Indian military justice needs reform

The Indian military justice system, on the other hand, suffers from lack of independence from the military hierarchy that exerts command influence on court martial. “The very concept of independence remains hazy even to members of court martial (who are not legally qualified).” But worse is that there is institutional resistance to change and organisational inertia.

Aditya S. Puar, in a blistering takedown, noted, “The current system of military justice does not meet the basic norms of independence or separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Most democracies have moved on, but we are clinging to a system long aborted by others. The US has proper military judges. In the UK, the Judge Advocate General is a judge functioning under the Ministry of Law and Justice and is civilian. Whereas in India, service in the JAG branch is a judicial service only theoretically but in practice the officers function as advisers without any judicial or executive role.”

The court martial, rather than being a standalone independent self-contained, confident institution, acts more as a wing or an extension of the convening authority, thus resulting in an over-reliance of the entire system on the official side rather than maintaining a balance. The biggest infirmity is that the convening authority decides on the charges against the accused, appoints the president and other members of the court martial board and later confirms the findings and sentence post-trial. Though this enables the chain of command to maintain control over disciplinary matters, it compromises on the basic tenet of justice — of independence of the court.

From this FirstPost book review by Chander Suta Dogra