Can an officer end military jurisdiction by resigning?

That question is likely to reach the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Details here.  Excerpt:

Malacañang on Thursday maintained that the court martial has “continuing” jurisdiction over Senator [Antonio] Trillanes IV, as the opposition lawmaker battles President Rodrigo Duterte’s order to the military to arrest him.

Duterte earlier this week issued Proclamation 572 voiding the amnesty given to Trillanes for taking part in uprisings in 2003 and 2007 against the administration of then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Trillanes questioned the proclamation, saying the military no longer has jurisdiction over him and that his amnesty application went through the proper process.

Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque said the voiding of Trillanes’ amnesty “means his status now will be his status before the granting of amnesty.”

“In view of this, the Armed Forces of the Philippines has stated that the court martial proceedings against Senator Trillanes will continue. As some of you may recall, he was charged both for offenses tried before civilian courts and service-related offenses that are punished under the Articles of War. The Court Martial has continuing jurisdiction over violations of the Articles of War. Violations of the Articles of War cannot be tried by civilian courts,” Roque said in a statement.

“As to the fact that Senator Trillanes resigned from military service, the act of resignation does not undo the violations of the Articles of War that he committed while he was in military service.”

Good questions from the bench

The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan asked some penetrating questions in the Military Courts Case. For example:

Justice Musarrat Hilali also expressed doubts, stating, “The officer conducting the trial does not deliver the verdict. Instead, the case is forwarded to a senior officer who decides without hearing the trial. How can someone uninvolved in the hearing deliver a fair decision?”

Justice Jamal Mandokhail remarked, “I have spent 34 years in this field and still do not consider myself fully accomplished. Does the military officer conducting trials have the necessary experience and expertise to deliver a death sentence?”

Defence counsel Khawaja Haris responded, stating, “The procedure for military trials will be fully explained in the second part of my arguments.”

Justice Mandokhail further observed, “The Army Act applies solely to the military. We must consider whether military officers are afforded basic rights and justice.”

Justice Musarrat Hilali raised a critical question, asking, “Please also clarify who writes the decisions in military courts. To my knowledge, the case is heard by one officer, but the punishment or reward is decided by the commanding officer. How can someone who has not heard the case decide the outcome?”

The Ministry of Defence's lawyer explained, “The decisions are written with assistance from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch.

A heavy news day

There is so much to report today that this post will simply offer links. Three items of particular interest to readers of Global Military Justice Reform:

• The UK Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan released a great deal of sanitized information on Wednesday. A video statement by the chairman, Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Sir Charles Haddon-Cave (at left), can be found here. Mark Landler's report in The New York Times is here. It is hard to imagine that the inquiry will not lead to criminal proceedings. The UK is far from alone in coming to grips with war crimes issues (see, e.g., the pending nomination of Pete Hegseth to be U.S. Secretary of Defense).
• A Korean Colonel of Marines was acquitted by a three-judge military court on charges of insubordination and defaming superiors. Choe Sang-Hun, also of The Times, reports here. It's complicated!
• The Times's Carol Rosenberg, doyenne-for-life of the Guantánamo press corps, has this useful explainer as the detention facility "heads into its 24th year with no end in sight," according to the headline. Among her questions: do we know how much Guantánamo costs?

Ensure parity of punishment for same offence: Delhi High Court

The Delhi High Court, in a recent judgment has held that troopers/members of different Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) cannot be punished with differential punishments for the same offence arising out of the same cause of action.

In the case, for an interconnected offence, a member of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) was merely severely reprimanded while members of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) were removed from service.

Citing caselaw on the subject, the High Court observed:

“From a reading of the aforesaid decision, what emerges is that when several individuals are involved in the same incident, parity regarding punishment is to be maintained, which should not be disproportionate while comparing the role of each individual, who are parties to the same transaction or incident.”

The judgment and a detailed exposition on the case has been reported by Verdictum and can be accessed here.

Administrative stay in 9/11 pretrial agreements case

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit yesterday granted an administrative stay of proceedings in the 9/11 military commission case to afford it time for briefing and argument on the government;'s petition for mandamus or prohibition. The court's order in In re United States, No. 25-1009, states in part:

FURTHER ORDERED that proceedings before the Military Commission concerning pretrial agreements entered into by Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, Walid bin ‘Attash, and Mustafa al Hawsawi be administratively stayed pending further order of the court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to allow the court time to receive full briefing on the mandamus petition, to hear oral argument on an expedited basis, and to render a decision on the petition and stay motion. The administrative stay should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that petition or motion. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2024). It is

FURTHER ORDERED that any responses to the mandamus petition, not to exceed 7,800 words, be filed by 5:00 p.m. on January 17, 2025. See Fed. R. App. P. 21(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 21(a). Respondents are encouraged to coordinate and, if possible, to file a joint response. Petitioner may file a reply, not to exceed 3,900 words, by 5:00 p.m. on January 22, 2025. The parties should also file, by 5:00 p.m. on January 17, 2025, a joint appendix containing any transcripts and documents cited by the parties and not already submitted as attachments to the petition. The parties are directed to file eight paper copies of the petition, any responses, any reply, and the joint appendix. The copies must bear the appropriately colored covers. See Fed. R. App. P. 32. The parties will be informed later of the date and time of oral argument.