Comparative law and military justice

From yesterday's decision in O'Brien v. Minister of Defence & Military Veterans, CCT 14/23 [2024] ZACC 30 (20 December 2024) (footnotes omitted):

[84] In the United States, the Supreme Court in Weiss upheld the renewable appointment of military judges due to historical peculiarities of the constitutional text and context.  Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14 of the US Constitution grants to Congress the power to “make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”  Exercising this authority, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (Uniform Code).  In Weiss, the US Supreme Court reasoned that because of these wide constitutional powers, judicial deference is “at its apogee when reviewing congressional decision making in this area” and that only “extraordinarily weighty” considerations would overcome the balance struck by Congress, which, in enacting the Uniform Code, had not specified fixed terms.  It would be fallacious to apply this sort of reasoning to the South African context.  Here, we have strong constitutionally entrenched guarantees of judicial independence for all courts, without exception.  The United States is therefore an improper comparator.

One wonders whether "fallacious" is the right term. Would "unpersuasive" have been better? 

American military trial and appellate judges have renewable three-year terms of office, with escape valves. Federal magistrate judges have eight-year renewable terms.

Does the two-year cooling-off period the Constitutional Court imposed make sense? Presumably, the South African Parliament will act promptly to frame remedial legislation in light of the court's decision.

Comments are most welcome concerning O'Brien and its implications. Real names only, please.