complainant to give more context and evidence to his claim of innocence.

The investigator refused and Hiestand was told that MPs did not need to interview him, as they "... had all the evidence they needed to prosecute him," the lawyer said.

Hiestand dropped out of sight in the days before his death and was found dead in his home on 18 January 2022.

The Department of National Defence (DND) launched an internal professional conduct investigation into the actions of the military police officer who handled Hiestand's case. However, Major Hiestand’s family wants a more independent investigation by the Military Police Complaints Commission.

According to Brewster, a military medical officer and a social worker believed Major Hiestand was a "moderate" suicide risk, but his superiors largely ignored his circumstances.

The case raises troubling questions about how military police conduct sexual misconduct investigations, notably about their obligation — or lack of one — to interview suspects in these cases.

A board of inquiry (BoI), frequently done following a military fatality, was obtained by CBC News. It notes that  "Procedures and responsibilities regarding the supervision of Maj. Hiestand were devised on an ad-hoc basis. . . .  There was no established standard operating procedure to supervise members who are working from home as a result of arrest and release conditions,” and any follow-up with Major Hiestand ended during the Christmas break in 2022.

The BoI concluded that the arrangement, "due to his release conditions, increased his feelings of isolation and amplified feelings of anxiety, stress and hopelessness," given that much of his self-worth was closely tied to his status as an RCAF officer.

On 15 March 2024, Murray Brewster reported “An almost two-year-long internal investigation into how military police handled the criminal case of an air force officer who took his own life after being charged with sexual assault has cleared the officers involved of any wrongdoing.

     Unsurprisingly, the report by the Office of Professional Standards of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, dated Feb. 9, 2024, concluded that complaints made by the family of Maj. Cristian Hiestand were "not substantiated.

Canada's Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) received three complaints about how military police conducted their investigation. Two came from Hiestand’s family and the third, from a former military officer who was serving at the time at the CFB Moose Jaw’s military police detachment that handled Hiestand's case.

His par­ents and sis­ter filed sep­ar­ate com­plaints with the mil­it­ary police, say­ing they “rushed to judg­ment” and didn’t take a state­ment from the accused before lay­ing charges. A mil­it­ary police officer has also filed a com­plaint alleging the invest­ig­at­ing officers did not record the woman’s inter­view even though they could have, and that an off-­duty ser­geant tried to help with the invest­ig­a­tion while intox­ic­ated.

The family requested a public interest hearing. In a 27 March 2023 letter, the watchdog agency initially declined their request saying it is prepared to do a public interest investigation — a step down from a hearing — once the military has concluded its professional standards probe. MPCC chair Tammy Tremblay responded that the circumstances and "the arguments set forward in your request do not warrant a Public Interest Hearing."

Kelly v. Hegseth

The complaint in Sen. Mark Kelly's case against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth et al. can be found here.

A case to watch from the Philippines

A passed-over colonel with 34 years of service in the Philippine Army is facing charges based on a social media post which went viral and is said to have indicated a withdrawal of support for the country's president. Tempo has the story here. Excerpt:

Malacañang confirmed that President [Ferdinand] Marcos [Jr.] is closely monitoring the situation. Presidential Communications Office Undersecretary Claire Castro said the President will allow due process to take its course as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) conducts its probe.

“Due process ang pairalin at ang kung ano ang sinasabi ng batas iyon ang ipapatupad,” Castro emphasized.

Military officials clarified that [Col. Audie A.] Mongao’s relief does not equate to a finding of guilt, stressing that proceedings are ongoing.

The AFP leadership reiterated its call for personnel to remain apolitical, loyal to the Constitution, and steadfast in fulfilling their mandate amid political developments.

Conduct unbecoming is among the charges under consideration. The Philippine Articles of War can be found here. 

Military trial of civilians in Vietnam

Le Courrier du Vietnam reports here on the military court trial of several civilian officials on fraud and land management charges involving the former Nha Trang airport. Excerpt:

According to the Judgment Council, this is a criminal case of particular gravity. Defendants holding positions within the People's Committee of Khanh Hoa Province and agencies under the Ministry of Defense failed to properly fulfill their responsibilities in the recovery, handover of land and allocation of the project, allowing Nguyen Van Hau (former chairman of the Phuc Son Group), Tran Huu Dinh and Nguyen Thi Hang to conclude land transfer contracts and illegally mobilize funds to fraudulently appropriate the property of others.

For violating land management rules, the court sentenced Nguyen Chien Thang, former chairman of the People's Committee of Khanh Hoa Province, to four years in prison; Le Duc Vinh, former chairman of the Provincial People's Committee, and Dao Cong Thien, former vice-chairman, to three years and six months in prison each; Vo Tan Thai, former director of the Khanh Hoa Department of Natural Resources and Environment, to three years and six months in prison; Hoang Viet Quang, former brigadier general, former deputy director of the Operations Department (Ministry of National Defence), and Nguyen Duy Cuong, former brigadier general, former rector of the Aviation Officers' School, to two years and six months in prison each.

For fraud, the court sentenced Nguyen Van Hau, former chairman of the Phuc Son group, to 11 years in prison; Tran Huu Dinh, former director of the Nam A investment company, to eight years and six months in prison; Nguyen Thi Hang, former deputy general manager of the Phuc Son group, to seven years and six months in prison.

Only two of the defendants appear to have had military status -- and it seems that they were retirees.

Human rights jurisprudence strongly disfavors the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.

Uganda Law Society sues over military trials of civilians

The Uganda Law Society has filed a case with the East African Court of Justice concerning the government's continued use of court-martial proceedings to prosecute civilians, despite last year's contrary Kabaziguruka decision of the country's Supreme Court. The Monitor has the story here.

Terms of office for general court-martial and court of criminal appeals judges

Readers of Global Military Justice Reform who are concerned with judicial independence may be interested in consulting the Reference Materials on Terms of Office for General Court-Martial and Court of Criminal Appeals Judges (Jan. 9, 2026). These can be found here, here, here, here, and here.

The Editor's Introduction, Summary and Recommendations:

These Reference Materials on Terms of Office for General Court-Martial and Court of Criminal Appeals Judges have been assembled for the use of military and civilian legal scholars; practitioners and judges in courts-martial and on appellate or collateral review; the Judge Advocates General; the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice; the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Defense; the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services; and the media.

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), each branch of the U.S. armed forces was asked for all agency records “that state the specific start- and end-date for the judicial term of office” of each current general court-martial and service Court of Criminal Appeals judge, including both regular and reserve component officers. The responses are reproduced in these materials. Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard records were obtained in 2025-26 only after complaints were filed in federal district court. Because the Navy reported in 2025 that there were no records responsive to the FOIA request, it was not included in the litigation. No armed force produced documents from any judge’s official military personnel file. The Air Force’s response does not provide any information about end-dates. In addition, the one-page table attached as “Judges Names and Tour Dates” provides only the month and year of start-dates, rather than the specific initial day.

The service regulations and sparse (and in some respects nonresponsive) records obtained depict a trial and appellate judicial system that is neither uniform nor in compliance with the “term” requirement of Rule for Courts-Martial 502(c)(2). The word “term” connotes a defined period of time that is known in advance, rather than a floor with no fixed end-date. 

Additional issues arise in connection with the use of reserve component judge advocates as trial and appellate judges (i.e., how does a “term” function when the officer’s call to duty is episodic) and, in the case of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, the civilian judges who seem to have entirely undefined tenure. 

Service rules shed no light on when judicial terms begin and end. In addition, they include escape clauses that undermine their obvious purpose. In the case of the Coast Guard, the rules improperly permit judges to have terms shorter than the minimum where the officer wishes to try out the assignment.

Remedial action should be taken to correct the services’ violations of R.C.M. 502(c)(2) and ensure uniformity across service lines going forward. There is no plausible basis for inter-service disparities, given the uniformity principle set forth in Article 36(b), UCMJ. Compliance with the R.C.M. will foster public confidence in the administration of military justice by fully and finally embracing the central traditional tool for protecting judicial independence.

The President should clarify the Manual to ensure service compliance and uniformity. Consideration could usefully be given as well to increasing the mandatory minimum to the eight-year terms afforded to full-time federal magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 631(e).

Feel free to share these materials. Information concerning pertinent litigation, regulatory changes, or legislative activity will be appreciated and can be sent to me at eugene.fidell@yale.edu.

One wonders what the charge is

This just in from the Jerusalem Post:

The IDF is court-martialing a Givati Brigade company commander in the Northern Command for dumping urine on his soldiers’ clothes in an attempt to discipline them.

Earlier, some of the IDF soldiers at a forward position – where presumably there was no bathroom – had urinated in bottles and thrown the bottles behind the post.

Their actions angered their commander, who retaliated by dumping the urine from their bottles all over their room, clothing, and belongings, causing a nasty stench among other problems.

Dividing the caseload

When it created the Offices of Special Trial Counsels, Congress set in place two parallel charging systems under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, one in which the STCs make disposition decisions over some cases and the traditional George III model in which nonlawyer commanders make disposition decisions for everything else. This seems wasteful. 

A big question is whether so little is now left to commander convening authorities that the old system should be shut down and that chunk of cases shifted to the STCs. According to this U.S. Army report, "[a]s of Dec. 28, 2024, the OSTC’s first fully operational year, prosecutors reviewed more than 9,500 criminal investigations and exercised authority over 5,600 of those cases, according to OSTC." This seems to mean that nearly 59% of cases go into the STC basket. It will be interesting to see if a trend emerges in future years. If the convening authority caseload declines, Congress will want to consider shifting everything to the STCs.

What's a lawful order?

Prof, Dan Maurer sheds light on this core (and timely) issue of military law here on Lawfare. His conclusion:

Clarifying the definition of an “unlawful order” and making the disobedience of an unlawful order an affirmative duty is both legislatively feasible and a practical imperative, considering the contemporary challenges facing the military under an administration that routinely pushes on the boundaries of legality. The six recommendations above do not contradict any existing military case law or any existing provision in the UCMJ. Instead, they preserve the necessary “inference of lawfulness” while acknowledging the real-world influences that inform a soldier’s inferences, and they add a duty to seek confirmation of legality when in doubt. These recommendations together refine and codify language already found scattered across relevant provisions in the MCM. In other words, the only new thing Congress would create is clarity in a notoriously opaque area of military law at a time when definitions are essential to ensure the military itself remains subordinate only to lawful commands by civilian authority.

It is difficult, at this point, to speculate on whether Congress would actively consider such recommendations. However, it is not so speculative to say that President Trump would not sign such legislation into law, nor approve of these amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial. These recommended reforms should spark an overdue conversation and serve as a template from which to build such reform when the political winds are more favorable.

Pakistan, civilians in military court

Nouman Ali, Fair Trial Rights under Military Jurisdiction: Constitutional and International Perspectives from Pakistan and the UK. IX Int'. J. Res. and Innovation Soc. Sci. (IJRISS), October 2025.

Abstract

The rule of law and right of a fair trial and judgment forms the cornerstone of constitutional democracy. The eighteen amendments of constitution of Pakistan, Article 10A (2010) shipped the process from a judicial principle into a constitutional guarantee. This study aims to examine how these constitutional guarantees operate in practice when civilians are tried in military courts, using a comparative approach. however, the chronic trial of civilians before military courts continues to this guarantee. Basically, this is designed for maintaining discipline for the military, but these courts have enlarged their jurisdiction and include civilians blamed of terrorism also do wrong offences against state security. This study shows how Pakistan resolves its military jurisdiction through international obligations and national constitution to ensure a fair trial. This study examines Pakistan's legal and constitutional framework, as well as Britain’s neighboring Findley (sic). International human rights level Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the general recommendation of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 32. The study shows Pakistan’s main structural defects: the discreet methods, command influence, weak appeal rights, the absence of civilian oversight and explanation for legislation, and gaps in judicial and institutional processes. Comparative study with the British demonstrates that operational discipline and judicial freedom can coexist within constitutional checks. This article shows the reform structure proposing self-reliance appellate procedure, and also show governance reforms, and the supervision of parliament to match Pakistan’s military lawfulness with domestic fair trial and international fair-trial standards.

It thus recommends an independent appellate process, enhanced civilian oversight, and stronger parliamentary supervision to align Pakistan’s military justice with domestic and international fair trial standards.

Military v. civilian court jurisdiction in Indonesia

This article in the November/December 2025 issue of the International Journal of Management Studies and Social Science Research addresses the tension between the civilian and military court systems in Indonesia for offenses committed by military personnel. Excerpt:

Article 65 paragraph (2) of the TNI Law states that TNI soldiers are subject to military justice if they commit violations of military law, while for general crimes, the resolution is carried out in accordance with statutory regulations. This norm emphasizes that not all actions of soldiers fall under military jurisdiction, so the distinction depends on the type of crime committed. In practice, the absolute competence of general courts over general crimes committed by TNI soldiers has not been fully implemented. This occurs because Law No. 31 of 1997 has not been revised and still gives broad jurisdiction to military courts. This conflict of norms gives rise to dualism which has an impact on the difficulty of determining the appropriate forum when soldiers commit general crimes.

The authors conclude:

The Absolute Competence of Military Courts Over Criminal Acts by TNI Soldiers Has Not Been Fully Implemented The absolute competence of general courts over general crimes committed by TNI soldiers has not been fully implemented. This is because Law No. 31 of 1997 has not been revised and still grants broad jurisdiction to military courts. This conflicting norm has given rise to a dualism that makes it difficult to determine the appropriate forum when soldiers commit general crimes. The implementation of Article 65 paragraph (2) of the TNI Law has not yet fully proceeded as expected. Various normative, institutional, technical, and cultural obstacles still hinder the transfer of authority for examining general crimes by TNI personnel to general courts. Furthermore, the lack of regulatory harmonization and poor inter-institutional coordination have reinforced the status quo, thus preventing significant change in the military criminal justice system.Taking these findings into account, this study believes that strategic regulatory, institutional, and operational measures are necessary to optimally achieve the objectives of legal reform.

Military justice in modern history

This extensive (386-page) tome, edited by Kelly Maddox, Tino Schölz, Nicolas Stassar, and Urs Matthias Zachmann, includes numerous essays of interest and can be downloaded here. The book's subtitle is "The Adjudication of War and Violence in a Globalising World." From the front matter:

This volume derives from a conference on comparative military justice hosted at Freie Universität Berlin in July 2022 as part of the project “Law without Mercy: Japanese Courts-Martial and Military Courts during the Asia-Pacific War, 1937–1945”. This project’s principal aim has been to advance the historical understanding of the inherent reasons and mechanisms of mass violence during the Asia-Pacific War and the role that military justice played in it. For more information, please visit https://www.lawwithoutmercy.eu/. The project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 819892). It was also financed in part by the open access fund for books of Freie Universität Berlin.

Conditioning public access to courts-martial

ChosunBiz reports here on a recent decision of South Korea's National Human Rights Commission. At issue was, among other things, whether spectators at a court-martial could be required to sign a pledge not to bring in their cellphones during proceedings. Excerpt:

[T]he NHRC said it determined that "the Court-martial's requiring the submission of a pledge when entering a military unit" lacks a legal basis and could infringe on freedom of conscience under the Constitution, and that "the current environment for observing military trials" could undermine the effective guarantee of the constitutional right to know and the principle of open trials.

The NHRC conveyed the opinion to the Minister of the Ministry of National Defense that, instead of a pledge, there is a need to receive the submission of a "guidance and acknowledgment form on the protection of military secrets, etc." and to issue a copy. It added that it is also necessary to prepare and implement measures to enhance spectators' accessibility to the Court-martial (a mid- to long-term roadmap, such as installing an off-base entrance for the Court-martial).

The Commission's last point is interesting. At the UK's Military Court Centres, it is possible to enter the courtroom area directly from a public parking lot. From the government website:

The courts are located on the perimeter of a military establishment. This design provides public access to the Service Courts. The public entrance is staffed by the personnel from Military Provost Guard Service who employ security screening checks as a condition of entry.