In dismissing the BDF’s appeal, the CCJ considered whether section 75 of the Act complied with constitutional standards of legal certainty and due process. Justice Peter Jamadar, delivering the court’s reasons, said: “The language of section 75 is expressed with sufficient clarity to be capable of objective assessment and self-regulation.”
He added: “International military guidelines contain examples of what may constitute an offence falling under the section. Also, the open-endedness of the offence is academically acknowledged and its utility in a military context is accepted.”
But the CCJ found that the specific charge against [David Anthony] Harewood lacked sufficient detail. Justice Jamadar ruled: “In the current case, the particulars of charge four lacked sufficient particularity. In a section 75 charge, the constitutional requirements of due process, the protection of the law, and fundamental fairness must be satisfied in the statement of the particulars of the offence, given the broad and general wording of the statutory offence.”
CCJ President Justice Adrian Saunders in a concurring opinion, emphasised the unique nature of military justice: “The Constitution of Barbados recognises, even if implicitly, the uniqueness of court-martials [sic] and the resulting specialised procedures and rules that exist for the prosecution of service members for transgressions committed in the course of service.”
Sunday, August 4, 2024
Landmark decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice
At issue in the July 26, 2024 decision of the Caribbean Court in Justice in Barbados Defence Force v. Harewood, [2024] CCJ 15 (AJ) BB, was whether s 75 of the Barbados Defence Act, which criminalizes conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline, is too vague. According to this Barbados Today account:
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