In The Queen v. Wehmeier 2014 CMAC 5, the Court Martial Appeal Court of
Canada (CMAC) enhanced the protection of civilians prosecuted before military
tribunals. Mr. Wehmeier was a former member of the Canadian Forces (CF). He was
hired by the CF for two months to work as a “peer educator” at a “third
location decompression center” operated by the CF in Germany. The Center’s
function was to assist CF members returning from Afghanistan.
While there
he attended a beer festival, allegedly became intoxicated and committed
offences against three members of the CF. He was immediately repatriated to
Canada and charged with the following ordinary criminal offences: sexual
assault contrary to s. 130 of the National Defence Act (Act) and s. 271 of the
Criminal Code of Canada (Cr.C.), uttering threats contrary to s. 130 of the Act
and par. 264.1(1)(a) of the Cr.C., and assault contrary to s. 130 of the Act
and s. 266 of the Cr.C.
The Chief Military
Judge who heard the case terminated the proceedings but without adjudicating the merits. He was of the view that they amounted to an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that there are
two forms of abuse of process which can be caught by s. 7 of the
constitutionalised Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). In
essence, s.7 gives everyone the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice. The two forms of abuse of process caught by
the provision are prosecutorial conduct affecting the fairness of a trial and
prosecutorial conduct that contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus
undermines the integrity of the judicial process: see R. v. O’Connor (1995) 4 S.C.R. 411, at par. 73; R. v. Nixon (2011) 2 S.C.R. 566, at par. 36.
The CMAC
also came to the conclusion that the proceedings should be terminated without
adjudicating the merits, but for different and more fundamental reasons.
It found that there was no prosecutorial abuse of discretion, but that this was
not the end of the matter because a breach of s. 7 of the Charter can occur
even if there is no abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the laying and
prosecution of a charge. At par. 49 of its reasons for judgment, the CMAC ruled that “the principle of prosecutorial discretion cannot shelter the fruit of the
exercise of that discretion from review on substantive grounds.” At pars. 54
and 55 it endorsed the following principles as regards the prosecution of
civilians before military tribunals:
[54] As noted earlier in these reasons, in Wehmeier 2 the Chief Military Judge found that Parliament’s objective in enacting paragraphs 60(1)(f) and 61(1)(b) of the NDA was that Canada retain primary jurisdiction over CF members and the persons who accompany them in order to protect their interests and have them tried according to our law and not according to foreign penal law. The provisions subjecting civilians to the CSD were intended to limit the jurisdiction of military courts such that jurisdiction would only be exercised if it was “absolutely essential or in the interests of the civilians themselves that they do so”: Wehmeier 2 at paragraph 24.
[55] In his memorandum of fact and law, the respondent reviews the particular needs of military discipline as it relates to accompanying civilians. He summarizes his conclusions at paragraph 51, a summary that we find correctly states Parliament’s intent:
The existence of Canadian military jurisdiction would allow the military to ensure the safety of our people abroad by affording it some enforceable control over civilians, help limit the reach of repressive foreign jurisdiction and extend the application of Canadian law and procedures to the civilians in foreign places. In all cases, Parliament’s intent was that military jurisdiction would only be exercised over civilians accompanying the forces when it was absolutely necessary or in the best interests of the civilians themselves to do so.
Since the
accused had been repatriated to Canada within five days after the occurrence of
the alleged offences, the prosecution in the military courts was not necessary
to protect the accused from foreign penal jurisdiction. The rationale for the
prosecution before a military tribunal did not explain why a prosecution before
a military as opposed to a civilian tribunal is necessary. “It is not sufficient,”
the CMAC said, “to simply assert the public interest in having charges laid in
the military justice system.” At par. 58, it found that the prosecution
in the military justice system was arbitrary because it lacked “any connection
with the objectives sought to be achieved by making accompanying civilians
subject to the CSD (Code of Service
Discipline).”
In
addition, the CMAC found that the proceedings in the military justice system
were not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice because of
the disproportionate effect on the individual relative to the state’s interest
in the proceedings. Such effect arises from the accused’s loss of certain
procedural rights when prosecuted before military tribunals: the right to be tried
by a jury, the right to have the prosecutor elect to proceed by summary conviction
as well as the right to benefit of the range of sentencing options available in
the Cr.C.
The
decision is a major breakthrough in the search for equality of rights under
the Charter, especially for civilians, including teenagers, who accompany
members of the CF. The time has come to ensure that the overall interests of
justice should prevail when what is at stake is either the prosecution of
ordinary criminal offences as opposed to purely military disciplinary
proceedings or, as in this case, the prosecution of civilians.
There is,
however, one disturbing conclusion in the CMAC decision. After having said at
par. 28 of its reasons that prosecutorial discretion was a term of art which
refers to “the use of those powers that constitute the core of the Attorney
General’s office and which are protected from the influence of improper
political and other vitiating factors by the principle of independence,” the
CMAC went on to say that it was satisfied on the record before it that the
existing differences between the position of the Attorney General and the
Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) “do not justify a conclusion that a different scope of
prosecutorial discretion applies to the DMP”: see par. 31.
It should
be recalled that under the Act, both the Prosecution and the Service Defence
fall under the jurisdiction of the Judge Advocate General who is the commander
of all military lawyers, the supervisor of the military justice system and the
legal adviser to the Minister of National Defence and the chain of command. It
should also be recalled that he is not a judge, that he is not elected, that he
is not accountable in the House of Commons and that his appointment is
political.
Finally it
should be kept in mind that the Attorney General is given broad discretionary
prosecutorial powers because he is the ultimate keeper of the public peace, a
responsibility conferred upon neither the Judge Advocate General nor the Minister of National Defence. In addition, by constitutional convention the
Attorney General is not bound by a decision of Cabinet in the exercise of his
powers and duties to administer justice in Canada. No such power is given to
the Minister of National Defence. It is an open secret that, contrary
to the conditions characterizing the Director of Public Prosecutions in Canada,
the Director of Military Prosecutions is far from being independent from the
chain of command and “protected from the influence of improper political and other
vitiating factors by the principle of independence.”
These
fundamental and principled differences and guarantees should be kept in mind in
future cases when reviewing the prosecutorial discretion of the Director of
Military Prosecutions.
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