Hon. Gilles Létourneau |
THE LAW
It is a
fact that often guilty pleas are entered after a plea bargaining as to charges
and/or sentences. In respect of sentence deals, the Supreme Court of Canada in
the recent case of R. v. Anthony-Cook 2016 SCC 43, [https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16201/index.do] rendered on October 21st
2016, underlined the importance of plea bargaining in the administration of
criminal or penal justice. At par.1 and 2, Moldaver J., on behalf of a
unanimous Court wrote:
[1] Resolution discussions
between Crown and defence counsel are not only commonplace in the criminal
justice system, they are essential. Properly conducted, they permit the
system to function smoothly and efficiently.
[2] Joint
submissions on sentence — that is, when Crown and defence counsel agree to
recommend a particular sentence to the judge, in exchange for the accused
entering a plea of guilty — are a subset of resolution discussions. They are
both an accepted and acceptable means of plea resolution. They occur
every day in courtrooms across this country and they are vital to the efficient
operation of the criminal justice system. As this Court said in R. v.
Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566, not only do joint submissions
“help to resolve the vast majority of criminal cases in Canada”, but “in doing
so, [they] contribute to a fair and efficient criminal justice system” (para.
47).
Under
Canadian law there were differing views among judges as to the test against
which to measure the acceptability of a joint submission on sentence. The first
test was fitness. A judge may depart from a joint submission if the proposed
sentence is not fit.
According
to a second test, which is in fact a variation of the first, a judge could not
depart from the submission unless he or she concluded that the proposed
sentence is demonstrably unfit.
Finally the
third test, the one adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada, is the public
interest test. It means that a judge can depart from the joint submission if
the proposed sentence “would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute, or is otherwise not in the public interest”: see par. 27 to 31 of
the decision. Then the Court went on to explain what the public interest
threshold means: see par.32 to 34 of the decision. From par. 35 to 43 the Court
goes on to explain why a stringent test is required.
Finally, in
par. 44 Justice Moldaver goes on to explain why a high threshold is not only
necessary, but also appropriate. He writes:
[44] Finally,
I note that a high threshold for departing from joint submissions is not only
necessary to obtain all the benefits of joint submissions, it is
appropriate. Crown and defence counsel are well placed to arrive at a
joint submission that reflects the interests of both the public and the accused
(Martin Committee Report, at p. 287). As a rule, they will be highly
knowledgeable about the circumstances of the offender and the offence and the
strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. The Crown is
charged with representing the community’s interest in seeing that justice is
done (R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at p. 616). Defence
counsel is required to act in the accused’s best interests, which includes
ensuring that the accused’s plea is voluntary and informed (see, for example,
Law Society of British Columbia, Code of Professional Conduct for British
Columbia (online), rule 5.1-8). And both counsel are bound
professionally and ethically not to mislead the court (ibid., rule
2.1-2(c)). In short, they are entirely capable of arriving at resolutions
that are fair and consistent with the public interest (Martin Committee Report,
at p. 287).
Justice
Moldaver’s comments are relevant in the context of the statement made by the
CDS and his intended policy to automatically kick out of the Forces those who
plead or are found guilty even though they are properly and duly sentenced
pursuant to a joint submission.
CDS
SNUBS THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
The
CDS actual and intended move is a clear snub to the professional work
accomplished by both the military Prosecution and the Defense Services.
Understandably but unfortunately the Prosecution and Defense Services’ lack of
open and public reaction to the CDS statement speaks highly to their subordination
to and lack of independence from the chain of command. After all they fall
under the direct supervision of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) who is the
head of the legal chain of command and who controls their career in terms of
assessment of their performances, promotions, postings, etc.
It
is also a snub to the judicial function of the military judges and to the
military judges themselves who cannot claim full and complete independence from
the chain of command. Although they are judges, they are first and foremost
soldiers with a rank much lower than the rank of many officers, including the
JAG who, notwithstanding his title Judge, is not a judge: he is a senior
counsel.
The
CDS statement not only undermines the state of the law as established by the
Supreme Court of Canada, but is also undeniably source of unfairness to an
accused who pleads guilty pursuant to an agreement on a joint submission. As
the Supreme Court pointed out, in pleading guilty the accused waives his
constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial in
return for a just and appropriate sentence assessed and accepted by prosecution
and defense professionals.
CDS
HAS LEGAL OBLIGATION TO ACT JUDICIALLY
The
administrative route of automatic dishonorable release [Pursuant to Queen’s
Regulations and Orders 15.01 - Service Terminated] from the Armed Forces is
likely to generate additional costs and court delays. First of all, it is most
likely that members of the military will now be reluctant to plead guilty
knowing that their conviction, in addition to the sentence, will result in
their dismissal from the Forces. Hence a likely increase in the number of
trials to seek to avoid dismissal.
While
an administrative release (or discharge) is an option certainly available to
the CDS in appropriate circumstances, it is a far cry from his saying that “as far as I’m concerned, I’m happy if they
leave our ranks permanently.” Such a practice will not satisfy the societal
principle of adhering to the rule of law and the principles of fairness and
equity. Release decisions fall within the ambit of administrative law and the
underlying legal principles. As the Final Authority in the grievance process,
the CDS is expected to reach each one of his decisions on the basis of natural
justice and the requirements of procedural fairness and not in accordance with
a predetermined autocratic outcome. His decisions in this regard are
potentially subject to judicial review by the courts to ensure that his powers
are exercised in the appropriate manner.
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