In United States v. Crawford, 15 C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964), our predecessor Court stated that in the course of creating a venire panel, it is appropriate to add an African American servicemember to the panel specifically because of that servicemember’s race. The Court stated that if such a step constitutes discrimination, “it is discrimination in favor of, not against, an accused.” Id. at 41, 35 C.M.R. at 13. However, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that “[a] person’s race simply is unrelated to his fitness as a juror.” 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude today that our predecessor Court’s holding in Crawford was abrogated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Batson. In other words, Crawford’s authorization— indeed, its encouragement—to use race when deciding who should be appointed to a court-martial venire panel is no longer good law. As a result, whenever an accused makes a prima facie showing that race played a role in the panel selection process at his court-martial, a presumption will arise that the panel was not properly constituted. The government may then seek to rebut that presumption. Here, the Government did not meet its burden. Therefore, the decision below is reversed but a rehearing is authorized. [Footnote omitted.]
Jeter is the court's 24th full-opinion case of the about-to-end Term.
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