Dissent and principled resignation

We may all be reasonably familiar with CAPT Brett E. Crozier, relieved of command because his communications about the COVID-19 effects on his ship became public and a hot mashed potato. Steven Katz leverages this incident to discuss situations where military persons should consider resigning on principle.

A few weeks ago, the acting Secretary of the Navy (A-SecNav) fired the commander of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Captain Brett Crozier, for circumventing his chain-of-command in sounding the alarm to senior civilian leadership on serious COVID-19 health and safety concerns on his ship. Ignoring the A-SecNav’s subsequent statements and eventual resignation, this relief incident has led to intense discussion on the propriety of the Captain’s actions.

Which brings me to Steven Katz, Frameworks for Dissent and Principled Resignation in the US Military: A Primer. Georgetown Univ. J. of Int. Affairs, 17 April 2020.

The Crozier affair should prompt senior military officers to contemplate situations in which ethics may demand a leader to express dissent, to resign, or even to disobey orders. This primer seeks to prompt that dialogue by outlining three ethical frameworks, which analyze such unconventional conduct.

The United States has a long-standing tradition of military obedience to civilian leadership decisions and control over military affairs. In fact, the civil–military norm is clear on obedience: barring evidence to the contrary, orders and policies are presumed to be legal and are executed upon receipt. If legality is in doubt, the officer should consult her legal staff and seek clarification from the order issuing authority. If the order is found to be illegal, the officer must refuse to follow it. The intentional targeting of civilians is a clear example of an illegal order that must be disobeyed.

Conversely, there is no American custom of senior military officers (e.g., Combatant Commanders, Service Chiefs, and other three and four-star officer advisors) disobeying or resigning in protest over morally objectionable, yet lawful, civilian-directed orders. Recent polling data suggests, however, that a new norm might be emerging in the officer corps. In 1999, only 26 percent of veterans agreed that a senior officer should resign in protest in the face on an immoral order; by 2014, support for this proposition had increased to 63 percent. While these figures suggest a new norm, further and more comprehensive study of senior military officers is needed to understand these shifting perspectives. The matter of what constitutes morally objectionable orders—and whether officers increasingly consider themselves duty-bound to resist them—could have profound implications for the future of civil-military relations.