Pakistan's retired-officers case

The Express Tribune has further reporting on the case of retired Lieut. Gen. Faiz Hameed:

Lawyers who conduct trials in military courts say that, as a general practice, written judgments are provided to convicted persons only after intervention by a high court.

There is no direct right of appeal against military court verdicts in superior courts. However, convicts may challenge such decisions through writ jurisdiction in the high courts, where the scope of judicial review remains limited.

In its majority ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the trial of civilians in military courts. However, in its judgment dated May 7, the court directed the federal government to take steps for appropriate legislation to grant a right of appeal to civilians convicted by military courts.

Despite the passage of several months, the government has yet to take any steps to comply with that directive.

A senior lawyer said the proposed legislation would need to clarify whether the right of appeal would also extend to retired military officers such as Faiz Hameed.

It is hard to see how the field general coiurt-martial could lawfully have personal jurisdiction over a retiree while such an accused would not have a right to appellate review.

Russia expands military court jurisdiction

Legislation recently signed by President Vladimir Putin expands military court jurisdiction, according to this account.

Military court jurisdiction over foreign fighters

Separate amendments grant Russian military courts authority to try stateless individuals and foreign citizens for crimes committed during military service. This change aligns with recent policy shifts allowing non-citizens to enlist in the Russian armed forces, reflecting the ongoing demands of the conflict in Ukraine.

Afghanistan's busy military courts

According to this report, the Taliban government of Afghanistan has been using its military courts extensively:

The Taliban Supreme Court says more than 1,000 people were sentenced to prison by its military courts over a three-month period this year.

According to the court, 1,163 individuals were jailed in the last three months. Taliban military courts handle cases involving personnel serving in military roles within the Taliban administration.

The figures were published in a report by the security and executive directorate of the Taliban Supreme Court. The report did not specify the alleged crimes, charges, length of sentences, identities of those imprisoned or the locations where they are being held.

The report said Taliban military courts also issued thousands of summonses, with some individuals reportedly contacted by telephone and ordered to appear before Taliban military and judicial authorities.

Taliban military courts have jurisdiction over cases involving employees of the ministries of defence, interior and intelligence.

In previous years, Taliban courts have tried cases involving allegations such as kidnapping, document forgery, murder and abuse of authority. In many cases, however, the Taliban have released little information about defendants, their positions, judicial proceedings or the rulings issued.

Happy New Year

 MMXXVI

Retiree jurisdiction in Pakistan

Under human rights principles, court-martial jurisdiction is supposed to be reserved for serving personnel, not veterans, retirees, dependents, or other civilians. Pakistan's field general court-martial this month convicted a retired lieutenant general, Faiz Hameed, for offenses said to have occurred both before and after his retirement. He has appealed to the Army's internal court of appeal. Dawn has the story here. Will he -- can he -- challenge the post-retirement exercise of military jurisdiction? Excerpt from Dawn's report:

Hameed, who retired in November 2022, is the first former ISI director general and only the second three-star general in Pakistan’s history to face a full military trial and be sentenced to a jail term.

The case against him originated from accusations by property developer Kanwar Moeez Khan, who alleged that in 2017 that Hameed — then a major general in ISI — and two officers orchestrated a raid at his home and offices, seized valuables and coerced him into paying Rs40 million and financing a private television channel. The matter resurfaced in 2023 when the Supreme Court advised the complainant to seek remedies through the defence ministry, leading to a formal military inquiry.

While the Army Act typically allows action against retired personnel within six months of retirement, the proceedings reportedly invoked Section 2(d), which extends military jurisdiction to certain offences committed by persons not subject to military law, though exceptions were also available under Sections 31 and 40, which permit court martial regardless of time elapsed for offences involving mutiny, insubordination or fraudulent acts related to property.

A Court of Inquiry convened in April 2024 found grounds to proceed, leading to Hameed’s arrest on August 12 of that year. He was subsequently served a detailed charge sheet covering four categories of alleged misconduct: post-retirement political engagement; violations of the Official Secrets Act; misuse of authority, including the 2017 raid; and causing wrongful loss through coercive actions against Moeez.

The investigation was later widened to include several retired officers, among them retired Brig Ghaffar, retired Brig Naeem Fakhar and retired Col Asim, although the verdict did not state what determination the FGCM made regarding them.

Comparative law mavens will recall that the U.S. Department of Defense is currently weighing what to do about an unlawful-orders video recently released by, among others, retired Navy captain (and current Senator) Mark Kelly.

Two rulings from Trinidad & Tobago

Trinidad & Tobago Newsday reports that the Court of Appeals has upheld a High Court decision allowing judicial review in a military case. Excerpt:

The appellant, the Chief of Defence Staff, sought to overturn an order made by Justice Joan Charles on June 24, 2024, which refused to set aside leave granted to Edwards to challenge the defence force’s decision not to re-engage and roster him following a prior court ruling that declared his discharge illegal.

Edwards, a soldier in the defence force, was discharged in May 2014 under a “zero tolerance” policy after he was charged with criminal offences. In a separate constitutional action decided in June 2020, then-Justice James Aboud ruled that the policy, as applied to Edwards, was unlawful, ultra vires the Defence Force Act and in breach of several of his constitutional rights. Aboud awarded Edwards $15,000 in damages but made no order for reinstatement.

After the Chief of Defence Staff declined, by letter dated September 22, 2020, to roster Edwards for duty, Edwards sought judicial review to challenge that refusal. The defence chief argued that Edwards had failed to disclose material facts, had abused the court process and was barred because reinstatement had been considered and rejected in the earlier case.

In dismissing the appeal, Bereaux said the threshold for granting leave for judicial review is low and that such decisions should be overturned only sparingly. He found that Justice Charles was entitled to conclude that Edwards had an arguable case and had not breached his duty of candour.

The Court of Appeals' December 17, 2025 careful decision in Chief of Defence Staff v. Edwards can be found here. Excerpt:

(iv) The question whether the respondent was ready, willing and able to resume duty, arose in the context of re-instatement as a component in the assessment of compensation for the breach of his rights. Because the respondent was then incarcerated and unable to post bail, Aboud J concluded that he was then not able to resume duty. While it is thus correct that Aboud J did consider the issue of reinstatement in the course of the hearing that consideration did not bind Charles J primarily because reinstatement was not sought as a substantive issue by the respondent. In any event, it was unnecessary to seek it formally as a remedy because a finding of illegality by Aboud J would mean that the respondent was always a member of the TTDF and would have remained a member since 2014. Further, that finding could not bind Charles J because his incarceration was due to the fact that he had not been able to post bail and was in respect of a charge of which he had not been convicted and for which he was presumed innocent.

(v) The respondent could not pursue the issue of re-instatement until Aboud J ruled in his favour. That occurred on 3rd June 2020. The effect of the finding of illegality meant that the respondent always remained a member of the TTDF.

(vi) The respondent then brought this claim in November 2020, after the appellant by letter of 22nd September 2020, refused to formally reinstate and roster him. There was no delay in challenging the failure to roster. To the extent that the appellant contends that he remains a member of the TTDF, that is an arguable contention for judicial review.

(11) For these reasons the appeal is dismissed.

Two days later, the High Court decided Hernandez v. Commanding Officer of Trinidad & Tobago Coast Guard, which can be found here. Was it lawful to promote officers who were junior to the claimant? Did he have a right to be promoted based on seniority? Guess the answer?

Venezuelan military capability (spoiler alert: military court jurisdiction over civilians)

As this thorough essay explains, Venezuelan military capability with regard to resisting US-led regime change involves far more than classic military hardware (inadequate, aging and poorly maintained). The Nicolás Maduro regime's reinforcement of previous Hugo Chávez-led militarization of society initiatives --  for example, beefing up paramilitary groups and national guard-type units that also conveniently function to oppress civil liberties and prop up the regime -- provide potential capability for resistance to regime change during the "what next" phase after US bombing runs of command centers, etc. have concluded. 

Interestingly for Global Military Justice Reform readers, this essay glancingly includes the Venezuelan extension of military court jurisdiction over civilians as (per this author's understanding) a tool  to currently prop up the Maduro regime and help it resist US-led toppling in the future.

As the Yale Draft of the Decaux Principles of Military Justice states in Principle No. 6, military jurisdiction over civilians should be exceedingly rare, limited to situations such as that allowed by the law of armed conflict (for example, during occupation per GC IV). 

It's no surprise that authoritarian, illegitimate regime's such as Maduro's in Venezuela would want to solidify internal control (in the process trampling civil and judicial rights) by exercising military court jurisdiction  over civilians. 

What should be far more surprising is that supposedly democratic constitutional republics such as the United States also extends military criminal court-martial jurisdiction over civilians, despite the gross unfairness in doing so. 

Hence is the Trump Admin really that different from Maduro's regime in some regards -- given that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently  threatened to court-martial a civilian -- Senator Mark Kelly -- for non-criminal conduct committed as a civilian? 

The authoritarian toolkit has long included military court jurisdiction over civilians, and has no place (at least in the guise of US court-martial jurisdiction over military retirees) in the American system of justice, and the latest threats against Sen. Kelly provide impetus for Congress to finally relegate it to the dustbin of history, lest the US continue to mimic practices of authoritarian criminals such as Venezuala's Maduro.

Unlawful command influence under Indian military justice

The British military justice system, conceived to ‘discipline’ a mercenary force, is the progenitor of the Indian military justice system. This system was modified after the Mutiny of 1857 and the military officer, who had the power to convene a court-martial was given absolute power over a court-martial; be it of convening, appointing members, or the award of sentence. Nothing has changed in the Indian military justice system even after 78 years of Independence. Even today, the convening authority under the military justice system holds an authoritative and influential position under the military justice system.

Powers of Convening Officers

Under the three service Acts, viz, the Army Act, 1950, the Air Force Act, 1950, and the Navy Act 1957, the service Chiefs have been empowered by the Government by a warrant to convene court martial for trial of persons serving under their command and once trial is complete, to confirm the findings and sentence of such court martial. The service chiefs have further issued warrants to senior commanders for convening and confirming court martials for trial of persons under such commands. Any such warrant may contain any restrictions, reservations or conditions as the officer/ authority issuing it may think fit.

Under the Army Act and the Air Force Act, a general court martial (GCM) and summary general court martial (SGCM) can try any person subject to the Act. They have complete jurisdiction to try any offence, though certain restrictions are placed upon their power to try cases of murder, culpable homicide and rape, if committed against the civilians. They can award any punishment authorised by the Act including the punishment of death and imprisonment for life. A court martial can also try a person who has ceased to be subject to the Act provided that the trial for the offence committed by him while so subject, commences within a period of three years of his ceasing to be so subject.

The convening officer exercises the following powers under the military legal system:

(a) Making the decision to prosecute an accused. An application for assembling a GCM or DCM is sent by the commanding officer (CO) of the accused to the officer empowered to convene such a court martial. Such applications are accompanied by a summary of evidence, a charge-sheet, and certain other documents like copy of court of inquiry, if held in the matter. Before acceding to the application for a GCM or DCM, the convening officer considers the nature of the case and uses his discretion as to prosecute an accused by court martial.

(b) Deciding the charges against the accused. After considering the opinion of the judge advocate (JA) on the recorded summary of evidence, the convening officer approves the charges under the Act on which the accused be tried by the court martial.  

(c) Appointing the members of a court martial. The convening officer has full discretion in deciding as to who would constitute the court martial. The presiding officer of a court martial could be appointed by name or else the senior most member acts as such.

(d) Appointing a prosecutor.  The convening officer has the power to appoint a prosecutor for court martial, who must be a person subject to the Army Act. In complicated cases, he is expected to specially select an experienced officer as prosecutor.  

(e) Detailing a judge advocate for trial. The convening officer details a JA for every GCM; however, the presence of JA is not a must in SGCM. The JA, the prosecutor and the court members come under his authority in the chain of command.

(f) Suspension of Rules on the grounds of military exigencies or the necessities of discipline. It appears to the convening officer that military exigencies, or the necessities of discipline render it impossible or inexpedient to observe certain provisions of Army Rules during a court martial (for example the right of the accused to prepare his defence or allocating him a defending officer), he may make such declaration.   

(g) Considering the pre-confirmation petition of the accused. An accused, who considers himself aggrieved by any order passed by any court-martial may present a petition to the convening officer who would be confirming the finding or sentence of such court. The confirming authority may take such steps as may be considered necessary to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the proceedings.

(h) Confirming or not confirming the finding or sentence of court martial. No finding or sentence of a court martial shall be valid unless confirmed. The convening officer has the power to confirm or not to confirm proceedings of court martial.  Non-confirmation would mean that court martial has not taken place. 

(i) Revision of the finding and sentence awarded by the court-martial. The findings and sentence of every GCM and SGCM may be once revised by order of the confirming authority, even if an accused is acquitted by the court martial. The court on such revision consists of the same officers as were present when the original decision was passed.

Season's greetings, 2025-2026

Best wishes from the glass-enclosed newsroom high above Global Military Justice Reform Plaza.

Release the video

In Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes famously cracks the case by reasoning from “the curious incident” of the dog that didn’t bark in the night. While the Trump administration has done plenty of things in broad daylight that don’t require similar reasoning, there is a pattern of things that don’t happen, from which it is entirely fair to draw inferences. Examples include Mr. Trump’s long-promised tax returns (still being audited?), complete medical examination results, and the drip-drip saga of the Epstein files. 

A current instance of things that should happen but don’t is the administration’s refusal to release the Department of Defense’s video of the second September 2 boat strike to either the entire Congress or the American public. Because the Niagara of troubling administration actions consumes so much of the available media bandwith and public attention, we must be sure not to lose sight of the missing video because it raises grave issues. It is all well and good that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 President Trump signed the other day incentivizes the Pentagon to make it available to Congress on pain of losing some travel funds, but that is not sufficient.

What do we know?

First, we have irreconcilable accounts of what the missing video shows, with the few Republican legislators who have been permitted to view it insisting that it’s nothing special, while the few Democratic legislators who have had precisely the same opportunity report that it is deeply troubling. Let’s assume that different observers can plausibly have such divergent reactions and not simply engaging in partisan posturing. In either case, the American public should be allowed to judge so grave a matter for itself.

The Defense Department says the video is top secret. But how can it be classified at any level and hence exempt from mandatory release under the Freedom of Information Act when videos of the main strike some 40 minutes earlier, as well as numerous other Caribbean and eastern Pacific boat-strike videos, have been made public? On its face, it is arbitrary and capricious not to treat like cases in like manner. Under section 552(a)(4)(F)(i) of FOIA, personnel who arbitrarily and capriciously withhold an agency record must be referred to the government’s Special Counsel for possible disciplinary action. (Don’t hold your breath.)

But might there be some difference that justifies the different treatment? Certainly, more people were killed in the initial strike, of which video has made public, whatever its classification level may have been. One would think that the video of the second strike would be a stronger case for release. Might it be that the second strike video is gorier than the first? The government hasn’t said that. But if that is the reason, the solution here would be simple: preface the video with a warning, as is so often done in contemporary television news reporting of violent or otherwise disturbing events.

There is of course a theoretical possibility that the second video is being withheld on the notion that it preserves evidence of a war crime, since the two victims were shipwrecked and, presenting no plausible threat, were entitled under international law to be rescued rather than killed. That would rest on a faulty premise since, contrary to the administration’s position, the United States is not at war with anyone in the Caribbean or Eastern Pacific. That means the deaths must be examined under the human rights rubric of summary execution in the course of what must be treated as a de facto maritime law enforcement operation gone sideways. Viewed through that (proper) lens, the second-strike deaths, along with all of the others, would seem to fall, in the opinion of many observers, within the murder on the high seas provision of the federal criminal code and, for military personnel, Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In any prosecution, video of any of these strikes would be material evidence and there would be major battles over whether it could remain hidden from the public in a public trial. The Classified Information Procedures Act governs, and it is possible a way could be found around disclosure to the defense, although I am skeptical that a satisfactory alternative to disclosure can be fashioned – or should be. If the government stands its ground, the result may be dismissal of the case. For courts-martial, Military Rule of Evidence 505(d), which is part of the Manual for Courts-Martial, provides: “Trial counsel [the prosecuting judge advocate] should, when practicable, seek declassification of evidence that may be used at trial, consistent with the requirements of national security. A decision not to declassify evidence under this section is not subject to review by a military judge or upon appeal.”

But there may never be a boat-strike prosecution (for example, if President Trump were to issue a blanket pardon). The video has already been the subject of a FOIA request. If it is withheld on the ground that it is classified, the classification is subject to review by a federal district judge, albeit under a highly deferential standard: the government need only show that its classification decision is logical or plausible. Still, the circumstances noted above suggest that such a case would not be a slam dunk for the government.

There is a further route to challenge the claimed classified status of the video. There is in the Executive Branch an agency called the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, located within the National Archives and Records Administration. It can overturn classification designations and has done so on occasion in the past. In a case in which I was counsel, it declassified part of an Army record that had been classified explicitly in order to save the service from embarrassment. The Executive Order on classified information states: “In no case shall information be classified, continue to be maintained as classified, or fail to be declassified in order to: (1) conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; [or] (2) prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency.” Interestingly, under 32 C.F.R. § 2003.13(i), if the Appeals Panel orders a record declassified, the agency can appeal to the President himself, through the National Security Advisor. Conveniently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is currently both the National Security Advisor and head of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Which brings us to a final point. Although he denies having done so, President Trump has stated publicly that he would have “no problem” with releasing the video. He is the Commander in Chief. Pete Hegseth works for him, rather than the other way around. Who is in charge? Where does the buck actually stop?

The Kirk purge

Prof. Frank Rosenblatt writes here on Lawfare concerning the Defense Department's social media purge. Excerpt:

. . . Normally, military members enjoy broad First Amendment rights to share their views, limited only when the speech conflicts with military duties. But the past few months have seen a “Kirk Purge” in which those standards have been abandoned for newer decrees that seek to punish military members for their viewpoints. These new standards inject uncertainty about which viewpoints are disfavored, which tends to broadly chill otherwise protected expression.

The Kirk Purge is not unprecedented. It’s reminiscent of the mood following the attack on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, a national event that, like Kirk’s assassination, felt personal for many. In the aftermath, a conservative soldier made social media posts about the Capitol attack that were, at worst, in poor taste. For this, he received a career-killing reprimand from a general who was eager to take action. Time cooled this zeal, and the punishment was rescinded. It was a lesson that military leaders can sometimes be tempted to control expression that is otherwise protected, especially during political controversies.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus promoted posthumously to Brigadier General

We missed it, but last month Captain Alfred Dreyfus was promoted posthumously to Brigadier General in the French Army. Le Monde has the story here. The text of the legislation is as follows:

LOI no 2025-1079 du 17 novembre 2025 élevant Alfred Dreyfus au grade de général de brigade (1)

NOR: ARMX2514008L

L’Assemblée nationale et le Sénat ont adopté,

Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit :

Article unique

La Nation française élève, à titre posthume, Alfred Dreyfus au grade de général de brigade.

La présente loi sera exécutée comme loi de l’Etat.

Fait à Paris, le 17 novembre 2025.

EMMANUEL MACRON

Par le Président de la République:

Le Premier ministre,

SÉBASTIEN LECORNU

La ministre des armées et des anciens combattants,

CATHERINE VAUTRIN

(1) Travaux préparatoires : loi no 2025-1079.

Assemblée nationale:

Proposition de loi no 1380;

Rapport de M. Charles Sitzenstuhl, au nom de la commission de la défense, no 1463;

Discussion et adoption, après engagement de la procédure accélérée, le 2 juin 2025 (TA no 124).

Sénat:

Proposition de loi, adoptée par l’Assemblée nationale, no 675 (2024-2025);

Rapport de M. Rachid Temal, au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, no 87 (2025-2026);

Texte de la commission no 88 (2025-2026);

Discussion et adoption le 6 novembre 2025 (TA no 18, 2025-2026)

Join the International Society (or re-up)

This just in from Prof. Eric Talbot Jensen, head of the U.S. Branch of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War:

Dear all:

Welcome to the end of 2025! It’s been a great year for the US Branch of the International Society for Military Law and Law of War. We have held terrific events: on the launch of the Virginia-Georgetown Manual Concerning the Use of Force Under International Law: Rules and Commentaries on Jus ad Bellum; a number of discussions and presentations on events in Ukraine, including a panel with members of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense and a discussion about technological innovations in Ukraine; a panel with the winners of the American Society of International Law’s Lieber Society writing prizes; a discussion on the End of War Project and the role of international courts in ending wars; a discussion on teaching the law of armed conflict; and a presentation on civilian involvement in ICT activities during armed conflict.  In the process, we have partnered with Georgetown Law School, the American Society of International Law, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and particularly with our brothers and sisters to the north – the Canadian Group of ISMLLW.  It has been a busy and full year!

If you found these activities useful and want to maintain your connection to the US Branch of ISMLLW and be on our mailing list for upcoming events, remember to renew your membership at https://forms.gle/kD2pzBuqnqYofkV76.  The cost is $60 a year ($35 if you are a student), which includes membership not only in the US Group, but also in the International Group as well.  You can pay by Zelle, Venmo, or check. Also, please help spread the word about ISMLLW and invite others to join.

As we look forward to 2026, here are some events we are planning: 1) A discussion on the upcoming West Point Manual on Artificial Intelligence in Armed Conflict, 2) A review of Ukraine’s perspective on war-sustaining objects, particularly in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, and 3) a multinational panel on how states view the applicability of the rule of proportionality to non-civilians who are protected from being made the object of attack, such as wounded and sick, medical and religious personnel, and others hors de combat. We also welcome your views on what events and topics you would like to see on the agenda and what you would like to talk about or present on. You are an amazing group and we know you are engaged in doing your own amazing work.  Let us know what you are doing, either individually, or at your school or institution, and we will schedule an event where you can tell us all about it.

We are grateful for your support and interest. Happy holidays and we look forward to continuing to collaborate and engage with you in 2026!

By the numbers (and some top stories of 2025)

As the end of another year rolls around, where do things stand at Global Military Justice Reform?

• Hits, 3,266,358 (from 195 jurisdictions)
• Posts, 7860
• Comments, 1123
• Contributors, 24
• Town Halls, 26

Biggest news stories of 2025:

• Ugandan Supreme Court forbids military trial of civilians
• Ugandan parliament enacts legislation permitting military trial of civilians
• Pakistani Supreme Court permits military trial of civilians, even without another constitutional amendment
• Trump administration fires two Judges Advocates General
• Trump administration shuts down Military Justice Review Panel and DAC-IPAD
• Trump administration threatens military justice action against U.S. Senator who is a retired naval officer
• Unlawful orders debate roils U.S.
• The Orders Project reactivated in the U.S., affiliates with National Institute of Military Justice
• Israeli Military Advocate General resigns under fire and is arrested on civilian charges
• CAAF cases on full opinion remain sparse
• First issue of Forces Law Review
• Third International Military Justice Forum conducted in Paris

Thank you for your support. Best wishes for the holidays -- and a more peaceful year to come.

Conscience v. unit cohesion

Should a military officer who is an adherent of one faith group be dismissed for declining to participate in his unit's religious activity when the unit is formally identified with a different faith group. In Kamalesan v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court upheld such a dismissal. According to this Supreme Court Observer account:

On 25 November, the Supreme Court disposed of the challenge against his dismissal and endorsed the Army’s views that his conduct amounted to serious indiscipline inconsistent with leadership responsibilities. 

The Bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi held that an officer who leads troops cannot selectively opt out of regimental practices. Responding to his plea that his right under Article 25 had been violated, the Bench observed that not every religious sentiment or practice is an “essential” feature warranting constitutional protection. “You have to respect the collective sentiment of your command as a group leader and lead by example. You are insulting your own group when you refuse to perform rituals,” the Bench told him.

Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, appearing for Kamalesan, urged the Court to apply a proportionality standard. He argued that the officer had served for six years without blemish, faced no court martial or other complaints, and was now being deprived of pension and gratuity for a single refusal rooted in conscience.

He also stressed that the case raised important questions on secularism within the Armed Forces and warranted a full hearing with notice to the Union. The Bench was not persuaded. At one stage, the Chief Justice remarked that the officer was a “misfit” for the Army and described his conduct as “gross indiscipline”.

If the Editor may be permitted a personal observation, the remark quoted immediately above is not only shockingly intemperate but preposterous 

Retired Indian Army Lieutenant General Philip Campose considers the case here. Excerpt:

I believe the military’s secularism, as truly practised, transcends narrow arguments over faith. It places institutional unity, operational effectiveness and regimental cohesion above individual commitments pertaining to personal faith.

The Army’s regimental sarv dharm sthals, temples, gurudwaras, mosques and churches exist not for propagating religion or doctrinal supremacy but for spiritual solace, morale, solidarity and the forging of trust between men who might otherwise have little in common beyond the uniform. In that context, to treat religion rigidly as purely individual and refuse to share in the rituals of one’s men undermines that unity. It reduces faith to dogma rather than allowing it to become a bridge.

When a non Sikh officer stands in a Sikh gurdwara with his troops or a Hindu, Sikh or Muslim officer participates in a Christian prayer, it becomes a powerful testament to what the Army truly is, a living embodiment of unity in diversity. That is the secularism that needs to be cherished, not indifference, but inclusion, mutual respect and collective identity.

For all men and women in our forces who follow varied faiths, the Kamalesan case should be viewed not as a warning against believing but as a lesson in understanding secularism and religious harmony in the Indian context and the nature of service in the Indian military. When you don the uniform, you pledge loyalty not just to God but to the men you lead and to the flag that binds you. When you visit places of worship of other faiths in line with your military duties, you are not placing ‘other gods’ before your own. You still retain loyalty to your own faith. That loyalty may demand sacrifice even over personal religious preferences. But that is not sacrilege. It is the highest expression of faith, when belief does not become a barrier but a bond between you and your men, between faiths, between hearts.

Any officer who cannot make that sacrifice, who places interpretations of his personal faith over collective duty, may appear to remain true to his creed. But he may find himself unfit for the unique secular ethos of the Indian Army.

A broken institution in India

India did a very good thing when it created the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT); better late than never, as it took many years for the government to act on a suggestion from the Law Commission. Sadly, the AFT, like other Indian courts, has become overwhelmed. This devastating and, if anything, understated article by Pragya Singh in The Wire tells the tale. Over 28,000 cases are pending at the AFT. Excerpt:

After all, the backlog of cases in the AFT has grown even as spending on this tribunal has increased every year. The budget and expenditure records (also retrieved by Nayak from Union Budget documents of various years) show that the tribunal’s annual expenditure rose from Rs 20.68 crore in 2012-2013 to Rs 48.22 crore in 2022-2023. In 2025-26, the budget estimate (BE) was over Rs 56 crore, slightly over the Rs 54 crore BE in 2023-2024.

This naturally raises questions about the capacity of the AFT to resolve cases, but there is yet another layer to this data. The parliament question answered in March 2021 included details of vacant positions in the AFT, which have a direct bearing on its capacity to function. At the time, 23 of the 34 sanctioned posts (nearly 70%) across AFT benches were vacant – coinciding with a sharp rise in pendency during the pandemic years (see image 4, above, on vacancies and image 5, above, on disposal).

This meant that several benches were functioning with one or no members, and some benches could not function at full strength. The period of highest vacancies was 2020-2021, when parliamentary data and RTI details both show lower disposal numbers, contributing to rising pendency. Cases not disposed in a particular year are rolled over to the next year, from 18,829 to almost 28,000 in four years.

What is more, when 23 of the tribunal’s posts were vacant, case disposals fell sharply – from 6,575 in 2019 to just 1,939 in 2020 – adding to the backlog that has grown by nearly 50%: from 18,829 cases in early 2021 to about 28,000 by September 2025.

The contrast is stark: even as the military is widely celebrated, thousands of soldiers and veterans are still waiting quietly for basic service and pension disputes to be resolved.

Lawful and unlawful orders

Frank Rosenblatt and Colby Vokey, both of whom are part of The Orders Project, write here for "Home of the Brave" about The Reality of Lawful and Unlawful Orders, examining three teachable scenarios. They conclude:

It is not the fault of our men and women in uniform that we occupy a unique historic moment, one in which they face a greater likelihood of being issued an unlawful ord than most of them had ever imagined. But it is incumbent on us as a civil society to ensure they have the resources needed at their disposal to properly handle the situation if and when that unfortunate eventuality comes to pass.

Thailand: not so fast on military justice bill

The Bangkok Post editorializes here about a bill to limit military justice that is among those on hold now that Parliament has been sent home. Excerpt:

Military courts are not designed to protect the public. They protect the institution. Their judges are officers, many without legal expertise. Civilians cannot appoint their own lawyers. Evidence is filtered through military prosecutors. Court buildings sit inside restricted military compounds. And the verdicts repeatedly favour the accused when the accused wears a uniform.

No justice system can survive when one arm of the state is allowed to police itself.

The effort to send soldiers accused of corruption or crimes against civilians to be tried in civilian courts was meant to fix exactly that. It was simple: treat soldiers like any other public official.

But just before Parliament was dissolved, a majority of a House committee led by Pheu Thai politicians made a U-turn to keep these cases in military courts as before. The timing was no accident. It came as the armed forces were reasserting influence during a border conflict with Cambodia, knowing full well that public sympathy tends to drift their way during wartime.

No matter how much the public sympathises with the armed forces, the country needs the military to reform. The push to preserve military court jurisdiction cuts against this public demand. It signals that some folk still believe soldiers deserve special treatment. Worse, it tells victims that their pain ranks below the institution's reputation.

More on the court-martial of General Xu Qinxian

From this recent article in The New York Times:

In the trial footage, General Xu explains that he refused the order as a matter of individual conscience and professional judgment. He tells judges that sending armed troops against civilians would lead to chaos and bloodshed, saying that a commander who carried out martial law poorly would go down as “a sinner in history.” 

* * * 

General Xu was sentenced to five years in prison, and he died in 2021 at 85. Parts of his story surfaced in books and news reports. In 2011, he told a Hong Kong newspaper that he had no regrets about his decision.

Readers who are following the current controversy over U.S. boat strikes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific as well as the Pentagon's escalating investigation into Sen. Mark Kelly's participation in a video about the duty to disobey unlawful orders will find this account of Gen. Xu's case of interest.

Unlawful orders watch

CNN has a scoop about the legal advice the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff received in connection with the boat strikes in the Caribbean:

How should a military commander respond if they determine they have received an unlawful order?

Request to retire — and refrain from resigning in protest, which could be seen as a political act, or picking a fight to get fired.

That was the previously unreported guidance that Brig. Gen. Eric Widmar, the top lawyer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave to the country’s top general, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, in November, according to sources familiar with the discussion.

Do you agree?

Stay tuned.

Heritage Foundation report on victim legal counsel (VLC) program

Here is the full report, and here is the conclusion:

If the military needed the VLC program at one point, those reasons are no longer present with the advent of the OSTC. To be sure, the VLC program has provided a benefit to victims at a time when the JAG Corps did not have career prosecutors. As lawyers trained to focus like a laser on one client and her rights, VLCs brought a degree of professionalism to their task that gave victims of crime in the military more confidence in the system.

Today, most victim cases can be handled professionally and properly by well-trained military prosecutors who understand victims’ rights, victim dynamics, and the services available to victims in the military. The DOD has a vast array of professional victims’ services spread across the military that are fully capable of addressing their non-legal needs. For the most part, the professionals providing those services have backgrounds that are far more appropriate for providing counseling and support services to victims of crime than are the skillset and experience of attorneys.

All of the VLC program’s non-legal counseling and support features of the job should be moved to existing victims’ services in the DOD, and the OSTC, not the VLC, should be the primary entity that works directly with and on the behalf of victims. The OSTC, consistent with common practice in the civilian sector, should be responsible for filing all pretrial motions, including those related to MRE 412 and 513, on behalf of victims. In the rare instance where, in the judgment of the OSTC, a VLC’s legal services are required, the OSTC should be given the responsibility to refer cases to a VLC.

Finally, modifying the VLC program will save the services money that can be used to enhance the OSTC and other essential services provided by the JAG Corps.

Metamorphoses of Czechoslovak military justice after World War II

Abstract of this article by Stanislav Polnar:

The study examines the development of Czechoslovak military justice after 1945. The subject of the analysis is mainly the organisational structure of military prosecutors’ offices and courts. The text discusses the issue of military justice in its broader sense. The subject of the analysis also includes other authorities that played an important role in the criminal proceedings regarding acts committed by military personnel. These concern the search activities of commanders and investigative activities of intelligence and security authorities in the context of pre-trial criminal proceedings. The article also deals with the issue of the development of the military prison system and the problem of crimes committed by members of the Soviet army on Czechoslovak territory after 1968. In the context of international criminal law, mention is also made of the activities of General Bohuslav Ečer, who significantly affected the character of the prosecution of Nazi war crimes between 1945 and 1948 and thus wrote one of the most important chapters of Czechoslovak military justice after World War II. In general methodological terms, the author describes the development of the organisational structure of military judicial bodies in the context of the political developments in Czechoslovakia, including legal developments, specifically in the field of substantive and procedural criminal law. The final part provides a general overview of the basic development tendencies following 1989 and the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, set within the context of the current global security situation.

Swiss man convicted in absentia for serving as mercenary in Ukraine

 Details here. The military court sentenced him to 18 months' confinement, suspended for four years.

1990 PLA trial

Thanks to Jennifer Zeng and Jennifer's World, we can provide this link to a translation of the transcript of the 1990 court-martial of PLA Major General Xu Qinxian. He was tried for disobeying an order to suppress the Tiananmen protests.

Uganda and courts-martial

It is reported that President Museveni has appointed Brig-General Richard Tukachungurwa as Chairperson of the General Court Martial.

Prominent human rights lawyers have sharply criticised President Museveni’s appointment of Brigadier-General Richard Tukachungurwa as Chairperson of the General Court Martial, describing the move as a grave setback for justice, accountability, and the rule of law in Uganda.

Brig Tukachungurwa — the military officer who presided over the dramatic January 2025 confrontation that saw lawyer Eron Kiiza arrested, convicted, and jailed inside the General Court Martial — was appointed on November 25 to replace Brig Robert Freeman Mugabe, whose term expired in June.

His promotion has reignited concerns over the independence and conduct of the military justice system.

Reacting on Wednesday, human rights lawyer Kiiza condemned the appointment in the strongest terms, saying it signalled deep institutional decay.

Nile Post, 3 December 2025.

Expert Q & A on the boat strikes

There's been a great deal of insightful writing about the boat strikes -- none of it better than this essay by Tess Bridgeman, Michael Schmitt and Ryan Goodman at Just Security. BZ.

Professional responsibility and the boat strikes

Major General (ret) Steven J. Lepper, Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Dan Maurer, and the Editor have write here about some of the professional responsibility issues arising from the United States boat strikes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Excerpt:

What is not acceptable is for an officer who harbors substantial professional misgivings about a proposed mission to remain silent in the face of some other lawyer’s faulty, unexplained, or irresponsible opinion. Silence is not a hallmark of the exercise of independent judgment. Neither is failing to commit one’s professional assessment to writing. Remaining silent or in the shadows will be viewed as acceptance down the road, possibly after a mission has gone sideways.

When the dust settles and more is known about the boat strikes, we hope light will be shed on the extent to which the rules of professional conduct came into play in the operation and whether they proved an aid or a hindrance to the lawyering process and command decision-making.

Does what happens in the barracks stay there? (A note from Switzerland)

The Tribune de Genève has the story here -- with a good summary of Swiss military justice to boot. (Google Translate does a good job withv this.) Excerpt:

If the conviction that concerns you appears on your son's criminal record, he will need to be aware of it in certain situations in his daily life. A prospective employer may request a criminal record extract, particularly for sensitive positions. However, the criminal record extract available to individuals is more limited than the one accessible to authorities. Furthermore, entries are not permanent: they are automatically removed after a certain period, which depends on the seriousness of the offense.

Your son can request his own criminal record extract to know exactly what is included. This will allow him to better anticipate situations where his past might be examined and to prepare contextualized explanations if necessary.

Ultimately, a military conviction is not necessarily a dead end for civilian life. It all depends on its nature and severity. In many cases, the impact remains limited, especially if your son now demonstrates exemplary behavior.

Is Pakistan's 27th Amendment to the Constitution constitutional?

The Lahore High Court Bar Association thinks not, and that as a result, the intra-court appeals concerning the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians must be returned from the new Federal Constitutional Court to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Details from the bar's submission can be found here. Excerpt from Dawn's report:

The application contended that the 27th Ame­ndment was in violation of the salient and essential features of the Constitution, stating that the 1973 Constitution defined the powers of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.

“While parliament possesses the power to amend the Constitution, it does not function as a constituent assembly and is subject to both express and implied limitations,” it added.

The application pointed out that the jurisprudence of the SC — most recently the authoritative 17-member judgement in the Rawalpindi District Bar Association case — had affirmed that parliament could not, through any amendment, alter or abrogate the salient or essential features of the Constitution, including the independence of the judiciary.

The application pleaded that both the 26th and 27th amendments impermissibly encroached upon judicial independence and restructured the constitutional architecture in a manner inconsistent with these unamendable features. Therefore, they constituted an invalid exercise of amendatory power.

It argued that a constitutional amendment, which undermined judicial independence while simultaneously divesting pre-existing constitutional courts of jurisdiction to examine its validity, violated fundamental constitutional principles.

“If permitted, parliament can abolish or replace the forum for constitutional adjudication at will, thereby insulating unconstitutional amendments from judicial scrutiny,” the plea feared.

The application further noted that the SC had consistently distinguished betw­een “jurisdiction” and “judicial power”.

“Even where parliament modifies jurisdiction, judicial power — i.e. the authority to determine whether jurisdiction exists — remains inherent in the superior judiciary,” it read.

“Accordingly, notwithstanding the 27th Amendment, it lies within the judicial power of the SC to determine whether it has been validly divested of jurisdiction. The subject appeal must therefore be restored to the SC for that purpose.”

Reform proposed for Nigerian military justice

A bill to reform Nigerian military justice has passed its second reading in the Senate, according to this report. Excerpt:

Under the bill, such reports will now be submitted to a court of law for review before any conviction can be upheld.

The proposed legislation also prohibits undue command interference in courts-martial, guarantees due process, and strengthens independence and fairness within the military justice system.

The Armed Forces (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill, 2025, sponsored by Senator Abdulaziz Yar’Adua, aims to modernise military law, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution, and align Nigeria’s Armed Forces with global standards of accountability, discipline, and professionalism.

The Sde Teiman Case (another in the series)

Noam Kozlov has written this post for Just Security on Persecuting the Prosecutors: Israel’s Military Lawyers Under Pressure. Excerpt:

At this point, it is crucial to highlight that safeguarding the Israeli MAG [Military Advocate General] is in the best interest of everyone who values the rule of law, regardless of their broader views on the conflict. Even for those who believe Israel is unwilling or unable to investigate itself, especially with respect to high-ranking officials, the capacity of international tribunals to effectively and timely investigate and prevent violations is, at best, limited. The authority of the MAG within the IDF enables it to influence policy in real-time, not only enforcing but also preventing violations of international law. In this regard, a functioning internal review mechanism cannot be fully replaced by an international body, which has inherently limited resources and access to enforce compliance in real-time. Even when it comes to holding violators accountable, international institutions naturally face limitations in access to information and evidence, and cannot meaningfully replace an effective internal investigative system.

That said, the Israeli MAG seems to be increasingly unable to fulfill its duties in holding violators accountable, partly due to political pressures, including from certain government officials. Therefore, it is essential for Israeli leaders, both in the military and civilian sectors, to safeguard the legitimacy and independence of the MAG; Israel’s allies should also emphasize the critical role the MAG plays in their ongoing cooperation with Israel. Additionally, members of the international law community must voice their support for a robust and independent MAG. As noted above, dismissing the role of the Israeli MAG would be counterproductive; while the MAG faces significant and growing challenges to performing its duties independently and effectively, there is no fully adequate alternative to an internal compliance institution.

Finally, the Sde Teiman case demonstrates that many in the MAG still value the rule of law and the enforcement of international norms, including the officers involved in the investigation and the higher chain of command that authorized and supported them. This is said regardless of whether Yerushalmi should have acted differently with respect to the leak and cover-up. Ultimately, the Sde Teiman soldiers accused of abusing prisoners were indicted with charges of aggravated battery and abuse, and their trial is still ongoing. Therefore, while many changes are needed in the MAG, there is hope, and an urgent need, that the MAG will once again uphold the rule of law and enforce humanitarian duties during war.

Mr. Kozlov concludes: "These dynamics demonstrate the role of the MAG in upholding the rule of law in Israel as part of the broader judicial apparatus. The weakening of the MAG affects not only the IDF’s ability to carry out its missions lawfully, but also the broader protection of the rule of law in Israel." American readers may see some resonance with the current administration's stance with respect to the Judge Advocates General and their responsibilities.

Reforming India's grievance redress system

In India, the fundamental rights of the members of the Forces (Armed Forces and the Central Paramilitary/Armed Police Forces) are restricted by Article 33 of the Constitution to ensure the proper discharge of duties and maintenance of discipline among them. They are denied the right to be members of trade unions or associations, to attend political meetings and to communicate with the press. The State has, however, bestowed on them the right to make complaints seeking the redress of their grievances. The provision for the redress of grievances is contained in the Army Act, 1950 and is similar in the other two services. The Regulations of the three services, however, provide different procedures for the processing of grievance petitions; thus, damaging the effectiveness of a statutory right.

Shortcomings in the grievance redress system are as follows:

Inordinate Delays: The time-frame for processing of a grievance petition is too long, and is different in the case of each service. For instance, in the case of the Army, when the complaint does not contain any accusation requiring investigation, it is required to reach the Army headquarters within 135 days. If the complainant has made an accusation requiring investigation, the complaint should reach the headquarters within 180 to 195 days. Moreover, the Regulations do not provide any time-frame for the Army Headquarters or the Central Government to give its final decision in the matter. The length of time taken in giving a decision also causes significant distraction to the affected persons and their peers. When it takes a long-time to resolve a grievance petition, members may also feel that the complaint is not being taken seriously. This can cause discontent at unit level and the delay in the finalization of a complaint frustrates the very purpose of the system.

Faulty Processing: During the processing of a complaint, the complainant is not informed about the comments of the section commander and intermediate authorities on his grievance application. In the case of Union of India v. Maj Gen Arun Roye (2008), the Calcutta High Court opined: “…non-furnishing of comments of the intermediate authorities to the complainant who lodged the statutory complaint is tantamount to violation of the principles of natural justice. This is because the comments that are furnished by the intermediate authorities to the Central Government are essential to the complainant, so as to enable that person to know what has been commented against him/her by the said military authority while forwarding the complaint to the Government.” 

Decision is not ‘reasoned’: The decision on an application is not required to be a “reasoned” order and it could be conveyed in a brief sentence, such as: “Your application has been rejected by the competent authority as being devoid of merit.” Stereotype rejection orders reinforce the doubt that complaints are treated arbitrarily and against the principles of natural justice. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The rejection of a grievance, in the absence of any reasoning, indicates either that the authority did not listen or that it took an arbitrary decision. For reasons of transparency, a judgement must assure that appropriate care has been given while taking the decision, and that outcome is not the result of improper motives. The reason given for a judgement plays a significant role in demonstrating that the person concerned has actually been heard.       

Coercive Provisions: In the Army, if a complainant has made an accusation in the grievance petition, he/she is required to render a certificate, “I undertake that any false statement or false accusation made by me in this complaint will render me liable for disciplinary action.” In cases of the use of abusive language, misbehaviour and sexual harassment, which may take place in private, it may not be possible for a victim to support his/her accusation with any documentary proof or witness. Then the victim would be liable to disciplinary action under section 56(b) of the Army Act, based on the certificate rendered with his/her petition, where maximum punishment could be up to 5 years of imprisonment. This often deters the victim from seeking redress and makes the statutory right meaningless. Similar provisions do not exist in the regulations of the Navy or the Air Force.

Legal Help and Harassment: All levels of the military hierarchy are entitled to seek legal advice on a complaint. However, the aggrieved person is not provided any legal help for preferring his complaint. The persons objected to may participate in disposing of the objection. If the grievance is against the higher authorities, the affected individual or his family may also face social seclusion and harassment. There have been allegations that those lodging complaints against their superiors have been transferred to far-flung places, causing harassment to them and their family members.

Increasing number of court cases: There has been an unusual increase in the filing of writ petitions and civil suits by the men in uniform, which demonstrates a gradual erosion of faith in the grievance redressal system in the Forces. The large number of cases that have come up before the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) and the superior civil courts in recent years show that the grievance redress system of the defence forces has not only been moving at a very slow pace, but has also not been able to satisfy the aspirations of men in uniform.